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SUMMARY
The purpose of this thesis is in the first place to institute
a comparison between certain elements in recent Hindu theo¬
logy, i.e. concepts of human freedom, transcendence, regenera¬
tion of the self and history and the kind of thinking which
Bultmann in the Christian tradition represents. Secondly, it
is to suggest the relevance for Christian apologetics of the
recovery of the Pauline understanding of the God-man relation¬
ship.
This study is therefore designed to examine the question whe¬
ther the over-playing of the man-ward aspect of religious
experience as exemplified by both Bultmann and recent Hindu
thinkers is the best approach to the philosophy of religion.
For example, can Christian anthropology really underemphasize
the divine operation in the individual's faith-decision? This
study attempts to indicate that in view of the universal impo¬
tence of the human will to decide for God Paul's consistent
insistence on the divine operation (which is nothing less than
the Spirit of God, the power of the historical community) is a
straight answer to the above question.
This thesis takes account of the fact that while for Bultmann
"genuineness of life" is a gift from God - the last word to
man is not what he can and should do but what is done to him,
- for the Hindu apologists of modern times, as of the past,
true selfhood is the outcome of self-discipline and self-puri¬
fication.
While it brings to light how close Bultmann and neo-orthodox
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Hindu thinkers come in their insistence on 'personal history'
over against 'world history', this study suggests that as in
Pauline anthropology 'personal history' and the cosmic pers¬
pective are not mutually exclusive.
Because both Bultmann and recent Hindu theologians adhere to
an anthropological approach to the philosophy of religion and
consequently lay unwarranted emphasis on the limitation of
language about God, i.e. of a rational explanation of the on-
tological status of the ultimate being, this thesis maintains
that as in Paul there is a genuinely theological concept of
reality underlying much of what he says about man and his ex¬
istence .
A final section deals with the question of the relevance of
the Pauline view of the God-man relationship to the forms of
thought of modern Hindu theology.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study of Bultmann's existentialist theo¬
logy with special reference to his understanding of faith
and meaning of history is two-fold: a) to show that certain
basic presuppositions of his theology have been foreshadowed
in recent Indian thought; b) to bring out the relevance of
Pauline anthropology to that of modern Hindu theologians.
The wealth of literature in the light of Bultmann's thought
testifies to the cumulative effect of his writings. Undoubted¬
ly many will accept his account of N.T. theology with relief,
if not with enthusiasm. That is to say his intellectual in¬
tegrity and the breadth of his N.T. scholarship brought into
clear focus the genuine substance of the Gospel. And this
has been widely accepted as providing a model for theologi¬
cal thought of today.
The evolution of his thought over the years may well be divi¬
ded into three major productive periods: (i) The development
of his early thought from liberal origins, from which he grad¬
ually moved away, his becoming the wholehearted champion of
the historical-critical research into the Gospels resulted in
a very thought-provoking and an ingenious study, The History
of the Synoptic Tradition in 1921; (ii) his encounter with
Barth, and the dialectical theology; (iii) and his eventual
1. Rudolf Bultmann, The History of the Synoptic Tradition,
tr. John Marsh (Oxford, 1963).
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movement towards what we now call the 'existentialist
theology'. It is probably correct to say that the latter,
namely 'existentialist theology' was prefigured in the for¬
mer two for he used Heidegger's existentialist philosophy
for the clarification of ideas already present to his mind.
Bultmann's dialectical strand of thought came out in his
>
'Autobiographical Reflections: "It seemed to me that in this
new theological movement, as distinguished from 'liberal'
theology out of which I had come, it was rightly recognized
that the Christian faith is not a phenomenon of the history
of religion, that it does not rest upon a "religious a priori"
(Troeltsch), and that therefore theology does not have to look
upon Christian faith as a phenomenon of religious or cultural
history. It seemed to me that, distinguished from such a
view the new theology correctly saw that Christian faith is
the answer to the Word of the transcendent God which encoun¬
ters man, and that theology has to deal with this Word and
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with the man who has been encountered by it".
Both Barth and Bultmann were concerned to repudiate any claims
on man's part to have God at his disposal. It is precisely
because of this influence of the dialectical theology in its
detailed application that natural theology "which has some-
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what extravagantly been called "the Sick Man of Europe", ,
appears to have been called in for severe criticism, if
not bypassed. It is now generally admitted that while the
1. The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann. ed. Charles W. Kegley,
(London, 1966), p. XXIV.
2. Kai Nielsen, "Can Eaith Validate God-Talk?", Theology
Today, Vol. XX (1963-64), p. 159.
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existentialist and dialectic idiom has continued to charac¬
terize Bultmann's thought Barth held that "there can be no
such thing as 'natural theology' or 'theological anthropology'.
The analogia entis must be rejected, since it reduces God to
a philosophical category, a human creation".
While our century marks the period in which in almost every
field of learning there has been constant stress on the human,
the historical, and the empirical, and the metaphysical and
cosmological aspects have disappeared, Bultmann felt no qualms
about appropriating Heidegger's analysis of human existence,
which, in his opinion, is the best account available of man
as a historical being who exists by decision. It is from this
point of view that we can best understand Bultmann's view of
the relationship of philosophy to theology. His own words
are: "Xn this case, theology does not simply take over
some philosophical system of dogma, but rather lets itself
be referred by philosophy to the phenomenon itself; it lets
itself be taught by the phenomenon, by man, whose structure
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philosophy seeks to disclose".
It is from this presupposition that Bultmann proceeds to
show that Paul's theology is but anthropology. He therefore
advocates the idea that propositions about the past and the
future, about the miracles of Jesus or the future resurrec¬
tion and judgment of mankind are irrelevant to the genuine
offence of the Gospel and this is presupposed in his oft-
1. J.R. Williams, "Heidegger and the Theologians", The
Heythrop Journal, Vol. XII (1971)» p. 263.
2. Rudolf Bultmann, Existence and Faith, tr. S.M» Ogden
(.London, 1961), p. 95.
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quoted statement: to exist authentically is to be free from
one's past and open to one's future. Hence his programme
of demythologizing calls for a reinterpretation of the myth¬
ical aspect of the N.T. teaching. He thus vehemently argues
that "If the truth of the New Testament proclamation is to
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be preserved, the only way is to demythologize it". He adds:
"The real purpose of myth is not to present an objective pic¬
ture of the world as it is, but to express man's understanding
of himself in the world in which he lives. Myth should be
interpreted not cosmologically, but anthropologically, or
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better still, existentially". That these assumptions are
closely linked to his dialectical theology can be seen from
the following statement: "The real purpose of myth is to
speak of a transcendent power which controls the world and
q.
man ...". On the other hand, he presents N.T.theology as
being Kerygmatic theology and in so doing he locates reve¬
lation exclusively in the pnreaching of the Church. It is from
this point of view that he reacts against the idea of God as
acting in history as traditionally understood. He affirms:
"When we speak of God as acting, we mean that we are confron¬
ted with God, addressed, asked, judged, or blessed by God".^
1. See Primitive Christianity In Its Contemporary Setting,
tr. R.H. Puller (London: New York, 1956), p.189, History
and Eschatology (Edinburgh, 1957), P«1^5 •
2. Rudolf Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth I, ed. H.W. Bartsch, tr.
R.H. Puller (New York, 1961), p. 10.
3. Ibid., p. 10.
4. Ibid., p. 11.
5. Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (London, 1960),
p. 68.
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Bultmarm explains all these basic presuppositions in Ou com¬
pressed and clear style and with cogency. These presented to
me the challenge of an unclimbed mountain especially when I
began to wonder whether his anthropology is by any means the
only clue we need to interpret Pauline perspectives. The
principal question which kept recurring in my mind as I read
his works is whether he did justice to the complexities of
Paul, his whole scheme of concepts. To put this question
more sharply, how does Bultmann interpret Paul's concept of
the Spirit? Is it, on his account, merely another name for
"the possibility of a new life which has to be appropriated
by a deliberate resolve"? If the answer to this question is
in the affirmative will it not be correct to say that by rea¬
son of his emphasis on one's decisions in his historical exi¬
stence Bultmann virtually eliminated Paul's presupposition
of the function of the Spirit in the individual's act of
faith? My close examination of the passages wherein Paul
speaks of the Spirit gives me the clue for protesting against
Bultmann's interpretation of Paul's teaching on the Spirit.
And this clue becomes clear in the course of our study. This
theme in Pauline anthropology is important for our tackling
the question whether the activity of the Spirit is a necessary
element in the individual's act of faith.
In Bultmann's language it is the individual who must awaken
himself to the possibilities of life because in every moment
slumbers the possibility of being the eschatalogical moment.
It is not God or the Spirit who awakens man to the possibili-
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ties of life. If this is what he continually insists on
will it not be fair to say that he plays down the role of
divine operation in the individual's decision of faith? It
is true that Bultmann understands faith "as grounded in the
paradox of the eternal coming to be in time, a paradox which
is an offence to the reason, and can only be believed in by
'the virtue of the absurd'" and thus must be believed for no
external reasons. But it may be pointed out at the outset
that in so far as Bultmann underemphasizes the Pauline pers¬
pective on the Spirit's function in the individual's faith-
decision the present study undertakes to investigate the
question whether certain basic presuppositions of his anthro¬
pology have not been anticipated in the anthropology of modern
Hindu theologians.
Most books on Hinduism mainly concentrate on the Vedanta and
show an overwhelming interest in the quintessence of the rest
2
of the "six systems" of Indian philosophy. Pew books have
been written dealing with the revolutionary religious thought
of renascent Hinduism. Still fewer books have actually made
an attempt to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of Hindu
theology in its renascent form. But this lack is now made up
by the fine studies of Prof. V.S. Naravane, Prof. P.T. Raju,
and Prof. B.G. Gokhale on the modern basic philosophical trends
which helped to undergird the emerging national life and upon
1. William Nicholls, Systematic and Philosophical 'Theology.
(Harmondsworth, 1969), p. 170.
2. Nyaya, Vaise?ika, Sankhya, Yoga, Mimamsa, and Vedanta.
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which cultural progress ultimately rests. V.S. Naravane's
book, Modern Indian Thought, can be regarded as an exhaustive
treatment of the subject, particularly with regard to the
religious thought of the great thinkers of modern India. These
writers have brought into clear focus the thought-forms of
Hinduism of the period between the beginning of the nineteenth
century and the middle of the twentieth century.
The modern reformers selected for this comparative study have
discovered not only a new sense of the meaning of history but
also the importance and relevance of social reform. For that
very reason, their religious thought concerns itself with an
explication of the traditional idea of self-realization -
the individualistic idea of salvation from a new dimension of
life. That is, "the quest for salvation as a lonely pilgri-
<
mage to God neglects the clamouring social demands of life
A
without which the individual cannot gain fulfilment", as
Dr. S.J. Samartha puts it. In the course of our study of
recent Indian thought, we allow the votaries of this religion
to speak for themselves and thereby see how close some of the
dominant concepts in their religious thought come to Bultmann's
system.
But to introduce the subject of this comparative study it
may be said that just as Bultmann maintains that man is rela¬
ted to himself; he is responsible for himself so also recent
Hindu theologians advocate the idea that man is totally and
1. Dr. S.J. Samartha, "The Quest for Salvation and The Dia¬
logue between .Religions", International Review of Missions,
Vol. LVII (1968), p. 428.
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wholly responsible for himself. Just as Bultmann understands
Transcendence in terms of the contingent stuff of human living
more specifically, as an 'encounter' in one's concrete exist¬
ence, so also Tagore defines Reality, the Brahman of the Ve-
danta as "humanized". Tagore declares: "Reality is human,
it is what we are conscious of, it is that by which we are
affected, that which we express". Bultmann's concept of
self-understanding may be said to be strikingly similar to
modern Hindu theologians' interpretation of the traditional
idea of self-realization "the contraction of self in desire
2
into the expansion of soul in love" in Tagore's language.
Just as Bultmann emphasizes the idea that to know Christ is
to know his benefits, and not to look into his nature so also
Yivekananda understands religion in terms of experience when
he affirms: "It /religion/ is not to know, in the ordinary
sense of the word, not intellectual understanding, not a mere
rationalistic comprehension of the real things, nor mere
groping in the dark, but intense realization /the word reali¬
zation is peculiarly Hindu terminology/, much more real than
7
this world is to our senses". Moreover, the idea of "per¬
sonal history" appears prominently in the writings of recent
Hindu theologians. This may suggest that Bultmann's histori-
ological presuppositions may be similar to those of the modern
Hindu writers. Bultmann affirms: "Because of this insight
1. As cited by V.S. Naravane, Modern Indian Thought (Bombay:
London, 1964-), p. 145.
2. Tagore, Personality (London, 1921), p. 98.
5. As quoted in Swami Vivekananda Centenary Memorial Volume,
ed. R.C. Majumdar (Calcutta, 1963), p. 295.
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/the insight into the historical nature of man7 we shall
always interpret every historical source as a genuine his¬
torical phenomenon, that is, in the light of the presupposi¬
tion that in it a possibility of human existence is grasped
and expressed". S. Radhakrishnan also holds the view that
"man not only is but he knows that he is. His being is open
to himself" and "he can fling a flaming torch into the dark-
p
ness of the future". In short, Bultmann's basic presupposi¬
tions, namely his concepts of Transcendence, human freedom,
self-understanding and history may be said to be the governing
principles of this comparative study between his scheme of
thinking and recent Indian thinking.
With this in mind, I propose to develop the theme of this
study under the following four heads:
1. One of the important questions to be investigated in this
study is whether Bultmann's hypothesis that Paul's anthropo¬
logy is the key to the whole of Paul's thought is the whole
story. We can do this only by undertaking a re-thinking of
Paul's perspectives. Hence the first section of the first
chapter is devoted to re-articulating the Pauline perspec¬
tives on anthropology and Ghristology. This section includes
a critical analysis of the biblical basis to show how vital
the function of the Spirit is in Pauline anthropology. The
second section of this chapter concerns Bultmann's understand-
1. Rudolf Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, tr. L»P. Smith
(London, 1969), p. 150.
2. S. Radhakrishnan, Religion in a Changing World (London,
1967), pp. 67 and 153-
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ing of anthropology with special reference to his interpreta¬
tion of faith and history.
II. In the second division ofthis study we focus our attention
on a crucial movement of thought towards what we can now call
Eastern Existentialism in modern Indian thought. Under this
head we make an inquiry into existential elements in recent
Indian thinking as exemplified by Rabindranath Tagore, Prof.
S. Radhakrishnan, Mahatma Gandhi, Sri Aurobindo Ghosh and
Swami Vivekananda.
III. The third part of this thesis consists of a comparison
of the anthropology of recent Indian thinking with that of
Bultmann and also a critical evaluation of the same.
IV. The final section of this study deals with the question
of apologetics: in this we seek to show the relevance of the
Pauline idea of the God-man relationship to the anthropology
of modern Hindu thought as a necessary supplement to the
current Indian Christian Theology.
CHAPTER I
(a) Paul's perspectives on anthropology and Christology.
(b) JBultmann's understanding of anthropology with reference
to his interpretation of faith and history.
Although there are notable exceptions, namely Kasemann's
approach, of late most of our standard guides to the study
of Paul have been increasingly emphasizing his anthropology
and making that the centre of his theology. There is no
denying that one of the finest modern studies of the Chris¬
tian view of man is found in Bultmann's N.f. theology, es¬
pecially in his study of Paul. But the important question
is whether the Bultmannian hypothesis of Paul's anthropology
as nothing less than the key to the whole of Paul's theology
is the whole story. In an attempt to answer this question
the present study undertakes a re-thinking of Paul's pers¬
pectives. Out of the many-layered frame of reference of
Paul's theology three of his dominant concepts, namely (i)
Anthropology, (ii) Christology and (iii) the Spirit's role
will be discussed at length in the first section of this
chapter. But before we enter upon the detailed study of
these major themes of his theology we must give attention to
some of the essential elements of his thought which can be
summarily set forth as follows: Perhaps Paul held that the
revelation of his Son, specially given to him, Gal. 1:12,16
(implying that Paul had recognized him as divine and as
the exalted Son of God as compared with his experience of
12
meeting with the risen Jesus on the Damascus road as per the
accounts in Acts 9:1 ff. 22:3f- 26:10 f£) had to be taken as
self-evidencing proof for his explanation of his apostleship
as being on the same par with those of the apostolic band.
On the same score, he would claim to have had a share in
the early resurrection appearances, cf. I Cor. 15*3 ff-
A further reflection may strengthen this point. That is,
Paul had perhaps understood the event of his call as a gen¬
uine theophany as he uses similar language to that of
■>
the LXX for theophanies. Compare I Cor. 15:8: OO(p0-rj
And in Gal. he speaks of revelation within himself 1:16;o.ttd-
e _>. —• ✓ j
V o TW vJcs'VoCo The apocalyptic teaching
of Judaism has exerted its influence in Paul's thought, for
instance, in his repeated reference to "this age" and his use
of the terms, "things present" and "things to come", Rom. 8:38,
I Cor. 3:22. The two phrases namely, "this age" and "this
world" are interchangeably used, I Cor. 3:18, 19- Also syno¬
nymous is the expression "the present time" used in the N.T.
only by Paul, Rom. 3:26; 8:18, 11:5; II Cor. 8:14. The
present "age" or "world" or "time" is characterized by its
transitoriness, I Cor. 7:31? by tribulation and suffering,
Rom. 8:18 f, and by its evil nature, Gal. 1:4. Although the
present age is one of tribulation, Rom. 5:3* II Cor. 4:17;
and also Rom. 8:18 f., "the Christian still rejoices in his
hope of sharing in the glory of God", Rom. 5:2, and in spite
of his present afflictions, lives with a hope of an eternal
weight of glory, II Cor. 4:17, which will one day be revealed,
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Rom. 8:18. And also, it hasbeen remarked that Paul was the
first theologian of hope. For Paul, the goal of redemption
will include not only the individual but also the entire
created order. Hence the idea of redeemed and transformed
creation is an important concept in Paul's theology. Foerster
observes: "The uniting of divided humanity into one new man,
Eph. 2:15> is alsoa. The goal is a new creation in
antithesis to the totality of this creation The full
revelation of the new creation, will not come until
Christ reveals Himself, Col. 3*4-) then Christ will
reveal Himself asTj^V^-uywot ^uicTTcn <shjm in the totality of the
world, and the glorious liberty of the children of God, Rom.
8:21, will be displayed on the mortal bodies of those who
belong to Christ, and on all s " * This correlates clo¬
sely with Dr. J.A.T. Robinson's emphasis: "The process as a
whole has a movement and has a meaning: it "works up" to a
"goal".2
Further, it was axiomatic for Paul that God lays claim to the
world as his creation; through Christ's redemptive work all
fallen creatures may be saved, Rom. 5:12 ff., for the same is
the Lord of all and bestows his riches upon all who call upon
him, Rom. 10:12. The Gospel with its news of the universal
saving action in Christ is directed to the whole world, Rom.
3:27 f«» 29. God is the God not only of the Jews but also of
1. Th. D.H.T. Ill, 1034.
2. J.A.T. Robinson, In the End, God A Study of the
Christian doctrine of the Last Things (London, 1950J, p. 69.
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the Gentiles. Also, the background of Paul's concept of evil
forces can be traced to the influence of the apocalyptists
who held that the present age had fallen victim to "evil cos¬
mic forces bent on the destruction of mankind and of the
world itself". Accordingly, Paul held that the rulers of
this age are doomed to pass, I Cor. 2:6. While the powers are
said to be under the control of God, they will ultimately be
destroyed, cf. Rom. 8:38, and I Cor. 15:24-28. The hostility
of these alien powers is expressed not only in their attempt
to enslave man to their purpose, Gal. 4:3, but also in their
blinding him to the Gospel of Christ who is the likeness of
God, II Cor. 4:4. "The evil powers of this age "have taken
control not only of man's nature but also of the world in
p
which man lives". And man's own alienation from and hostili¬
ty to God is viewed as caused by his bondage to the powers of
sin and death. This is brought more clearly into view by
D.S. Russell when he observes: "This dualistic view of the
world which is characteristic of apocalyptic eschatology,
finds its expression in a doctrine of the two ages .... Over
against 'this age' (Hebrew ha-olam haz-zeh; Greek ho aion
houtos), with its sin and corruption, is set 'the age to come'
(Hebrew'ha olamhab-ba'; Greek ho aion mellon) in which evil
will be routed and wrongs will be sen rightPaul was also
of the same opinion and he spoke of these powers as if they
1. D.S. Russell, The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic:
200 B.C. to A.D. 100 (London, 1964). p. 267.
2. Ibid., p. 257.
3. Ibid., p. 266.
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were personal powers exercising their dominion over man.
(Incidentally, Bultmann explains Paul's statements about
man's servitude to the power of sin and death from the stand¬
point of his (Paul's) use of the Gnostic understanding of those
evil forces. As Bultmann puts it: "Paul is able to appropri¬
ate the cosmological mythology of Gnosticism because it enables
him to express the fact that the perishable "creation" becomes
a destructive power whenever man decides in favour of it in-
stead of for God ". He adds: "This eschatological-
historical meaning of "kosmos" and along with it the under¬
standing of man's situation as an enslavement to powers for
whose dominion he nevertheless is himself responsible, comes
out, finally, in the interpretation of Paul's mythological
p
statements about these powers". What Bultmann contends is
that for Paul, man himself has given to it (world) these
possibilities of evil).
Paul characteristically brings to clear focus the apparently
unresolved opposition between the powers and the transcenden¬
tal power of God. And yet, he emphatically stresses the in¬
controvertible truth that the victory of God's transcendental
power was unambiguously manifest in and through the death and
resurrection of his Son, II Cor. 13:4-, and as a result the
Christian is liberated from the power of the elemental spirits
of this age, Gal. 1:3-4-. Besides, in Paul's theology, "as a
creature whose destiny, however, transcends the world, man is
1. Rudolf Bultmann, Th. N.T. I, tr. Kendrick Grobel (London,
1965), p. 230.
2. Ibid., p. 257.
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seen as the focal centre of the struggle between the forces
A
of evil and the power of God".
It is in this context that we have to probe more deeply into
the structural presuppositions implied in Paul's anthropology.
There is, indeed, much to be said for the view, as held by
Paul, that man is in bondage to the death-dealing powers of
this age. Paul declares: "man stands under sin's power",
£j(f) oL^oLp T{o(v, Rom. 3:9; Cf. Gal. 3:22; he is under sin
(UhoTvjv otyAdp iC(?(v ) , Rom. 7:14- sin is said to be that which
has come into the world as "an infiltrator" , G ^~^f>X£crQo(i?
Rom. 5:12, and finally killed him, Rom. 7:11? 8:10. For Paul,
among sinners there is no distinction, Rom. 3:9 if* and as
exact opposite of this, among the believers there is no dis¬
tinction either. In Paul's understanding sin leads to death
and is given a radical meaning. In his view it is far more
serious than the perversion of life, and ultimately leads to
its (life's) negation. The tragic state of sinful mankind
(whether the Jew or the Gentile), more specifically, "the
radical fallenness of man" was poignantly portrayed by Paul
in Rom. 1:18-3:20. (Incidentally, one of Bultmann's special
contributions to the history of N.'T. theology is that he,
among other things, brings to the fore the fallen state of
man. For him, every moment of man's will, even his move to
get out of his predicament is still a movement of fallen man
- he is incapable of extricating himself from his plight -
only an act of God can effect this transition).
1. Stuhlmacher,"Gerechtigkeit Gottes bei Paulus,"in Forschun-
gen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testa¬
ments, 87 (1965) esp. pp. 228-29, cited by V,P..Furnish,
Theology and Ethics in Paul (New York, 1968), p. 135.
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Further, it will be noted that Paul's understanding of sin
hinges upon his two basic concepts, namely "the flesh" and
"the law". For Paul, sin found its lodgement in "the flesh"
which, as V J5. Furnish puts it "is its quisling power within man's
own existence when man makes "the flesh" rather than God the
object of his confidence and hope". It is important to note,
however, "that the Gnostic answer that the divine core of man
has been tragically overpowered by the sinister forces which
p
seduce the senses is not Paul's answer", as Schweizer observes.
For Schweizer, "the typical Pauline conjunction of flesh and
sin is the same as that already found in the O.T.". Besides,
Paul viewed "boasting" as something far more serious than the
attitude of conceit in relationships with others. In his view,
it is an essentially sinful mode of being of the self-righteous
Jews who boast in the law, Rom. 2:23. In short, for Paul, sin
is "boasting" (f^uX^CTt). Paul characteri¬
stically brings into focus that the "boasting" represents man
turning away from God, "to the creation and to one's own
LL
strength". Sin (boasting) means "a misconstruing of the human
5
situation", a refusal to recognize that life is a gift from
God, I Cor. 4:7.
Further, it is to be observed that in his understanding of the
relation of the law to sin Paul never entertained the idea that
the law itself is to be identified with sin, Rom. 7=7- Never-
1. V.P. Furnish, op. cit., p. 137*
2. Th. D. N.T. VII, 133-
3. Ibid., p. 132.
4. Rudolf Bultmann, Th. N,T. I, p. 241.
5. Ibid., p. 242.
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theless, he held that the law played an important part in
sin's "reigning", which consequently led to death. Paul
declares: "Death spread to all men because all men sinned",
Rom. 5-i2. Paul recognized that the law held out a prospect
of leading men to life; the commandment was ordained unto
life, Rom. 7:10- But the law proved itself in Israel's
experience powerless to do this thing, to make alive, Gal. 3:
21. To Paul the law appeared "a form of administration which
issued in death", II Gor. 3:7- For Paul, the law had mocked
men, as the Cambridge N.T. scholar G.A. A. Scott comments.
The law "as a method of attaining the righteousness which
God required" had failed. Hence Paul was unalterably con¬
vinced of its ineffectiveness and powerlessness to help
Israel to establish any standing of their own in the sight of
God.
But how does Paul explain the connection between the law and
sin? In Rom. 5:20 Paul says: the law came in to increase the
trespass. "I should not have known sin" he declares "except
through the law, Rom. 7:7&« I should not have known covet-
ousness had the law not said: "thou shalt not covet", 7b. By
this statement Paul makes it clear that sin is prompted by
the commandment. And Paul goes one step further to say that
sin works by means of the law: "but sin finding opportunity
in the commandment wrought in me all kinds of covetousness",
8a, hence the power of sin is the lav/, I Gor. 15:56; and
1. G.A. Anderson Scott, Christianity According to St Paul
(Cambridge, 1927), p. ^3-
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also instead of bringing life the law led to death, Rom. 7:10,
for sin, finding opportunity in the commandment deceived me
and by it killed me, Rom. 7:11« To put it summarily, in
Paul's opinion, the law deals out nothing but death. V.P.
Furnish aptly phrases it: "If the flesh is sin's "host", then
te law is sin's agent".
Paul's understanding of man's salvation stems from his view
of Christ's death: Christ had died unto sin once for all,
~ C J j ^
Rom. 6:10 ("T-vj c4T£&c(V<£ v ). Christ died
at the right time, Rom. 5:6. Christ had provided for man
the absolute freedom which is 'security' in God from the
obligation of shifting slaveries. That is, first of all,
any deliverance from these slaveries that is to be achieved
must be achieved by God since man is powerless to help him¬
self as he is enslaved to sin and cannot break free from these
chains that bind him. The upshot of all this is as Paul in¬
sists, that man's true freedom lies in his "belonging to God
or "the Lord" - namely, freedom from "flesh" and "sin" (Rom.
6:15 ff-; 7:5 f"). This presupposes the fact that man, apart
from Christ, outside faith, remains in bondage to the powers
of the present evil (sin and death). Thus Paul held fast to
the objective reality of the Christ-event, even apart from
faith. (Incidentally, it is to be noted that Bultmann also
shares this idea, he recognizes exclusively the "pro me",
only he insists that "the salvation - occurrence is nqt_jwhere
1. Theology and Ethics in Paul, p. 138.
2. Rudolf Bultmann, Th. N.T. I, p. 244.
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present except in the proclaiming, accosting, demanding, and
i
promising word of preaching". for him, the objective fact-
ualness of the redemptive event becomes real only when the
past act is made present. What he contends in that..., "it /pro-
clamatio_n7 directs man to bis own humanity, for this humanity
grace is valid. And the grace of forgiveness is simply the
fact that the history in which we exist is conditioned by the
2
'crisis' in Jesus Christ".
Further, Paul also holds that once the "transition" in the
individual's life takes place, his life is a "standing in
grace", Rom. 5:2. However, for Paul, grace, to be sure, is
understood to have a "power" of its own, quite apart from
man's acceptance or rejection of it, because God's grace
"reigns" with power. Hence the idea of salvation made avail¬
able in the Christ-event belongs unquestionably to the apos¬
tle's eschatological perspective. That is, as Foerster points
out " (T^,J'5mtand(ri^T"-''yy<)t<^, in contrast to justification, re¬
conciliation and redemption, refer to future, eschatological
salvation". This means that the problem of eschatology and
its realization, in Paul's theology, are not unrelated to the
equally great issue of Gospel and Law.
(i) Paul's anthropology: The above brief survey of some essen¬
tial elements of Paul's thought shows that Paul has developed
1. Rudolf Bultmann, Th. N,T, I, p. 302.
2. Rudolf Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, p. 140.
3. Th. D. H.T. VII, 993.
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a particular understanding of man and of his place
in the universe. That is, in our analysis of his thought we
have had occasion to notice that he characteristically explains
the nature of man in terms of his fallen state - his bondage
to the powers of sin and death as a result of his desire to
trust in "the flesh", that is, trusting in himself while dis¬
honouring his creator. In so far as he explains the God-man
relationship in terms of the Creator - the creature, his
thinking is viewed as in keeping with the O.T. idea of God as
the Creator of the world. It would then be logical for us to
assume that by reasoncf his Hebrew background the apostle's
anthropology could probably be seen within the rather tradi¬
tional framework of Judaism. That is, his perspective on an¬
thropology strikes a note of Judaistic understanding of God
whose righteousness is manifest pre-eminently in Christ's
death and resurrection. His conception of justification,
as V.P. Furnish says, "is related first of all to his /Paul'.§7
affirmation of the righteousness and power of the covenant
God who creates, upholds, and redeems". The other worldli-
ness of what God has revealed is expressed by the question in
I Cor. 2:9: "what no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the
heart of man conceived", let alone the awesomeness of the power
of God over the universe, Rom. 1:20. And it is as our Father
that he decreed the form of our redemption. The mission of
the Son to "redeem" is accomplished. While we were sinners
1. V.P. Furnish, op. cit., p. 14-6.
we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, Rom. 5:10.
Note Paul's own statement: For historical and theological
reasons, he declares, Christ has made me his own, Phil. 5:12;
and elsewhere he says, 'even as I have been fully understood',
I Cor. 13:12b. Further, in his explanation of Abraham's righ¬
teousness of faith Paul undertakes an extended refutation of
the theory of works of the law and what Paul S. Minear points
out is that there "the apostle's argument rested upon the com¬
parability of God's promises and God's action in these two
events /death and resurrectior/ and upon the resulting corres-
pondence in the character of faith". The upshot of all this
shows that there is, indeed, a concept of man in Paul. However
his concept of man can be interpreted in a variety of ways.
One like Bultmann can say that Paul's concept of man fairly
and squarely reflects the whole of his theology. This view
has not gained general acceptance. The critical consensus,
on the other hand, suggests that such an hypothesis is certain
ly not the whole truth as Paul's concept of man is unquestion¬
ably inseparable from his doctrine of God, and of his dealings
with the world. Even in the passage Rom. 6:1-11 which will
doubtless be regarded as the key stone of the arch of Paul's
understanding of man under grace his Christological statements
are found not wanting (note Paul's reference to Christ as hav¬
ing been raised from the dead by the glory of the Father,
being alive to God, and ever living). It is precisely in
this sense that Prof. E. Schweizer makes the point with great
1. Paul S. Minear, The Obedience of Faith (London, 1971).
P. 55.
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insistence that "Christ's death was the eschatological ful¬
filment of God's history with mankind If it is true that
this formula /nwith Christj7 goes back to the apocalyptic hope
of an eschatological life with Christ, it guards us from dis¬
solving Paul's statements into mere anthropological descrip¬
tions".^
And also, Paul declares: " , you were sanctified, you were
justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the
Spirit of our God", I Cor. 6:11. This verse perhaps explains
Paul's telling argument to show that the spirit is an agent
of justification through baptism and we can also use this verse
as typical of many to establish the familiar fact that Paul
thinks of man in relation to the Spirit. Moreover, Paul's con¬
cept of man is indubitably inseparable from his Christology.
That Paul rather integrates Christology with anthropology than
subordinates the former to the latter is brought more clearly
into view by A.R.C. Leaney when he comments: "in I Cor. 15
Paul shows clearly how firmly the resurrection is part of his
doctrine of man: for consider these well-known words and judge
if they are not both part of his eschatological Christology
and no less-of his doctrine of man As in Adam all men
die so in Christ all will be brought to life, (v. 21 f). Man
is subject to death but in a state bestowed on him by God he
is destined for life. This is eschatology and Christology,
2
even ecclesiology. It is certainly also anthropology".
1. E. Schweizer, "Dying and Rising with Christ", N.T.S.,
Vol. XIV (1967-68), p. 10.
2. A.R.C. Leaney, "The Doctrine of Man in I Corinthians",
Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 15 (1962), pp. 396-97.
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This now inevitably brings us to the discussion of the second
of Paul's dominant concepts, (ii) Ghristology: The Kerygmatic
message focuses on the Lordship of Jesus and the redemptive
significance of death and resurrection or on humiliation and
exaltation as much in Paul's preaching as in the preaching of
the apostles. Paul's own kerygma however, is concerned not
so much with the incarnation and exaltation as with the cross
and resurrection. Paul no less than the first preachers of
the kerygma, saw the significance of the death and resurrection
of Jesus as the accomplishment of God's ultimate victory over
the power of sin and death. Compare Rom. 6:4; I Cor. 15:53-57
also Gal. 1:5-4 with Acts 2:24, 33, 36; 10:34-44. (Inciden¬
tally, it is to be observed that the problem of the Christology
of the Palestinian Church and that of the Gentile Church is
still unsolved as there are many problems when we look below
the surface of the solutions offered by Dr. J.A.T. Robinson
and Prof. R.H. Fuller).^
Further, for Paul, God's act of redemption is connected with
raising of Christ from the dead, cf. Rom. 10:9. This implies
that the redemptive event, as Paul viewed it, has happened
before our decision. That is, what Paul clearly asserts is
that God's act in Christ was redemptive because God decreed
and acted for the salvation of mankind. The beginning and
end of the divine will have been revealed in this event, cf.
2:7- (Incidentally, we have made it clear already that Prof.
1. See R.H. Fuller, The Foundations of New Testament Christ¬
ology (London, 1965), p. 184f.
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Bultmann also fully shares this concern of Paul, while he
incessantly stresses that the past lives in the present
through proclamation. This is why Paul can speak of the
Gospel as itself the power of God unto salvation). It will
also be remembered that the Easter faith, as Paul understood
it, did not arise in vacuity, but as the response to what it
understood to be certain prior actions of God himself - Paul
declares: "If Christ has not been raised, then our preaching
is in vain, and your faith is in vain I Cor. 15:17 - Christ
is the first fruits of them that slept, V.20, - Christ was
crucified in weakness but lives by the power of God" II Cor.
13:4-. And this makes the kerygma and faith what they are.
To put it differently, the Church did not create belief in
the resurrection of Christ; the resurrection of Christ, his¬
torically speaking, created the Church by calling faith into
being. Hence, the objective factualness of the event was the
subject of Paul's most profound reflection. To put it more
plainly, it has become the springboard as it were, of Paul's
Christology. It was from this axiom that Paul developed the
other various views; to name a few, Christ became the servant
for the circumcised, Rom. 15:14-, God making him to be sin for
us so that we might become the righteousness of God, II Cor.
5:21, Christ became a curse for us in order to redeem us
from the curse of the law, Gal. 3:14-, Christ who offered him¬
self Gal. 1:3-4-, Christ Jesus who died, who is at the
right hand of God, Rom. 8:34-.
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(iii) The Spirits' role:
The other theme that demands our attention at this point is
that of Paul's understanding of the functional relation of
the Spirit to the risen Christ. At the very outset, it will
be observed that many found the concept of the Spirit in Paul's
theology far from easy, hence many divergent views on the sub¬
ject have been expressed. R. Jewett's recent admirable book
entitled Paul's Anthropological Terms: A study of their use
in conflicting settings, (Leiden, 1971) was devoted to a full-
dress debate on the question of the role of the Spirit, espec¬
ially in the discussion of the end-time passages in Paul's
letters. Bultmann conducted his exposition of the Pauline
passages relating to the Spirit with learning and ingenuity
and came to the conclusion that Paul's theology of the Spirit
became imbued by the gnostic substance idea of the spirit.
Quite obviously, the novelty of his approach to the problem
of the function of the Spirit in the believer's act of faith
has raised some fresh issues. In point of fact, Burton a
half century ago defined the Greek's view of the spirit as of
substance as follows : " •••• a term of substance,
not of functions, and a name not of God or the human soul, but
of the substance of which both are composed " We will
however, have an occasion to discuss Bultmann's detailed treat¬
ment of Paul's understanding of the Spirit in the second half
of this chapter when we explain his anthropology. But in the
1. E. de W. Burton, A Critical And Exegetical Commentary on
the Epistle To The Galations (New York, 1921), p. 487.
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first place let us turn to make a careful consideration of
Paul's perspective on pneumatology.
For Paul, the Spirit is no less Christ's Spirit (Phil. 1:19;
Rom. 8:9; Gal. 4:6) than God's Spirit (1 Thes. 4:8; Phil. 3:
3; II Cor. 3:i6). Paul explains that the manner in which
Corinthian Christians obtained faith was due to the demonstra¬
tion of the power of God and of the Spirit and that their
faith rests in the power of God, I Cor. 2:4b-5. The function
of the Spirit is thought to have peculiar power because it
comes from God, cf. I Cor. 2:12b, (To€-K). Let us
now make a careful examination of the passage in I Cor. 2:7-
12 in which Paul describes theTlT£-cT/-^ as the miraculous
power which mediates supernatural knowledge, "we impart a
secret and hidden wisdom of GodG~o(j£ co<v 4-v /U o <. co v
oiTKo'KCr Kyi \j^yu*£rWjv» 7 in distinction from human wisdom,o<v(^u;-
, 13^ It will be noted that I am as anxious
-rrw-YjS (T°(f l^s
as any one to allow that "Paul is here adopting the same
understanding as that widespread in the community as influen¬
ced by the O.T. and also by Hellenism, which means that for
Paul, the miraculous powerdetermines both the con¬
tent and form of preaching and it is thus perceptible only
to the spiritual. But what is the content of this spiritual
instruction? Paul's answer is formally gnostic: TBi T&v
v , I Cor. 2:10. In content, however, it is not all gnos-
c
tic: God's saving work at the cross. The content is ~TX una
y^/o icrfye vToC T/UIV . According to I Cor. 1:24 the
(fori \cL (Qe-trv which is revealed by the \\ \[£-t^Ae^in I Cor. 2:7-10
is simplyJ^c<rrnF 6(TT<yD£u^cv'<3S» I Cor. 1:23; 2:2; this is
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confirmed in I Cor. 2:8. The cross is seen to be the already
accomplished crisis which divides the new creation from the
old. With the Hellenists, then, Paul regards the Spirit as
the power which takes man out of this aeon and sets him in
that aeon, cf. I Cor. 2:6. But he also carries out a decisive
correction. The union of the believer with theK-O^ is not
granted in pneumatic materiality. It is granted with the
knowledge that theTTv€-viA<< gives of the One who was crucified for
him". And Schweizer quotes with approval Prof. Dodd's com¬
ment: "The participation in the Spirit is participation in
Christ and not merely in a gift dispensed by Him, though nei¬
ther, Rom. 1:4, nor II Cor. 3:i7 adequately supports, since
p
both could be taken in a purely naturalistic sense".
Since this judgment appears justified it seems probable that
Paul's main concern was to emphasize not so much the super¬
natural power of the spirit as found in Hellenism as the Spirit's
functional relation to Christ. This view Prof. E. Schweizer
vigorously advocates and he points out that "the substantial
is regarded as only a form of thought for the power which
alone is vital to the Israelite". And this concept is further
amplified in the statement of W.D. Davies:"Surely it is not
the materiality of the ruach that is to the fore in the Old
Testament, but its quality as power, vitality, activity or
1. Th. D. N.T. VI, 425.
2. Ibid., p. 425, fn. 4.
3. Ibid., p. 425.
29
life; its essence is power not substance. Much more to our pirpose
is the fact that in Rabbinic Judaism the Spirit is often con-
-i
ceived in material terms". This, then, makes it clear that
the idea of the Spirit as power is an inbuilt notion of the
Hebrew mind and it is not an imported a priori concept of
reality. Moreover, according to the O.T. teaching he who
bears the Spirit is always referred wholly and utterly to
God's work. T.W. Manson remarks that "Just as in the O.T.
the ruah Yahweh is the heavenly correlative to man's ruah,
so in Paul the Spirit of God stands over against the spirit
p
in man". That Paul makes this distinction between God's
Spirit and human spirit is another element in his theology
and this will be discussed later on.
It is then clear, as Schweizer argues that "the believer does
not live by his substance but by God's action at the cross.
There is thus created the possibility of an understanding of
the Spirit in which~T\V<92/-uk as power establishes the existence
of the believer and is no longer regarded as a purely supple¬
mentary miraculous power, though without becoming the substan¬
tial possession of the^uJec (TL^ou&vof this light it is
easy to see why the extraordinary nature of the manifestations
can no longer be a decisive criterion. The fact that the know¬
ledge is supernatural no longer rests on the fact that it is
received or taught ecstatically and built logically or non-
1. W.D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism (London, 194-8),
pp. 183-4-. "
2. T.W. Manson, On Paul and John, ed. Matthew Black (London,
1963), p. 36.
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logically. The miracle is that a man may believe that God is
for him in Jesus Christ. The content of this supernatural
knowledge is not disclosure of mysteries of the heavenly world,
but the divine act of love effected at the cross or the divine
sonship granted to the believer thereby, and thus the~T\vet^ud
can be called specifically thevVWttj/A<*Ttrj^ TTiCTTeu)£ » H Cor. 4:
13"» Besides, it is suggested that the statement of Paul
"out of faith with regard to the Spirit, we wait for the hope
of righteousness" Gal. 5:5,T\>CrVf^d-Tc eK.TV\crvecjs'G°uld also be
construed in connection with II Cor. 4:13* Dr. N.Q. Hamilton
goes to the extent of saying that "and here I suggest that
with relation to£;\<-TC\<fTewc, »^vP-vyAcCTt as a dative of respect
in that it is true that the believer may have faith in view of
p
the action of the Spirit ".
Moreover, Schweizer argues that "in I Cor. 12:3) in distinction
from all subsidiary charadteristics, knowledge and confession
of Jesus as theKup kos is the gift which gives evidence of the
as such. Only in appearance is this contradicted in
the statement Gal. 3:14 (and 5:5?) according to which the Spirit
is receivedChc£ orJreujs • /The Gen. of Gal. 3:14 is
appos., Lietzmann G1., ad loc$ In its permanent antithesis
t0C-;$ <r/ayu>Y \Joju^&-c this statement is simply to the effect
that no human merit has secured the Spirit. He adds in the
J
footnote: "That perhaps Gal. 3:2, 5 uses the odd-xKo-y* m<ftetoS
1. Th, D, N.T. VI, 425-26.
2. N.Q. Hamilton, The Holy Spirit and Eschatology in Paul,
(Edinburgh: London, 1957)) P- 34 fn. I.
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(not <k Ke-v^S T\\CTTiS) instead of TV^TT i$ because strictly
this is already the work of theT\v The fact that
Y\"\(TT^ 5 is dominant in Rom. 2-5, andTVv £~upvtA in 6-8 shows
that the one, as the antithesis to the works of the Law, is
the precondition of the new life, whereas the other is its
possibility". "Similarly, when theTVVfrC/Aoi. is the power of
sanctification (Rom. 15:16, I Cor. 6:11, also II Thes. 2:13),
one cannot say whether Paul's emphasis is that the Spirit
sets us in God's saving action and justifies us, or that he
2
enables us to live thereby in concrete obedience". The
former is stressed in I Cor. 6:11, the latter in I Cor. 6:19.
All this exegesis explains an important element in Paul's
theology of the Spirit that to say the Spirit is God's power
operating in the individual's act of faith is to establish
more than a probability.
Furthermore, Paul's citations from an unknown book in I Cor.
2:9 and from Isa. 40:13 in I Cor. 2:16 are in perfect harmony
with the apostle's intention in I Cor. 1:18-3:20, namely to
set forth that there is only one way to the profound secrets
of God's revelation in Jesus Christ and it is through God's
own Spirit. As for the background of Paul's use of the Spirit,
the Spirit is clearly the revelatory agent, cf. 1Q5 IV: 2-6,
1QH XII:11f, XIII:18 f. This lends further support to the
contention that thefunctions here as stated in
1. Th. D. N.T. VI, 426-27 fn.
2. Ibid., p. 431.
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I Cor. 2:6-11 as a revelatory agent. Also,that Paul has
perspective of his own on the function of the Spirit as over
against the Corinthians' view of the Spirit as substance is
evident by reason of the linguistic usage peculiar to him in
this passage and in a parallel passage, Rom. 8:12-27 where
the various functions of the Spirit are listed as follows:
I) the Spirit is revelatory agent; II) in both sections the
human spirit is introduced in addition to the divine spirit;
III) in both places and only here in these passages Paul
uses the word^oeuvc*to.
This, then, makes it clear that from a careful consideration
of Pauline idea of the relation of the human spirit to the
divine spirit one gets the impression that the former is intro¬
duced into his theology in addition to the latter. R. Jewett
also argues: "A distinction between the human and divine spi¬
rits is worked out for the first time it was a Pauline
creation". Besides, R. Scroggs argues that "it is important
to note that the Hebrew of Isaiah XL.13 quoted in I Cor. 2:16
has ruah, which the LXX translates byVcrJs (and only here of
all appearances of ruah). Did Paul have the Hebrew in mind,
since he has been talking about theTWP^/^ ? The possibility
is perhaps enhanced by I Cor. 7:40, where to give support for
his judgment on marriage Paul asserts that he has the IT"
(here again the Spirit is revelatory)".





Moreover, it will be noted that just as in the O.T. the Spirit
of God is viewed as empowering men to perform acts of which
otherwise they would not be capable, so also in Paul's think¬
ing the Spirit is viewed as empowering man. Think of what he
says: "now there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit.
And this is the source of the "utterance of wisdom of
knowledge faith gift of healing working of
miracles prophecy ability to distinguish between
spirits various kinds of tongues interpretation
of tongues", I Cor. 12:4. cf. also, I Cor. 2:10, 12b, 13> 14;
Gal. 3=5; I Thes. 5:19. The first product of the Spirit in
human life is "that love becomes the central motive of our
own moral being ", as Dodd comments.
In our exegesis of I Cor. 2:6-12 we showed that Paul held
that the Spirit bears a functional relation to Christ and is
also revelatory agent. A detailed exegesis of the passage
II Cor. 3:7 ff. also may strengthen this point. In Paul's
understanding the Spirit plays the role of revealing the
Christ who is identified with the Spirit himself, II Cor.
3:17-18. In his explanation of the benefits of the Christ-
event Paul seems to lay great emphasis upon the completeness
of the event, the communication of which is carried through
the operation of the Spirit who gives life, II Cor. 3:6 as
opposed to the death and condemnation which were the results
of the old dispensation.
1. C.H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans (London, 1932),
P. 74.
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The exegesis of the passage which equates the Spirit with the
Lord Himself is, of course, contested. Schweizer's exegesis
on this passage stands out, in my opinion, as one of the most
satisfactory attempts so far made by an impressive body of
theologians, namely K. Prumm, B. Schneider, D.W. Davies, C.H.
Dodd, and of late, J.D.G. Dunn. In verses 6 and 8 the mini¬
stry is depicted as that which is controlled by theTC^4-u^o^ ,
not they• 11 Is then shown that the unbelieving Jew
still lives under the veil which is done away onlyc2V JQ) \(TTcO ,
V. 14. Turning to the\Cdy31c>S ( =W) iCTToS in V. 14 as always the
One who was crucified and is risen, Rom. 5:6, 8: 6:4 The
word appears where there is reference to the work of redemption,
Rom. 8:35, 15*7; II Cor. 3:14....^ takes the veil away. The
statement that thisVvOybioS is the Spirit connects two trains
of thought. The exalted< oS to whom Israel must turn in¬
stead of to Moses, cf. Rom. 10:4 f. I Cor. 10:2 is identified
with the IV 4fro^\c<. This shows that turning to Him means turn¬
ing to the new cT,(kKoV(<k. in thelTveCyiAc< • It is not wholly
true that, while Paul ascribes the same functions to Christ
and the Spirit, he does not elsewhere equate them, cf. I Thes.
1:5; II Cor. 12:9; Phil. 4:13 /from the viewpoint of the idea
of(5u VqiAAlS'and that Christ became TnriO-uV >
I Cor. 15:457- In so far as Christ is regarded in His signi-
1. K. Prumm, "Die Katholische Auslegung von 2K. 3:17a in den
letzten vier Jahr Zehnten", Biblica, 31 (1950), 316-345;
32 (1951), 1-24;
B. Schneider, Dominus autem Spiritus est (1951);
W.D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, p.196 fn. 1
and
C.H. Dodd, History and The Gospel (London, 1938), pp. 55~57-
2. Th. D.N.T. Ill, 1090.
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cance for the community■in His powerful action upon it, He
«
can be identified with the'lfVVeCytw. • in so far as He is also
Lord over His power, He can be differentiated from it just as
the I can be distinguished from the power which goes out from
it It is declared expressly in I Cor. 15:4-5 that Christ
became aTTv €-CyvAc*. ^LOoTTcrib-u vin the resurrection. Nor can
appeal be made to Rom. 1:4- in favour of a different view. It
is thus maintained that the exalted Christ is the \\ V<3--
and that turning to Him entails entry into the sphere of the
Spirit. Whosoever comes to Him comes into this sphere. If
V^O/0V0Sand^V6-WUA. are distinguished in 17b, this simply makes
it plain that v. 17b is not asserting the identity of two per¬
sonal entitiesis defined as the mode of existence
of the KCjh i oS . Where there is reference to theTCv(rv^&L
His mode of existence is depicted, and this means the power in
which He encounters His community".
In a similar vein, one can argue that even though it is true
to say that Paul took over the other cardinal conceptions
such as the Messiahship of Jesus, his death 'for our sins1,
and the Lordship of Christ, yet the equating of the Spirit
with Christ, of Christ with the Spirit, appears to have been
original with him, in short, this discovery was his own. What
is implied in this equation is that the relation between Christ
and the Spirit does spell not so much of a personal identity
as of an equivalence of function. It is perhaps in this sense
5
1- Th. D.N.T. VI, 4-18-19.
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that Prof. C.A.A. Scott becomes the forerunner of the critical
consensus when he observes: "The Spirit and the exalted Christ
alike make themselves felt as^uVoCyUi^, a divine force of per¬
sonality working on the personality of the Christian cp. I Cor.
2:4 (hendiadys); I fhes. 1:5 with II Cor. 12:9 and Phil. 4:13".^
Moreover, for much the same reasons as are explained in Schwei-
zer's ingenious exegesis on the passage, II Cor. 3 = 7 ff- Dr.
N.Q. Hamilton argues "that the identity here posited is not
ontological, an identity of being, but dynamic, an identity
which occurs in redemptive action The Spirit portrays
the Lord so well that we lose sight of the Spirit and are
conscious of the Lord only. This suggests the following patt¬
ern of redemptive action: from the Lord - through the Spirit -
p
to the believer". Thus far we have seen the strength of the
main line of argument based on this passage and there seems
little doubt that the role of the Spirit is to be construed in
terms of its functional relation to Christ. Purther, Dr. J.
D.G. Dunn quotes with approval what Schildenberger says
"the Spirit is the Unveiler, the Revealer (I Cor. 2:10; 12;
13:5; cf. Eph. 1:18)".^ Thus once the functional identity
of the Spirit and of Christ is assumed, it is easy to see
why Paul holds the view that the Spirit's special function is
to bring to completion the creative purpose of God as the oy>—
^ e<^2> V (DI Cor. 5:5; 1:21; cf. Phil. 1:19) of the new order
1. C.A. Anderson Scott, Christianity According to St Paul, p. 260.
2. N.Q. Hamilton, The Holy Spirit and Eschatology in Paul,
pp. 6-7. " ' "
3. J.D.G. Dunn, "II Corinthians III. 17 - 'The Lord is the
Spirit'", Journal of Theological Studies New Series Vol.XXI
(1970) p. 320.
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brought about by the Christ-event. Gunkel made a convincing
comment that the whole life of the Christian is an effect of
the~[C V (ro
Perhaps this is explained by the fact that "long before the
Spirit was a theme of doctrine, He was a fact in the experience
of the community. This is the basis of the marked variety and
p
unity of the N.T. statements". There is, however, a problem
before Paul or any exegete who heavily falls back upon Paul's
own understanding of the Spirit for formulating any form of
the concept of the role of the Spirit. Schweizer raised the
problem thus: "As in the O.T. and Judaism as a whole, the
Spirit is not necessary to salvation but is a power for addi¬
tional deeds. Understood thus, the Spirit naturally becomes
a sign of something still to come, of the real things. Thus
in the quotation from Joel in Acts 2:19-21 the outpouring of
the Spirit is clearly depicted as the beginning of the eschato-
logical catastrophe, and^/according to Heb. 6:4t7 the wonder-
working V frU^MHeb. (2:4)' is a foretaste of the good things of
the world to come. This means, however, that the Spirit is
only a singular prelude to the parousia, a welcome but basically
unnecessary sign of the real thing which is yet to come. For
salvation is not to be discerned in the mere presence of all
*
kinds of miraculous powers".
This problem is probably more acutely set forth by the whole
1. cf. H. Gunkel, Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes, (Gottin-
gen, 1888), p. 75.
2. Th. P. N.T. VI, 396.
3. Ibid., p. 415.
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approach of Bultmann's exegesis of Paul's letters, more speci¬
fically, of his understanding of the Spirit. It is in the light
of this problem that the discharging of my burden of proof of
the necessity of the role and function of the Spirit in the
matter of faith becomes accentuated. It will be pointed out
that this problem provides no ground for denying the truth of
the matter that before the parousia the Spirit as the divine
power at work, more accurately, the historical power, the
phrase from Prof. E. Schweizer's essay on the \\ V e-CywoC in
BlD.N.T. VI,pp. 389 ff-, was the fact of experience in Paul
himself before it became a theme of any affirmation made by
him. I intend to indicate that this fact of experience is
an answer to the problem in respect to the "relation between
the message of the Spirit and that of the crucified, risen
and coming Lord". "This is the decisive question for the
p
primitive Christianity".
It will be remembered that the mission of the crucified and
Risen Lord was entrusted to Paul - the Gospel he preached came
to him through the revelation of Jesus Christ. He declares:
"he who has set me apart before I was born ..... was pleased
to reveal his Son to me", Gal. 1:16. How did this revelation
of the Risen Lord and even of his own self-understanding come
to him? Was it not through the divine intervention in the
course of his life previously controlled by outright Judaistic
1. Th. D.N.T. VI, p. 4-15.
2. 0. Michel, Das Zeugnis des N.T. von d. Gemeinde (194-1),
p. 65, cited in Th.P. N.T. VI, 4-15.
39
thinking and the deep influence of the tradition of his fathers,
Gal. 1:12-16? This divine intervention essentially belonged
to the sphere of the Spirit, whether you call it divine opera¬
tion or supernatural phenomenon, which actuated Paul's own con¬
version experience. Schweizer rightly remarks that "this power
is not anonymous or unknown. It is identical with the exalted
Lord, once this Lord is considered, not in Himself, but in His
work towards the community. This is not new in Paul for
in Ac.- too, the Spirit is not merely the*T©-tTTo, 2:23 in dis¬
tinction from the Pauline or Johannine \j o s , John 14;26.
^osandTVv/t-OytkA can alternate there".^
At the risk of repetition, it must be clearly stated that the
Spirit is fundamentally the power which sets a man in God's
saving work in Christ, thus making impossible any trust in
his flesh. What is known is known through the Spirit and this
means that the Spirit makes man to know what is given by God,
I Cor. 2:12. What is given is the salvation - deed.
b) Bultmann's understanding of anthropology with reference to
his interpretation of faith and history.
Bultmann's understanding of anthropology can be seen in his
oft-repeated statement: "Every assertion about God is simul-
2
taneously an assertion about man and vice versa". Perhaps
1. Th. D.N.T. VI, 433.
2. Rudolf Bultmann, Th. N.T. I, p. 191; Jesus Christ and Myth¬
ology ,p.63 where he affirms: "The question of God and the
question of man are identical"; and Faith and Understanding,
I. pp. 55-56. ~
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one can say that the nature of God and his activity are only
indirectly explained by Bultmann; but man and his possibili¬
ties of self-understanding is a dominant concept in his scheme
of thinking. As is well known, Liberal theology had shifted
the balance of emphasis to historical-critical research draw¬
ing its critical standards from the contemporary world out¬
look* Since with Bultmann, revelation and existential faith
are strictly correlative the fides quae creditur as the accep¬
tance of an orthodox doctrine produced from outside and the
fides qua creditur as a religious experience or act from with¬
in are not mutually exclusive. That is, these two explanations
of the Christian experience are not separate enterprises, as
held by Schleiermacher. Further, even though Bultmann develops
his own critical historical method drawing his theological pre¬
suppositions from the point of view of modern man's picture of
himself and his world similar to the viewpoint of liberal theo¬
logy* yel his concept of "a point of contact in man" radically
differs from what liberal theology says to the question.
Bultmann insistsRather is man in his existence, taken as a
whole the point of contact. And for this reason it is also
true that in man there is no faculty in man-no religious facul-
ty possessing a special receptivity for God's Word". He
strongly upholds Augustine's view that "human life is - consci-
2
ously or unconsciously-impelled by the question about God".
1. Rudolf Bultmann, Essays Philosophical and Theological,
tr. James C.G. Greig (London, 1955)* 157 (cited as Essays).
2. Rudolf Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth I, p. 192.
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And also, for him "we are also given two possible ways of under-
standing of ourselves: from what is done or from the doing.
What Bultmann emphatically defends is the idea of the histori¬
cal existence of man as embodying both the question of God and
at the same time the answer to it. His contention is that man
must raise the question about himself because he "has been
called in question" by God, who is at the same time the answer
to man's question about himself. He argues that "man as such,
the whole man, is called in question by God But to know
this judgment is also to know it as grace, since it is really
liberation Man then knows that the question is also the
answer; for it is only God who can so question him. And he
knows that the answer is primary. A question so radical can¬
not originate from man, from the world. But if the question
is asked by God, then it originates from the claim of God on
p
man. Man is called". His argument is that the natural man
and philosophy are already aware of the questionableness of
existence. He also maintains that "the question of his own
real being which engages the attention of man is the
■X
point of contact for God's Word". But this point of contact,
for Bultmann, is not given "before hand" but in the very pro¬
clamation of the Church is this point of contact "uncovered".
It is worthy of note that the theme of the disclosure of the
divine answer to man's question about God occurs with striking
1. Rudolf Bultmann, faith and Understanding I, p. 255-
2. Ibid., p. 46-47, and pp. 316 f.
3. Rudolf Bultmann, Essays, p. 136.
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frequency in Bultmann's writings. Also, his fundamental con¬
viction is that the only knowledge that man has of God is
what is disclosed in the Bible. To that extent, Prof. Bultmann
is at one with Prof. Barth. But Barth has little sympathy for
Prof. Bultmann's proposition of "Prior understanding of the
self", since the former holds that the word of God should be
given absolute primacy in the hermeneutic process. In con¬
trast, Bultmann holds that there is an understanding of him¬
self given to man prior to the word. This position Bultmann
uncompromisingly defends taking his stand on the existentialist
philosophical propositions. This can be clearly seen from the
following statements: "Paith does not depend on a resolution
about which I can deliberate. Paith is immediate decision;
-i
that is, xn hearing I have already decided how I hear". What
he implies is that the decision about the how is made possible
by my self-understanding, the understanding of my situation,
but it is not caused by it. The above statement is further
qualified by him on this wise: "The text does not give me
knowledge of any astonishing discoveries, But possibili¬
ties of my own self are disclosed to me which I can understand
only insofar as I am open to my possibilities and will to let
myself be open ..... Understanding, therefore, is always simul-
p
taneously resolve, decision".
It is from this point of view that Bultmann criticises Barthian
theology severely, saying that it inculcates an attitude of
1. Rudolf Bultmann, Paith and Understanding I, p. 139.
2. Ibid., p. 158.
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blind surrender, at the price of intellectual sacrifice; the
reason for this statement is the fact that Barth lays so much
stress on faith as based upon itself alone, and on the sover¬
eign right of the word apart from "the understanding which is
-1
the guide for all my activity". He further explains that
"there is no recipe for procuring lost freedom. There is only
the appeal to the individual to reflect on his freedom and his
self Every individual must make the venture for himself:
there is no guarantee. But the future can only flourish on
the ventures of individuals". He insists: "In these decisions
he develops; he gains his character, He would have to
experience an encounter which presents him with the possibility
of decision against his old self in favour of his new self. He
does experience this encounter in hearing the word of divine
grace , whereas the Christian view is open for the full-
2
ness of the possibilities of life in history".
This makes it clear that Bultmann understands man as a free
and responsible being. That is, in keeping with existentia¬
lists' view he puts every man in possession of himself as he is,
and places the entire responsibility for his existence upon
his own shoulders. This is really determinative in so far as
man is understood as "an independent self who can win or lose
himself in decision". This idea of man winning or losing him¬
self in decision is further qualified: "Nan today can under¬
stand himself in relation to God only as a person who is add-
1. Rudolf Bultmann, Essays, p. 261.
2. Ibid., pp. 325, 309-10.
3. Rudolf Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth I, p. 12.
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ressed by God. precisely in his being as person. This means
that the only divine speaking and acting he can understand as
important and of concern to him are such as encounter him in
his personal existence - and, in fact adhere precisely to it".
Whatever the reasons may be which are urged in support of this
statement, whether one can be so certain as Bultmann seems to
suggest that "man can adhere to it", is another question which
will be taken up at a later stage of our examination of his
demythologizing of the Kerygma. However, suffice it to say
for the present that Bultmann emphatically stresses that the
"possibility of understanding the Word coincides with man's
2
possibility of understanding himself". For him, these two
possibilities are not only basically related to each other
but also are one and the same.
Furthermore, Bultmann believes that "Man's being is removed
from his own control, it is risked continually in the concrete
situations of life and goes through decisions in which man
never chooses something for himself, but chooses himself as
x
his possibility". Elsewhere he writes: "I do not attain to
my existence in the sphere of what happens generally, but
rather in a concrete situation, in the here and now, in my
individual responsibility and decision, where as I hazarding
myself I can gain or lose myself, ...." This he explains
1. Rudolf Bultmann,"Zum Problem der Entymythologisiering" in
Kerygma und Mythos II, ed. H.W. Bartsch (Hamburg, 1952),
p. 182, cited by S.M. Ogden, "Bultmann's Project of Demytho-
logization.Journal of Religion, Vol. XXXVII (1957)? P« 160.
2. Rudolf Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, p. 502.
3. Ibid., p. 149.
4. Rudolf Bultmann, Essays, p. 78.
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from the standpoint of the kerygma by saying that "... It is
in this world of concrete historical happening that God and
what he asks, what he demands and what he gives are to be en¬
countered. God is not manifest to the thought that soars
away into what is beyond Time in the eternal orders - and that
is where to the Greek Weltanschauung the(J~~KXV(5o£lies ....
The quest for the truth is to the Greek search for the disclo¬
sure of the world of entities in its totality; to the New
Testament it is the question of the demand, or the gift, of
1
the moment".
He further explains that for the Bible "the worth of man is
not determined by his human quality or the character of his
spiritual life, but simply by the decision the man makes in
the here-and-now of the present life Only what a man
2
now does gives him his value". The Bible is therefore con¬
cerned "that just this necessity of decision constitutes the
x
essential part of his human nature".
All this perhaps explains his understanding of Kerygma and
his great concern and preference for the existentialist philo¬
sophy of existence. And it is in this latter sense also he
differs from Barth. This can be seen from his letter to a
friend wherein he writes: "In any case, Barth's background
is the neo-Kantianism of Cohen and Natrop, who also continued
to influence me for a long time; he has - unfort inatelyi -
1. Rudolf Bultmann, Essays, pp. 83 f.
2. D. Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus and The Word ,tr. L.P. Smith
(London, 1935), P- 54.
3. Ibid., p. 52.
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1
nothing to do with phenomenology". All this goes to show
that Bultmann lays a consistent emphasis on the existential
understanding of faith. He affirms: "Only such statements
about God are legitimate as express the existential relation-
2
ship between God and man". But this position is not without
problems. We admit that any statement about God as Creator
and still more as Redeemer has some kind of reference, even
if only implied to man and nevertheless, it must be asserted
that there are statements which directly refer to God and not
to man and his possibilities of decision.
The lasting merit of Bultmann's understanding of man is that
although he makes use of Heidegger's existential analysis in
order to bring to man's consciousness the meaningless of his
existence he yet asserts that to ask for a meaning of life is
to ask for God and to ask for God is the same thing as to ask
for myself. Elsewhere he points out that "if our existence
is grounded in God and it is non-existent outside God, then
to apprehend our existence means to apprehend God". This is
perhaps the heart of Bultmann's concern, hence, he untiringly
stresses this idea in a number of instances. He observes: "If
5
a man will speak of God he must evidently speak of himself".
He understands God's uniqueness from the standpoint of man.
1. In a letter of 1926, cited in W. Schmithals, An Introduction
To The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, tr. J. Bowden (London,
1967), p. 17.
2. Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 69.
3. cf. Ibid., p. 53.
4. Rudolf Bultmann, Eaith and Understanding I, p. 63.
5. Ibid., p. 55.
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He asserts: "His being (existence) is understood aright only
when it is understood as significant-for-man being; hence it
is not understood aright unless at the same time man's being
is also understood as springing from God and thereby orienta-
ted towards Him".
Understood from this point of view Bultmann's interpretation
of faith could be summarily set forth as follows. In his
understanding of it, faith no longer needs the props of objec¬
tivity. For him, "Faith insists not on the direct identity of
God's action with worldly-events, but, on the paradoxi¬
cal identity which can be believed only here and now against
2
the appearance of non-identity". In this connection it may
well be proper for us to explain what Bultmann means by the
demythologized Kerygma. For him, "the word is ker^gma,perso¬
nal address, demand, and promise; it is the very act of divine
grace. Hence its acceptance-faith-is obedience, acknowledg-
ment, confession". He explains that "the fact that "to
believe" is "to obey" as in the O.T. is particularly emphasi¬
zed in Heb. II How naturale-> ^ includes obey¬
ing may be seen from the use of Q(Z 0~~QtK( rather than7TlTT-
{r-V&c v lor receiving the Christian message Paul in par¬
ticular stresses the element of obedience in faith. For him
c
ITiCTT(S is indeed UTToCKc"^ > as comparison of Rom. 1:8;
I Thes. 1:8 with Rom. 15:18; 16:19» or II Cor. 10:5 f• with
10:15 shows. Faith is for PaulUvTcJ
1. Th. N.T. I, p. 229.
2. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 62.
3. Th. N.T. I, p. 319.
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Rom. 10:16 He /Paul_7 coins the combination OTT.?<Kcy|
TV\<rx~etvS> ^om- ^ : 5 TV^^T \ S is understood here as
acceptance of the Christian kerygma. It is thus the saving
faith which recognizes and appropriates God's saving work in
Christ Kerygma and faith always go together Since
Jesus Christ was made theKoyj i oS by His history, acceptance
of the kerygma also includes acknowledgement of Jesus Christ
as the\C<jp ^o£ In its original and true sense, however,
faith in Jesus Christ is not obedience to a Lord who is known
already. Only in faith itself is the existence of this Lord
recognized and acknowledged It /faith_7 believes on the
basis of lerygma It is always the foundation of faith.
God has instituted theXoyoSTVy s with the Christ
event, II Cor. 5:18 f. For this reason faith in the kerygma
is inseparable from faith in the person mediated thereby. In
the sense that it believes on the basis of the kerygma, faith
is always a "venture". He adds: "Rom. 10:9 proves clearly
that to believe in Jesus Christ is to acknowledge Him as Lord
so that VCvoreo v? being followed by baptism, brings
into a personal relation to Christ TYlVTvS ^-s
understood as acceptance of the Christian message in, e.g.
Rom. 1:5; 5:25; 10:17 : Rom. 1:8; 11: 20 ("thou hast
attained thy status by believing"), ..... Along the same
J
. . .
lines oCTv \CTT~voC is rejection of the Christian kerygma,
Rom. 11:20, 25".1
1. Th. D.N.T. VI, 205-12.
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He further affirms: "Paul understands faith primarily as
obedience; this is shown by the parallelism of two
passages in Romans: "because your faith is proclaimed in all
the world" (Rom. 1:8) and "for your obedience is known to all"
(Rom. 16:19). Thus, he can combine the two in the expression
U serpen s( "the obedience which faith is", Rom. 1:5)...
Compare further, I Thes. 1:8: "your faith in God has gone forth
everywhere" and Rom. 15:18:" to win obedience from the
Gentiles" "They /the Jews/ did not submit to (=obey)
God's righteousness", and 10:16: "They have not all heeded
si
(=obeyed) the Gospel". Bultmann argues that "the message
itself, then, can be called vC\o~t^ S • thus follows that,
since W\<3—T\S is the divinely demanded relation of man to God,
and is as such the divinely opened way of salvation, Paul can
use the word in the sense of a norm of principle, e.g., when
he contrasts VOyLtc?5 and IvxTTv s as the two ways of salvation
(Rom. 3 = 51; 4:14), ".2
It is indeed of particular interest to note that the idea of
radical obedience of the individual to the saving grace of
God received a classic expression in Bultmann's writings
wherein faith means surrender of worldly and personal security.
To turn aside from our present to God's future, from fear and
anxiety to freedom, to freedom for others, to love of God and
our neighbour. In a word, man is called to accept the escha-
1. Th. N.T. I, p. 314.
2. Th. B.N.T. VI, 213.
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tological existence of the new creature, the authentic and
truly natural form of human existence. His own words are:
"Man does not belong to himself; for there is for man no
absolute belonging - to - one's-self but belonging to God
or "the Lord" is man's freedom-namely, freedom from "flesh"
and "sin" (Rom. 6:15 ff• ; ?'• 5 f)".^ Elsewhere he observes:
"True freedom is only to be found in constraint the
recognition of a true authority presupposes man's humility,
and a radical openness for the power speaking to him from the
sphere of the transcendent: only in such humility and
openness in radical renunciation of one's own claim and
one's own capacities - is the meaning of the transcendent
p
understood at all". And also for him "faith is the surrender
of his /inan'sy7 previous understanding of himself, the reversal
of the direction his will previously had Faith's attitude
is the radical opposite of the attitude of "boasting": nor can
faith take credit for itself - that would be "boasting"
Eor the purpose of God's salvation - deed is: "that no flesh
may boast before God" (I Cor. 1:29 tr)".^
Besides, for him "acceptance of the divine grace is
because this grace encounters man in the paradoxical form
of the cross of Christ, i.e. because the divine act of grace
is also the judgment executed at the cross on man, on his sins,
and also on his striving for righteousness or wisdom. Faith
Th- N.T. I, p. 244.
2. Essays, p. 522.
3. Th. N.T. I, p. 315.
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is thus the obedient acceptance of the divine judgment on
man's previous self-understanding. The knowledge imparted in
the kerygma and appropriated in faith embraces not only know¬
ledge of God's act in Christ but also a new self-understanding
on man's part. the distinctive way of understanding
the divine^plyAlS and hence also of understanding oneself under
Paul, then, speaks of the knowledge of the believer in
a twofold sense. On the one side it is knowledge of the event
of salvation through the kerygma, Rom. 6:8 f.; II Cor. 4:15 f«
cf. Rom. 10:14-17. On the other it is the knowledge which dis¬
closes itself to faith as a new self-understanding, Rom. 5:3>
14:14; II Cor. 1:7, 5:6; Phil. 1:19".1
Judging from the argument of Paul in Gal. Bultmann understands
"
TV~\0T4 5as man's absolute committal to God, a committal in
which man cannot make any resolutions of his own - which would
be to remain in the sphere of Equally plain, how¬
ever is the fact that this committal, is a movement of the will
it is indeed the radical decision of the will in which man
delivers himself up In Paul, the character of tT4 0~T~)^
as act is expressed on the one side by the fact that he under¬
stands^J\q (TT1 $ as u7Io^K°G'j and on the other quite unintention¬
ally by the fact that, unlike Augustine, he never describes
2
faith as inspired". He adds: "If one does not understand
the paradox that \ (T"T1 S>as a movement of the will is the
negation of the will itself, the antithesis of TY\(T~n S and
1. Th. D.N.T. VI, 217-18.




V^utfuwill easily be misunderstood, as though j"T\0~~T~i_S
were another work or achievement". And elsewhere he points
out that""faith" - the radical renunciation of accomplishment,
the obedient submission to the God - determined way of salva¬
tion is the free deed of obedience in which the new self
constitutes in place of the old. As this sort of decision, it
is a deed in the true sense. In a true deed the doer himself
is inseparable from it, while in a "work" he stands side by
2
side with what he does".
Bultmann further contends that""faith" is not an "experience",
not the "truly religious in religion", , not
(prospensity, disposition) or an(virtue, excellence).
It is not - as if it were the perfected state of the soul -
salvation itself. Rather - as genuine obedience - it is the
condition for receiving salvation In his /Thilo's_7
thought "Raith" stands at the end "as the goal of life's
movement toward God" , while for Paul it stands at the
beginning furnishing the basis for the new life". Moreover,
Schlatter's view of faith as trust in God's gracious forgive¬
ness which brings the sinner to the way of the Law is challen¬
ged by Bultmann who contends that "the very rarity of the
terms "forgiveness of sins" and "repentance" in Paul and the
similar rarity of&'T\\.(Tp£-(j)€~(\/ ("turn to", - only at I Thes.
1:9 and II Cor. 3 = 16 in Paul) indicates that the movement of
will contained in "faith" is not primarily remorse and repen-
1. Th. D.N.T. VI, 220.
2. Th. N.T. I, p. 316.
3. Ibid., p. 316.
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tance but it is primarily the obedience which waives
righteousness of one's own it is evident that "faith"
has the character of obedience and is an act of decision".
Bultmann goes on to explain that""faith "is simultaneously
"confession". "Faith" is faith in That is, it always
has reference to its object, God's saving deed in Christ.
Hence, "confess" and "believe" correspond to each other: "If
you confess with your lips that Jesus is Lord and believe in
your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be
saved (Rom. 10:9)". And he adds: "Faith, therefore, is hot
"piety" or trust-in-God in general. Rather it has "dogmatic"
character insofar as it is acceptance of a word: "the word of
faith" (Rom. 10:8) or "the heard word" (c^Ke^ KJ.: "the hear¬
ing") of faith (Gal. 3:2, 5). Hence, faith can also be called
"faith of the Gospel" - i.e. faith in the Gospel (Phil. 1:27)"
For Bultmann, "'faith' which arises from what is heard, (Rom.
10:17), consequently contains a knowing",.... "But since this
knowledge can be appropriated only in obedient, comprehending
faith, and hence contains an understanding of one's self,
knowledge may also appear as arising out of faith Ul¬
timately "faith" and "knowledge" are identical as a new under¬
standing of one's self, if Paul can give as the purpose of his
apostleship both "to bring about the obedience of faith" (Rom
1:5) and "to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of
God in the face of Christ" (II Cor. 4:6 cf. II Cor. 2:14:
1. Th. N.T. I, p. 317
2. Ibid., pp. 317-18.
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"God .... who .... through us spreads the fragrance of know¬
ledge of Him") An additional clarification of the
character of "knowledge" lies in the fact that "knowing" has
its basis in a "being known by God" (Gal. 4:9; I Cor. 13:12)".''
With his usual exegetical rigor and distinction Bultmann draws
these conclusions, i.e. faith containing a knowing, a new
understanding of the self and the same knowledge arising out
of faith - these are obviously classic in scale and quality.
It is more than likely that these conclusions are the result
of his being influenced by the existential scheme of thinking.
And also, one cannot fail to be impressed by the fact that he
explains "faith" in the plainest possible manner as a "venture"
- the movement of one's own will in terms of historical exis¬
tence and thereby gaining a new understanding of one's self.
Further, "faith" for Bultmann, also has, on the other hand,
"undogmatic" character in the sense that the word of procla¬
mation brings about "transformation of the hearer's own ex¬
perience. For the word is kerygma, ...." He argues that
""faith" is what it is only with reference to the "grace"
which is actively present in the word. In his "confession"
of faith, the believer turns away from himself, confessing
that all he is and has, he is and has through that which God
has done. Faith does not appeal to whatever it itself may be
as act or attitude but to God's prevenient deed of grace
which preceded faith Though Gal. 3:23-26 sketches the
preparation and the "coming" of "faith", what is sketched is
1. Th. N.T. I, pp. 318-319.
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not the individual's development but the history of salvation.
The attention of the believer does not turn reflectively in¬
ward upon himself, but is turned toward the object of his
si
faith. ""Faith", then, as "obedience" is also confession".
And as another category of it, faith, as Bultmann points out,
is thought to have a peculiar correlative in "fear" "inasmuch
as it guarantees the centring of the believer's attention upon
God's "grace"." In support of this, Bultmann takes up the
experience of Paul on his arrival in Corinth, I Cor. 2:1-5*
"He came to Corinth in "weakness and in much fear and tremb¬
ling" so far, that is, as he looked to himself. But since
he waived eloquence or wisdom of his own and determined to
know one thing only, "Jesus Christ and him crucified, he was
2
effective with a demonstration of the Spirit and power". One
can admit that this conclusion of Bultmann from Paul's experi¬
ence can certainly carry conviction.
He develops this idea still further in that ""fear" has not
only the negative purpose of destroying false security and
directing the believer's attention away from himself towards
God's grace which alone supports him (as in Rom. 11:20), but
also the positive purpose of making man conscious of his res¬
ponsibility, which he can assume now that he is no longer
under Law but under "grace" (Rom. 6:14)".^ Bultmann is cer¬
tainly right in asserting that the man of faith utterly
surrenders to God's care and power, waiving all care or power
1. Th. N.T. I, p. 519.
2. Ibid., p. 3 20.
3. Ibid., p. 321.
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of his own and all security that he might be at his own dispo¬
sal. And that this is rightly so in the case of man under
faith does by no means come under dispute and is obviously an
intelligible and reasonable affirmation. But taking the cen¬
tre of the matter into consideration, i.e. the relation be¬
tween kerygma and the individual's act of faith, Bultmann's
explanation of it will lead one to arrive at the idea that
from Paul's point of view everything else in the act is anci¬
llary to kerygma. Because, in his argument, "the message it¬
self can be called THO—HS "• But, of course, this conclusion
of Bultmann is the outcome of his exegetical and systematic
presuppositions. Therefore, his explanation of the emergence
of faith vis-a-vis the proclamation of the Word is that Keryg¬
ma in which God in Christ meets man here and now and offers
him a new possibility of understanding his own existence. He
insists that man in his exceptional being, "stands between
God and creation and must decide between the two". Elsewhere
he argues that "only the man who knows himself to be a sinner
Can know what grace is. He only knows himself as a sinner in
so far as he stands before God; therefore he can only know of
sin when he knows of grace. The sight of God's judgment and
2
God's grace together belongs to the nature of faith". The
upshot of all this is that the last word to man is not what he
does or should do - or his achievement, but what is done to
him. Thus Bultmann's statement "only those who are loved are
capable of loving" becomes the articulus stantis et cadentis
Th. N.T, I, p. 229.
2. Rudolf Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, p. 51.
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theologiae.
All this is very helpful and full of insight. However, the
question still remains whether one can be so sure as Bultmann
seems to be that the "point of contact" in man vis-a-vis the
proclaimed word should be given supreme and sole importance
as means of making man readily to be conscious of his standing
between God and the creation. If that were all that easy, to
be pragmatically true the Church which engaged itself for more
than the last two centuries in proclamation of the word in the
non-Christian world, say, the eastern countries would have
found itself in a different condition. And the non-Christian
world would have by now been brought to the saving knowledge
of Christ or would have experienced the encompassing reality
of God's love. At this point it is worth noticing that stu¬
dents of the history of religions, particularly of Eastern
Religions certainly find it not easy to accept the idea that
the proclamation of the Word by the Church makes all the dif¬
ference in the world, because they recognize the fact that
the hearers of the Word, by reason of their religious back¬
ground face with the problem of breaking certain barriers be¬
tween their way of thinking and the challenge of the Gospel.
It will be remembered that even when Paul preached Kerygma
we are told that some mocked, some deferred and some believed.
However, it is generally recognized that no one should unduly
question the legitimacy and positive evangelical intention of
Bultmann and his insistence on the power of the proclaimed
Word. But its real limitation lies, to my mind, not in its
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emphasis on the power of the proclamation or his rationalist
presuppositions but in its practicality. It is perhaps in
this sense that Bultmann's interpretation of faith may prob¬
ably need to break out from its scheme of existential thinking
to the climate of thinking of the combination of the divine
operation and man's decisions in his historical existence.
But Bultmann as a historian contends that divine operation is
not something with which history qua history can deal. But
how can the historian apply his method to the documents of
the Bible wherein a good number of actions are ascribed to
non-human causes? Bultmann replies to this question by say¬
ing that to find God in miracles would be incompatible with
\<?>
the uniformity and of causation. For him, to speak of God
A
acting in any way observably is to deliver up the faith in
wonders (God acting somehow within events) to the criticism
of science and in so doing validate such criticism. For him
it is highly improbable that God acts "between events". All
that he admits is that God acts "within events". He insists:
"The only way to preserve the unworldly, transcendental
character of the divine activity is to regard it not as an
interference in worldly happenings, but something accomplished
in them in such a way that the closed weft of history as it
-1
presents itself to objective observation is left undisturbed".
The implication is that insofar as man is concerned, God's
action, in its final form, comes to fulfilment in his personal
encounter with God. That is, God meets us when the cross of
1. Rudolf Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth I, p. 197*-
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Christ is proclaimed to us. That we find God in our own exis¬
tence and we do not find him in miracles is Bultmann's recur¬
ring argument.
Further, Bultmann was not slow to reply to the critics who
made much of the absence of the subject of divine action in
his programme of demythologization. He writes: "Perhaps we
may say behind all the objections raised against demythologi-
zing there lurks a fear that if it were carried to its logi¬
cal conclusion it would make it impossible for us to speak of
an act of God, or if we did it would only be the symbolical
description of a subjective experience". The passage which
follows these words and the similar passages in Jesus Christ
and Mythology, particularly the following one: "God as acting
does not refer to an event which can be perceived by me with¬
out myself being drawn into the event as into God's action,
without myself taking part in it as being acted upon. In other
words, to speak of God as acting involves the events of per-
2
sonal existence" obviously indicate that Bultmann takes this
apparently formidable objection to the demythologizing pro¬
gramme most seriously. Evidently, his implication in these
passages is that his demythologizing does not necessarily
warrant the critics' objection since he can speak and speak
non-mythologically, of the action of God. In this one can
detect Bultmann's insistence on the paradoxical non-identity
1. Rudolf Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth I, p. 196.
2. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 68.
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of God's action and his stress, that is, he is both an evan¬
gelist and a historian. Henderson remarks that "as an evan¬
gelist, he is constrained to proclaim the action of God. As
a historian he cannot accept it as a causal factor in the
scheme of things".
Moreover, in his explanation of faith Bultmann points out that
"faith as response to the proclaimed word (which is called
O(k6'Y^TO<rT€-c0S> > "preaching of faith"), like that word itself,
is part of the salvation - occurrence, the eschatological
occurrence Faith can also be said to "come" and "to be
revealed", Gal. 3:23, 25. This, of course, does not take
from the concrete "faith" of the individual that decision-
character which belongs to its very nature as obedience.
Nevertheless, the concrete realization of the possibility of
faith in the individual's decision of faith is itself eschat¬
ological occurrence. Since the believer experiences the possi¬
bility of faith-decision as grace, it is only as a gift of
grace that he can understand his decision - his decision 1
And because he knows that it is God who accomplishes his will¬
ing and doing - his concrete, historical existing in "faith"
he is conscious not of being relieved of the responsibility
for it but on the contrary of being made responsible for it,
Phil. 2:13 £• Thus, Paul can say that faith in Christ is
"granted" as a gift, Phil. 1:29 Faith is God-wrought
to the extent that prevenient grace has made the human
1. Ian Henderson, Rudolf Bultmann (Makers of Contemporary
Theology) (London^ 1965), P^ 3^.
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decision possible, with the result that he who made the deci¬
sion can only understand it as God's gift; but that does not
take its decision-character away from it. Only so does the
-1
imperative, "be reconciled to God", II Cor. 5:20 make sense".
From this important statement two basic assumptions of Bultmann
come to the fore: (a) by prevenient grace he means grace as an
integral part of the proclaimed word - grace as the deed of
salvation contained in the encountered proclamation - God's
p
eschatological deed, and "there can be grace only as an
event".^(b)The salvation - occurrence is to be appropriated
as God's gift by the one who makes decision, granted that
decision - character is central to the act of faith. Bult¬
mann 's explicit exposition of the concept of faith as found
in Pauline theology can be digested or subsumed under these
two main assumptions. One must, however, ask whether Bult¬
mann has not explained the eschatological deed accomplished
by God in relation to human - decision in over-tones with
the result that the divine operation which is at work in man
goes into the background.
Further, in my assessment of Bultmann's interpretation of
faith I do not intend to argue for the idea that the act of
faith as obedience and confession in man is a divinely dicta¬
ted act or a purely supernatural one with no relation to one's
own historical existence. Rather, I venture to suggest that
1. Th. N.T. I, pp. 329-30.
2. cf. Th. N.T. I, p. 289.
3. Rudolf Bultmann, Existence and Faith, p. 220.
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there is bound, to be a correlation of the divine operation
and man's historical decision of faith and these are commen¬
surate with each other. We are bound to recognize the fact,
as Prof. J. Macquarrie writes in his foreword to Peter Fransen's
book entitled The New Life of Grace that "our very existences
are a free gift from God so that there is a kind of grace in
existence itself and even those who do not profess belief in
A
God may know the stirrings of grace within themselves". It
will also be remembered that one of the tenets of Transcen¬
dental Thomism is that contingency recognizes the creativity
of God and this is more so in the act of faith. Further,
for Origen, as Wiles explains "our creation as rational beings,
is a sheer act of God's grace ; there is also the res¬
ponse of faith in which divine grace and human freedom are in
2
some mysterious way combined".
In this connection what Bultmann says of creation and existence
will occupy our thinking in the following pages. He observes:
"That man is in the world is due to an event, to the creation
of God; it is not to be deduced from the eternal necessity
3
.... of a cosmic continuum". He further explains that "the
true faith in creation, on the other hand, affirms that man
is subject to a power that lies beyond him and that cannot be
disposed of - not even in his thinking; that he is called into
1. Peter Fransen, S.J. The Uew Life of Grace, tr. from the
Flemish by Georges Dupont (London, 1969), Foreword.
2. M.F. Wiles, The Divine Apostle :The Interpretation of St
Paul's Epistles in The Early Church (Cambridge, 1967),
pp. 103, 105.
3. Rudolf Bultmann, 'Existence and Faith, p. 208.
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being by this power, abandoned to it, and placed under its
authority " Greek science held the view that the source,
the0^7'yj-yj as the creator stands beyond the world and man but
is immanent in the world as its law and is also immanent in
the human spirit; "Deus in nobis". And accordingly, man is
understood as part of the cosmos; he is not seen in his histor¬
icity. 'This is precisely what Bultmann rejects and explains
that "Life also is my particular life. It is not an
instance of the process of life in general, but is entrusted
to me to live I live in my decisions in which I myself
am at stake, either to win myself or lose it. I have my guilt
and my remorse. And as my life is uncanny because I am a tem¬
poral being subject to death, so also is it uncanny because it
is a historical life. There are no universal standards that
relieve me of the concrete responsibility of deciding myself.
Who knows whether he has decided rightly? Who knows what the
right authority is? Who knows whether he has really been obe¬
dient and has not lived under illusions? In the deed of deci¬
sion, man's being is at stake - i.e., in the moment whose con¬
tent can never be deduced from the universal, but which js al¬
ways a concrete, individual moment that demands action, deci¬
sion. What man himself is — i.e., has become in his temporal
- historical existence .... He can win his self or lose it,
but he has to act To be sure, he can determine, to a
certain extent, the possibilities of action; and he ought to
do this as far as he can. But the choice among these possibi-
1. Rudolf Bultmann, Existence and Faith, p. 212.
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lities is always a venture; and no God and Spirit can take away
from him the venture and the responsibility for his choice".
All this obviously reflects Bultmann's interpretation of faith
understood from the viewpoint of the existentialist philosophy
of human existence. Two important points can be deduced from
the above statements. Firstly, for him the human will and his¬
torical decisions of the individual are the sole and sure means
of winning or losing of his self and the exercise of such means
is always a "venture". Secondly, his contention is that faith
is not attributable to the Spirit or any source outside man's
decision in his historical existence. Hence, he elsewhere
argues that "the eschatological nature of faith is testified,
lastly, by the fact that Paul does not describe faith as in¬
spired, attributable to the "Spirit" .... when I Cor.12:3 gives
the cry, "Lord Jesus" as criterion for possession by the Spirit,
this does not intend to attribute the confession of faith to
the Spirit, but to state the means by which spiritual and
2
demonic ecstacy are to be distinguished". "Just the opposite:
The Spirit is the gift which faith receives (Gal.3:2, 5, 14)
and in which the grace of God appropriated by faith becomes
effective in concrete living. Therefore, Paul calls the "love"
oCTTy) in which faith is operating "the fruit of the Spirit",
A comparison between the parallel sentences Gal.
5:6, and 6:15: in Christ neither circumcision nor uncircumsion
has any meaning, but (in the first case) "faith working through
1. Rudolf Bultmann, Existence and Paith, p. 214.
2* Th. N.T. I, p. 330, and footnote.
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love" or (in the other case) "a new creation", reveals that
the existing of a Christian in the faith that operates in love
is eschatological occurrence ".
It is at this point that one can join issue with Bultmann who
has little sympathy for the view that the divine operation is
thought to enkindle an inward urge in man before faith, i.e.
God working "from within outwards". To quote Augustine's
famous statement: "you have made us (in creation and redemp¬
tion) and turned us towards you, Lord, and our heart finds no
peace until it rests in you". It is not clear why Bultmann
vehemently argues for Augustine's theory of a "point of con¬
tact" in man as shown above and at the same time takes very
little note of the second half of this quotation from Augus¬
tine's works. Further, in the direction indicated here by
Augustine Jan Van Rysbroeck goes a step further as the follow¬
ing passage will show: " the grace of God, which flows
out from God, is an inward compulsion or driving of the Holy
Ghost, Who from within us drives our spirit and incites it
in all virtues and His inward driving or working in us,
natural or supernatural, is more within us and closer to us
than are our own works; and therefore God works in us from
2within outwards, " I do not however, fully agree with
Rysbroeck as his statement seems to be one-sided because it
does seem to undermine the importance of human decisions. And
1. Th. N.T. I, p. 350.
2. Jan Van Rysbroeck, The Spiritual Espousals, tr. Eric Colledge
(London, 1952), p. 92.
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I for one, wish to emphasize both human decisions and divine
operation in the individual's act of faith.
Besides, not only does Bultmann und eremphasize the divine
operation in man before faith but also accords no value to
the Spirit's working within. He astonishes by the extent of
his erudition when he interprets I Cor. 12:3 and no one
can say "Jesus is Lord" except by the Holy Spirit, along the
lines of his thinking that faith is not attributable to the
Spirit. The general ethos and expression of Paul's state¬
ment in that context (I Cor. 12:3) abundantly makes it clear
that Paul was trying to impress upon the Christians in Corinth
that in the midst of the influence of being led away to make
an act of homage to rulers it is the Holy Spirit which enables
any one to confess Jesus as Lord. E. Schweizer is unequivocal
on this point: "In I Cor. 12:3? in distinction from all subsi¬
diary characteristics, knowledge and confession of Jesus as
the 9 is the gift which gives evidence of the \ \V6-cytAoLas
such"
At this point it may well be necessary for us to make a brief
survey of Bultmann's estimate of the Spirit. He argues that
"Paul, as a matter of course, shares the general Christian
view that the Spirit is conferred by baptism, (I Cor. 6:11,
12:13? II Cor. 1:22, ) and also the conception of the
Spirit as a miraculous, divine power, (Rom. 15:19, I Cor. 2:4-
etc ). In speaking of the Spirit, he uses animistic and
1. Th. D. N.T. VI, 4-26.
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dynamistic terminology promiscuously, a fact which in itself
indicates that he is unconcerned with any speculative interest
in the idea of Spirit At least Paul can speak of the
Spirit as a something that can take residence in a man (Rom.
8:9, lis I Cor. 6:19), and therefore is bound to a locality.
But such a locution is scarcely to be taken strictly, since
it can also be used in reference to the congregation (I Cor.
3:16), in which case a conception strictly corresponding to
the literal wording is inconceivable. Nevertheless, Paul's
term "spiritual body" (I Cor. 15:4-4-, 4-6) strongly suggests
that Paul conceived of the Spirit as a material, just as the
term "glory" closely related to that of Spirit, undoubtedly
denotes a (heavenly) substance in I Cor. 15:4-0 f. Moreover,
though II Cor. 3:7 naively speaks of the externally visible
brightness of "glory", still Paul's contrasting of the glory
of the old and the new "covenant" (3:7 f£) indicates by itself
that he does not stick to this conception; When Paul
says of those who along with the Spirit of the Lord have rece¬
ived freedom: "we are being transformed from glory Into glory
" (V.18), it is clear that this present glory is no shining
material. It is nothing other than the power by means of which
the "inward self" is renewed day by day (4-:16); recall that
"glory" and "power" can be synonomous " Indeed, Bultmann's
attempt to explain the various trains of thought which lie be¬
hind Paul's use of the term Spirit has received widespread
attention. I have, however, a special reason to believe that
Bultmann's categorical statements that Paul simply shares the
1. Th. N.T. I, pp. 333-S4.
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general Christian view of the Spirit as a miraculous power,
and that Paul uses animistic and dynamistic terminology pro¬
miscuously in order to explain the role of the Spirit are not
entirely convincing. For, judging from the indications in
the texts, for Paul the gift of new life is a supreme token
of God's operation. The Risen Lord who appeared to him was
essentially Spirit, for the living person with whom he had
come in touch belonged to the sphere of the Spirit. About
this transforming power H.A.A. Kennedy rightly observes that
"when Paul thinks especially of this power he speaks of the
Spirit. When he dwells on the source of his energy he speaks
of Christ". It would be logically possible to hold that for
Paul the operation of the Spirit was no miraculous power in
the ordinary sense of the term but rather it was God's power
at work: "For I will not venture to speak of any thing except
what Christ has wrought through me to win obedience from the
Gentiles, by word and deed, by the power of signs and wonders,
by the power of the Holy Spirit", Rom. 15*18-19. Paul's gos¬
pel came to the Thessalonians not only in word, but also in
power and in the Holy Spirit they received the word in
much application, with joy inspired by the Holy Spirit, I
Thes. 1:5-6. To identify any kind of miraculous power with
Paul's idea of the Holy Spirit as the divine power is to blur
the distinction between the gnostic understanding of the spirit
as a magical, spasmodic and eccentric and Paul's own understan¬
ding of the Spirit as God's power in the proclamation of his
Gospel. In Paul's sense the Spirit as a miraculous power
1. H.A.A. Kennedy, Theology of the Epistles (London, 1919),
p. 89.
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mediates supernatural knowledge,I Cor. 2:7-
Furthermore, from the axiom - 'that being a Christian is a
constant self-relating to God's act of salvation', Bultmann
concludes that there is a variety of grades and individual
possibilities of faith. And for him closely related with the
aspect of "standing in Christ" or "in faith" is the aspect of
faith which issues in the gifts of the Spirit. He affirms:
"knowledge as a special aspect of "faith" is a gift of the
Spirit Though here (Phil. 1:9 f• and Rom. 12:2 clearly
show) and probably in the majority of cases the knowledge
meant is knowledge of the will of God - i.e However
great the danger is that gnosis may separate out of "faith"
as speculation - a danger which has undoubtedly become a rea¬
lity in the Gnostics of Corinth - in Paul it retains its basic
character of an existential knowledge in which faith unfolds
itself. For Paul defines its purpose to be: "that we may un¬
derstand God's gift means to understand one's self as the
receiver of it; hence, this highest "wisdom" and "knowledge"
must simultaneously be the clearest understanding of one's
self I Cor. 8, above all, indicates that Christian gno¬
sis is the understanding of one's self under divine "grace".
For "knowledge" is not genuine if it leads to getting "puffed
up" and hence damages the "love" (o^x/cCTT^) in which "faith"
ought to be working. So here, too, it becomes clear that
"knowledge" in all its forms and degrees besides being an un¬
derstanding of its object is simultaneously an existential un-
derstanding of one's self in "faith".
1. Th. N.T. I, p. 327.
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All these conclusions which Bultmann draws and develops with
the utmost vigour of consistent thought basing on Pauline
passages to prove the existential understanding of man under
faith are apparently cogent and convincing. However, from
these passages two things are to be underlined. Firstly, as
an exegete he tries to demonstrate that almost every text in
Paul strikes a note of existential understanding of man.
Secondly, only too obvious is the fact that his exposition
of I Cor. 2:12 stems from the existential interpretation of
faith which differs from our interpretation of the same pas¬
sage, especially, I Cor. 2:6-12 as being the classic example
of Paul's understanding of the Spirit as a revelatory agent
as shown above, cf. I Cor. 2:10. Besides, one can see a
danger into which Bultmann is falling, a danger of using a
single key to fit all the wards. He tends to explain almost
all, if not quite all, aspects of Christian life as understood
by Paul from the viewpoint of one single scheme of thinking.
He further understands the status of man under faith, the gift
of wisdom or knowledge and other God's gifts granted to him
as though the profundity of Paul's theology were revolving
round one single scheme of thinking - an existential under¬
standing of man.
Moreover, he elsewhere explains that "man stands in a histo¬
rical world in which he is bound together with concrete human
beings. It is in relation to them that he is responsible,
not to some universal law or idea. In this responsibility
he wins his true dignity because in it he ventures himself
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and, through surrender, wins himself". What Bultmann is
actually arguing for is the acknowledgment that "man is a
being who lives in time, in history, and in responsible
relation with others and therefore is insecure and not at
his own disposal - without this acknowledgment, there also
is no faith in God the Creator". He adds: "The uncanniness
by which human life is always threatened"/rs_7"sin"//^y which
he understand^7"Superbia" - namely, that man wills to be
himself by himself and for himself God's goodness is
precisely that man should be himself and receive his self¬
hood from God his Creator as a creature. If he refuses to
do this, then precisely his selfhood, which he has received
2
from God as a possibility, becomes evil for him". Faith
in God as the Creator of which Bultmann speaks "is not a
conviction about ane^o^-rj that is constantly present in the
world-process, the rule of which I can rationally investigate
and with reference to which I can understand all individual
phenomena. Rather it is an "existentiell" knowledge, i.e. a
knowledge of myself as a right-wised sinner that has an effect
on my existence and that must constantly be laid hold of anew
Faith in the Creator can never be possessed once for
all as a reassuring insight, but must constantly be won and
realized anew. For if, in receiving forgiving grace, I
receive my selfhood as a being from God, then I must at the
same time understand and realize it as a being for God, i.e
1. Existence and Faith, p. 214-.
2. Ibid., pp. 216-19.
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as a life in love that I have to fulfill in my personal
relations with others".
All these statements obviously indicate that some measure of
interchange of the influence of the existential thinking
which insists on man's understanding of his own existence
and his possibilities, i.e. man is on each occasion called
to decision and stands at risk and the use of the Pauline
concept of faith as the committal of self to God's forgiv¬
ing grace is discernible in Bultmann's system. He is right in
saying that in receiving forgiving grace I receive my self¬
hood as a being from God even as we admit the fact that
selfhood is the precondition of all good and its need is to
understand and feel its creatureliness before God, its depen¬
dence and its own subordinate place in the entire scheme of
things. But can the self do this by its own effort? is the
basic question which an exegete of Paul's texts or a syste¬
matic theologian should seek to answer. Bultmann's answer
to this question is yes and no. Yes, when man by his own
will decides for God - i.e. in his decision for God one can
receive his selfhood as a being from God; and no, when the
individual decides to belong to himself or decides for the
world. So the matter of winning or losing his self rests
entirely with man's decisions in his historical existence.
For him, man's essence resides in his power to will, not in
his power to think. He insists: "Man's essential Being is
not Logos, reason or spirit. If we ask primitive Christianity
1. Existence and Faith, p. 221.
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where the essential Being of man resides, there can only be
as he is, decide for God? Paul's answer to this question lies
in his making it clear that the Spirit as the historical power
experienced by the community works in the individual's act of
the idea of the Spirit as supernatural power is quite incom¬
patible with his idea of "encounter". For him, the Spirit be¬
comes simply another name for the new life that God creates
in the moment of "encounter". We have alluded already to Bul-
tmann's own showing: "The Spirit is the gift which faith recei¬
ves". In contrast to Bultmann's contention, William Temple
suggestively pointed out that "so long as the self retains its
initiative it can only fix itself as centre. Its hope of deli¬
verance is to be uprooted from that centre and drawn to find
2
its centre in God, in the Spirit of the Whole". Thomas Aqui¬
nas believed in the absolute power of God. For him"free-will
can only be turned to God, when God turns it, ".^
Further, it is to be observed that it is from the standpoint
of Paul's understanding of the Spirit as the historical power
of God at work (cf. I Cor. 15:4-5 ~\\~V' tv/\Ack ^LjOVtfTLOVV) that
his idea of the divine operation as an a priori concept in
the total plan of God's redemptive activity becomes more
1. Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity In Its Contemporary
Setting, p. 180.
2. William Temple, Nature, Man and God (London, 1934-), p. 376.
3. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, (First Part) tr.
Fathers of English Dominican Province, Third Number (London,
1915), P. 335.
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one answer: in the will". Can man in his fallenness, unaided
This Bultmann rejects because
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meaningful and can be construed as one of the major themes
of his theology which Bultmann cannot afford to set aside.
As the following paraphrasing displays, Prof. Dodd has per¬
haps a far more balanced viewpoint on Paul's perspective of
the total plan of God's redemptive activity: "It is God who
as Creator determined the nature of man, and as Redeemer wills
his goal, Everything we may rightly affirm about
man is governed by the fact that his whole existence stands
i
within God's design". And also, nothing is more certain m
the mind of Paul than to believe that it was God's absolute
sovereignty which made him the apostle for the Gentiles and
thus he declares: "according to the command of the eternal
God to bring about the obedience of faith", Rom. 16:26. It
was thus axiomatic for him to say that God was in Christ
reconciling the world to himself, II Cor. 5:19*
It is perhaps from this understanding that Paul's most pro¬
found reflection on the God-man relationship is anparently
t
derived. In Stacey's opinion a new view of man for St Paul
could only arise from a new view of God. For him, "Paul
discovered a new view of God. He discovered that God was
in Christ and thereafter the experience of God in Christ be-
p
came the determinative factor in Paul's view of man". Also,
arguing from the 'indissoluble connection of power and gift
with the conception of divine righteousness' we ought to ask
1. C.H. Codd, Man in God's Design - A Publication of Studi-
orum Novi festamenti Societas (Valence: 1952), p. 9.
2. As cited in "Notes of Recent Exposition", The Expos.
Times Vol.The Sixty-Eighth (1956-57), p. 1.
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whether Bultmann has not overemphasized the aspect of gift
at the expense of the character of the Giver of which Paul
was said to have a profound understanding - especially His
dealing with His chosen race.
To be more precise, the idea of God's dealings with the nation
of Israel must have been in the foreground of Paul's movement
of thought adduced in I Cor. i0:1 ff. wherein he explains that
the Israelites shared in the revelations of God; the Wilder¬
ness period is determinative period in their religion. By
the phrase "our fathers" he probably means that the Christians
are spiritual descendents of the Hebrews. And also, when
Paul traces back to the righteousness of faith reckoned to
Abraham (see especially Rom. 4:17 ff-), on Kasemann's account
of it, "he depicts Abraham's faith as a relation to that God
•f
who reveals himself in history".
Bultmann argues persuasively that in Paul's understanding of
human existence the category of freedom of the will is a
dominant concept, and hence, he appeals in several instances
to the text: "Be ye reconciled to God", II Cor. 5:20. But
Paul's understanding of God as being active to reconcile the
world in Christ unto himself is equally forcibly portrayed
in the same passage to which Bultmann attaches such importance
from the viewpoint of his existentialist theological drive
and perspective.
This now brings us to the discussion of Bultmann's concept of
1. P. K'a'semann, Presnectives on Paul . tr. M. Kohl (.London,
1971), pp. 68-69.
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history, from the standpoint of which he interprets faith,
and it is therefore the most important aspect of his anthro¬
pology. In the following pages one important question press¬
es itself upon us, namely does Bultmann's demythologized
Kerygma interpreted from his understanding of history
have any compelling claim to be regarded as the correct pro¬
jection of Paul's theology? It is of interest to note that
both Prof. Bultmann and Prof. R.G. Collingwood, the English
historian and philosopher quite independently and working in
different fields reached not dissimilar viewpoints. Colling¬
wood observed: "history is for human self-knowledge. It is
generally thought to be of importance to man that he should
know himself: knowing yourself means knowing what you
can do: the only clue to what man can do is what
man has done. The value of history, then, is that it teaches
what man has done and thus what man is". And also for him
"the history of thought, and therefore all history, is the
p
re-enactment of past thought in the historian's own mind".
Bultmann, on the other hand, defines hermeneutics as "the
science of understanding history in general". This idea
is further amplified by Gogarten when he affirms: The crucial
problem of history , is the problem of hermeneutics
that is to say the problem of an interpretation which
approaches history not from outside but from within the his¬
torical character of human existence, or, more precisely,
1. R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford, 1962), p. 10.
2. Ibid., p. 215-
3. Rudolf Bultmann, Essays, 235-
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from (what Heidegger calls) 'my' (,je mein) historical chara-
1
cter". Bultmann contends that "the subject of history is
2
man" He does not explicitly make a reference to the influ¬
ence on him of Heidegger's view of history. For Heidegger,
history is nothing but man's way of being as historical ...
3
.... The primary historical is man himself. Heidegger
contends that the science of history (Historie) is concerned
4
with the study of the possible. Following the same line of
argument, Bultmann observes: "The "right" philosophy is simply
one which has worked out an appropriate terminology for the
understanding of existence, an understanding involved in
5
human existence itself". This is one aspect of his concept
of history. And there is another aspect to it, namely "by
historical is not meant the "brute facts" of positivistic
historiography, but an understood fact", in the sense of
Dilthey and Collingwood, a fact, which has not only an "out¬
side" but "inside". In fact, Dilthey's dictum is: Historical
knowledge is a mode of self-knowledge.
From this statement we can draw one preliminary conclusion
that Bultmann's philosophy of history stems not only from
his understanding of the existentialists' philosophy of
existence but from Dilthey's idea of history. And in the
1. J1. Gogarten,,Demythologizing and History, tr. N.H. Smith
(London 195$),p. 58,— —
2. D. Rudolf Bultmann, History and Sschatology, p. 143-
3. cf. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tubingen, 1949), p. 381
and J. Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, (London, 1955)
p. 161.
4. cf. Ibid., p. 394, and J. Macquarrie, op. cit., 162.
5- Kerygma and Myth I, p. 193.
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main, his philosophy of history can be taken as reflecting
the principal propositions of Collingwood's theory of his¬
tory. He insists: "the meaning in history lies always in
the present, Always in your present lies meaning in
history, and you cannot see it as a spectator, but only in
your responsible decisions. In every moment slumbers the
possibility of being the eschatological moment. You must
awaken it". We have already observed that Bultmann vehe¬
mently argues for R.G. Collingwood's view of history as "the
self-knowledge of-the living mind". He, on the other hand,
contends that the self of man in its radical historicity is
ultimately responsible to God. He observes: "The question
2
of meaning of history has become meaningless". What is
characteristic of history is that "an ultimate distinction
x
between the knower and his object cannot be maintained".
He explains with justification that to the reality of an
historical event belongs its future, indeed, "each present
L\.
hour is questioned and challenged by its future". "Histori¬
city now gains the meaning of responsibility over against
the future, which is at the same time the responsibility
5
over against the heritage of the past in face of the future".
As is well known, Bultmann virtually rejected all Greek idea
1. History and Eschatology, p. 155.
2. Ibid., p. 120.
5. Ibid., pp. 119-20.
4. Ibid., p. 140.
5. Ibid., p. 145.
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of history, which, in his opinion, had totally ignored man's
individuality. In short, "man is not understood in his his-
toricity". And his analysis of the religious thought and
history of the O.T. assumes a new significance in that for
him each situation for the covenant people embodies"a call
to responsibility in the face of the future", and "God con¬
fronts man with his blessing and demand, judging him in each
successive moment. Every such moment however points towards
2
the future. God is always a God who comes". The essence
of Biblical thought for him can be regarded as that which
effectively historicized cosmology. It made the human will
the central reality in history. Because its God is always
a coming God, man is recognized as a being always open to
the future — "a man is always what his past has made him.
He always brings his past along with him into his present.
Since evil is sin, it throws man's relation with God entirely
out of gear, just as the relations between man and man are
thrown out of gear by the wrongs they do to one another. Just
as when one man wronged another the only way out is for him
to own up to it and receive forgiveness, so it is with man's
relation to God. Only confession and forgiveness can make
him a new man and give him a fresh start".
Bultmann, however, thinks the Jewish thinkers of late Judaism
had cut the Gordian knot completely by assigning Redemption
to a future wherein God would intervene into history. Thereby
1. History and Eschatology, p. 18.
2. Ibid.. p. 18 and Primitive Christianity In Its Contemporary
Setting, p. 3A.
3. Primitive Christianity In Its Contemporary Setting, p. 182.
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Israel lost its historical moorings and history was cosmolo-
gized. And yet, the distinctive contribution of the prophetic
religion of the O.T. is admirably summarized by him when he
writes: "The responsibility of the individual coincides with
the responsibility of the whole people". His arguments
enlisted in the defence of his idea of history were also re¬
flected in his analysis of the thought-forms of the earliest
Christian Church. He points out that it (the earliest Chris¬
tian Church) adopted an eschatology which was more cosmolo-
gical than anthropological. Its cosmic elements were drawn
from Jewish apocalyptic. It believed implicitly in an immi¬
nent end of the world. It viewed itself not as an historical
community but as community belonging only to the new age -
thus eschatology was cosmologized - "in early Christianity
2
history is swallowed up in eschatology".
His contention is that the genuine historicity of man was
sacrificed at the altar of a cosmological mythology of the
early Church. Yet, he argues that a solution of the problem
was achieved by the anthropological theologies of Paul and
John - "At all events the Pauline conception of historicity
and his unfolding of the dialectic of Christian existence
contains the solution of the problem of history and eschato-
3
logy as it was raised by the delay of the parousia of Christ".
Further, he points out that Paul retained the expectation of
1» History and Eschatology, p. 31 •
2. Ibid., p. 37.
3. Ibid., p. 4-7
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future cosmic events. For Paul, "the end of history cannot
be the natural result of historical development, but only its
breaking off, accomplished by God. But Sub Specie Dei the
end is nevertheless the goal of history because, according
to Paul, it is grace of God by which the end is brought
about, ". This statement is further clarified when
he writes: Righteousness becomes "the essence of salvation".
It has its origin in God's grace which is his "eschatological
deed". Thus "every "cosmic" dimension - i.e. in reality, his¬
toric dimension /has_7 a locus in the actual living of men,
p
which is true "history"".
All this clearly reflects Bultmann's recurring argument that
God's eschatological deed in Christ becomes a present reality,
i.e. the power of God's righteousness in the proclamation
because the kerygma makes it so. To the same effect he writes
elsewhere: "The kerygma is itself an eschatological happening.
In it qua address the event of Jesus Christ - on each occasion
3
encounters my existence".
As is well known, Bultmann has little sympathy for the objec¬
tive factualness of the Christ-event. The historical past
cannot have historic meaning for the present. The historian's
task, as Bultmann explains it, is to reproduce past events
in memory; but such a reproduction of past events "in their
purely wordly actuality" ./has no existential significance7
1. History and Eschatology, p. 40.
2. Th. N.T., I. pp. 271 f. 289, 305.
3. Tr. from Kerygma und Mythos, VI/I. (Hamburg, 1963), p. 27.
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"and memory in that sense can imperil and even destroy
"historic" existence, With the recollection of the
kerygma it is otherwise. This does not present us with facts
of the past in their bare actuality, but, as a sacra¬
mental event, it represents the events of the past in such a
way that it renews them, and thus becomes a personal encoun-
q
ter for me". This is amplified when he writes: "It seems
high time that Christology was emancipated from its subordi¬
nation to an ontology of objective thought and re-stated in
2
a new ontological terminology".
Further, he affirms: "But although the history of the nation
and the world had lost interest for Paul, he brings to light
another phenomenon, the historicity of man, the true histori¬
cal life of the human being, the history which every one ex-
3
periences for himself and by which he gains his real essence".
What he untiringly stresses is that "Paul no longer looks into
the history of peoples and the world nor into a new history".
"What is the core of history? What is its real subject? The
H.
answer is: man". What Bultmann argues is that Paul's view
of history is orientated towards the individual. This seems
fascinating, illuminating, and probably quite convincing, es¬
pecially when he points to the fact that meaning in history
issues in the present moment of decision, through which the
individual achieves his authentic existence. And also, the
1. Kerygma and Myth I, p. 115.
2. Ibid., p. 209 fn. I
5. History and Eschatology, p. 43.
4. Ibid., pp. 43 and 139.
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upshot of all this well-balanced exposition of the Biblical
outlook of God's saving history is an admirably clear and
concise example of his argumentation of his strong existen¬
tial philosophical thrust. Besides, Bultmann's exegetical
rigour in setting forth the significance and intelligibility
of God's righteousness of grace, viz. the power of the pro¬
clamation of the kerygma is certainly striking in so far as
he incessantly stresses the idea that "the 'core of history'
is therefore man History is the sphere where man
may attain 'genuineness of life' or fail to attain it ....
It is here that the Christian Faith is of crucial importance
because by it genuineness of life with its freedom from self,
is offered to man by God as a gift. It can be received only
as a gift".''
It is worth noticing that in his demythologizing programme
of the kerygma Bultmann accords the utmost importance to two
aspects, namely that God's eschatological deed in Christ does
not admit demythologization and that the genuineness of life
is offered to man as God's gift. With these two structural
presuppositions he never ceases to emphasize the historicity
of man. It thus goes to Bultmann's credit as over against
the liberals that by his demythologization of the message of
the N.T. to modern man the timeless character of Christian
truth is upheld. But nevertheless, we ought to ask whether
in his overemphasis on the individual's historical existence
Bultmann does not oversimplify the significance of the his¬
tory of the nation of Israel for Paul's explication of God's
1. "Notes of Recent Exposition", The Expos. Times,Vol. The
Sixty-Eighth (1956-57), p. 353.
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righteousness. That is, whether his assertion: "To Paul
the history of the world had lost interest" was not loaded
with startling implications. It has been asked already "whe¬
ther the ascription of this very individualistic view of his¬
tory to Paul /Paul's view of history is 'the expression of his
view of man/7 does Justice to the theme of Rom.9-11, where
Paul wrestles with the significance of events in the history
I
of the people of Israel as a whole". Why does Paul stress
that the gifts and the call of God are irrevocable (Rom. 11:
28)? Does not Paul's thought centre around the conflict be¬
tween the Synagogue and the Church? Why does Paul talk of
the Judgment upon the Jew first and then upon the Gentile
Rom. 2:9 and the Gospel as the power of God unto salvation
to every one who has faith, to the Jew first and also to the
Greek, Rom. 1:17? Paul declares: "To the Jew I became like
a Jew, to win Jews; To win Gentiles who are outside
the Law, I made myself like one of them ", I Cor. 9:20-
21. Why is all this constraint in the mind of Paul to win
for Christ Jews first and Gentiles as well? Is it not be¬
cause, in Paul's view, Israel is particularly the bearer of
the promise, Rom. 9:1-5? Paul was certainly conscious of
God's dealings with his people whether you call it God's
saving history or religious history. It is precisely in
this sense that Dahl's estimate of Bultmann's understanding
of Paul's view of history is still valid. In Dahl's opinion,
1. "Notes of Recent Exposition", The Expos. Times, Volume The
Sixty-Eighth (1956-57), p. 553-
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Bultmann's understanding of Rom. 9-11 ,■ "is just one example
of his 'unhistorical1 treatment of Paul: 'One may ask whether
this "dehistoricising" of the New Testament is not really
more characteristic of Bultmann's theology than his famous
-"I
programme of demythologizing'.
Besides, Bultmann untiringly stresses the power of God's
righteousness in terms of God's gift, i.e. the 'genuineness
of life' is offered to man by God as a gift. However, it is
more than likely that Paul's shout of triumph in the passage
of Rom. 8:58 ff. reflects his theology of the power of God's
righteousness in terms of cosmic dimensions (with the impli¬
cation that Christian hope is dependent on God's love which
is to be understood from the standpoint of God's power). If
this interpretation of the text is nearer the truth from the
standpoint of Paul's view of God's futurity it would then
give weight to the case we are making that Paul would not
have made such an absolute distinction between the history
of the world and the historicity of man. This view may pro¬
bably be supported by the fact that whenever Paul speaks of
Christ's redemption, reconciliation and justification by his
blood, I Cor. 1:50; Rom. 5s1-11» he must be thinking in terms
of the new creation of both man and the world. R. Tannehill
makes an interesting comment: "If Paul sees man as conditio¬
ned by the world of which he is a part, man's salva¬
tion is tied up with what God does with this world. Thus
1. As quoted in R.H. Puller, The New Testament in Current
Study (London, 1965), p. 72.
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history cannot be reduced to the historicity of the individual,
and the cosmic aspects of Paul's eschatology cannot be dis-
missed as cosmological speculation".
Moreover, if with the Synoptists, we mean by the kingdom of
God a spiritual reality inaugurated by the coming of Jesus,
i.e. the new Age began, and with Paul by the cross of Christ,
the new creation began, for the cross is the power of God
for salvation, I Cor. 1:18, then it is easy to see why Paul
could declare that the kingdom of God does not consist in
talk but in power, I Cor. 4:20 which in turn means righteous¬
ness, and peace and joy i-n "the Holy Spirit, Rom. 14:17. Paul's
language of the cross of Christ as final and decisive act in
history which exhausted the power of the principalities and
powers certainly indicates the fact that with the Christ-
event the new creation in the cosmic mode of existence star¬
ted - the possible regeneration of the universe is anticipa¬
ted, Rom. 8:21 f. and cf. Col. 1:12. Paul's thought is so
much couched in the language of the redemption of the world.
The Pauline soteriology embraces not only anthropology but
the whole cosmos. The main thrust of Paul's argument in the
passage Rom. 8:21-23 is that the first fruits of the Spirit
is the sure sign of God's power at work in history to redeem
the cosmic mode of existence. Whereas Bultmann's scheme of
thinking individualizes too much, i.e. it is too much con-
1. Robert C. Tannehill, Lying and Rising with Christ:A study
in Pauline Theology (Berlin, 1967), P- 74.
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cerned with the inwardness of the human existence. His
framework of thought is lamentably lagging hehind this
Paul's main emphasis on the basis and regeneration of the
world.
It is instructive in this connection to note what Prof.
Kasemann suggests "To understand the righteousness of God
exclusively in terms of gift is to ask for trouble: the
inevitable result is that the Pauline anthropology is sucked
under by the pull of an individualistic outlook what
distinguished the Pauline theology from both ^Christian en¬
thusiasts and Jewish apocalyptists/ is rather the unprece¬
dented radicalization and universalization of the promise in
1
the doctrine of the justification of the ungodly". Elsewhere
he quotes with approval E. Schweizer's statement: "conseque¬
ntly it is not permissible to interpret man as an individual,
resting within himself and fundamentally separable from the
2
rest of the world". Following the same line of argument,
what he himself writes is cogent and convincing: "The terms
used in Pauline anthropology all undoubtedly refer to the
whole man in the varying bearings and capacities of his exi¬
stence; Here existence is always fundamentally concei¬
ved from the angle of the world to which one belongs
Anthropology is cosmology in concreto, even in the sphere of
faith".^
1. E. iCasemann, New Testament. Questions Of Today, tr.
W.J. Montague (London, .1969), pp. 176 and 178.
2. Perspectives on Paul, p. 17*
3. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
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In die final analysis, however much Bultmann with acumen
and precision makes a rather strong case by reason of his
concept of history that Paul's view of history is but his
view of man, yet his thought appears to be defective in two
respects. Firstly, at his hands the cosmic dimension has
been significantly limited to the anthropological category.,
Secondly, his idea of the "believer's standing in Christ"
stops short of the explanation of his personality which is
to find its true fulfilment in the context of community.
That is, in his widely-ranging discussion of the theme of
the Christian's attitude toward men in terms of Paul's
characteristic phrases, "a slave to all", "be servants of
one another", "bearing" of "one another's burdens", "each
counting the other better than himself" and so on, Bult¬
mann leaves out one element of great importance. In Paul's
theology the "individual's standing in Christ" cannot be
completed apart from his place in the community. Prof. E.
Schweizer considers this essential point as the life-prin¬
ciple of the community when he affirms: "The Spirit not on¬
ly liberates man from himself and opens him to others, but
it also restores his individuality, not in such a way that
he can contemplate it, but in order that he may stand be¬
fore God and others and live for others therein"
"The value of the spiritual gifts is not that those who
entjoy them are shown to be pneumatic thereby, but they edi-
2
fy the community". This interpretation of the "belie-
1. Th. N.T. I, pp. 340-4-5.
2. Th. D. N.T. VI, 432.
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ver's standing in Christ" is in keeping with the teaching
of the New Testament according to which the true regulative




An inquiry into Existential elements in recent Indian thought.
In the second half of the preceding chapter we have closely
examined Bultmann's anthropology with reference to his under¬
standing of faith and history. Our primary concern in this
chapter is to make a careful examination of the works of
recent Hindu theologians in order to investigate whether
there are any existential elements in their religious thought.
The conceptual framework of Idealism, be it Western or East¬
ern, has never gone unchallenged. Until the proponents of
Existentialism, especially Kierkegaard, M. Heidegger, Jaspers,
questioned the tenability of some of the main propositions
of Idealism, the sharp distinction made by it between the
realms of appearance and reality dominated philosophical
thought. Idealism could not establish a satisfactory rela¬
tionship between the temporal and the eternal. This is per¬
haps the major shortcoming of the idealistic schemes of
Plato, Sankara and Mahayana Buddhism. In contrast, Heidegger
insists that existence is always individual and cannot be
reduced to any form of classification - a close parallel
with Kierkegaard. (Incidentally, it may be pointed out that
we cannot trace the source from which Heidegger learned this
principle). Jaspers affirms: "We are completely irreplaceable.
We are not merely classes of universal Being". This is
perhaps an important noint of contact between Christian and
1. K. Jaspers, Vernunft und Existenz (Groningen, 1935), p. 19,




But from the middle of the nineteenth century, if not earlier,
there emerged a new movement of thought advocated by the
existentialist theologians who questioned "Philosophical
idealism in which existence is said to be slipping backward
1into the timeless anamnesis". Kierkegaard writes: "Thus I
always reason from existence, not toward existence, whether
I move in the sphere of palpable sensible fact or in the
2
realm of thought". " So it is axiomatic with Kierkegaard
that "the objective thought has no relation to the existing
subject: and while we are always confronted with the diffi¬
cult question of how the existing subject slips into this
objectivity, where subjectivity is merely pure abstract sub¬
jectivity "which again is an objective determination, not sig¬
nifying any existing human being), it is certain that the
existing subjectivity tends more and more to evaporate."
And so they were not satisfied with the traditional under¬
standing of the Christian faith, and gave a new interpreta¬
tion to it - faith is understood to be a leap in the dark;
and also the analysis of ontology was conducted on phenome-
nological principles.
This school of thought acquired added importance with the
1. D. Templeton, Critique of Some Aspects of Kerygma as
understood by Rudolf Bultmann and Charles Harold Dodd,
unpublished Ph. D. Thesis submitted to the University
of Glasgow, 1967, p. $8.
2. S. Kierkegaard, Philosophical fragments tr. D.F. Swenson .
(Brim>eton, 1956), p. 51•
5. S. Kierkegaard: Concluding Unscientific Postscript, as
quoted in The Search for Being: Essays from Kierkegaard
to Sartre on the Problem of Existence. Trans, and eds.
J.T. Wilde and W. Kimmel (New York, 1962), p. 65.
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emergence of the existential theology of Bultmann who as an
exegete made the same point with greater precision when he
brought more clearly into view the crisis - theology of
John and the anthropology of Paul. Much more to our present
purpose is the fact that in Bultmann's account of New Testa¬
ment theology the historical events, more precisely, the
Christ-event are explained from the standpoint of anthropo¬
logical and historiological presuppositions. That is to say
for him supernatural phenomena are to be given natural expla¬
nations. This means that in changing the nature of authority
from history to experience, i.e. from Heilsgechichte with
the eschatological emphasis that "Christ professedly comes
"late in time" and inaugurates the stage that will not pass
away", to the individual's historical experience, Bultmann
is taking up a position (governed by the principle of demytho-
logizing and phenomenology), which shows some similarities
to the position of modern Hindu writers. What these simila¬
rities are will be investigated in the following chapter. But
now in this chapter we proceed to investigate the works of
recent Hindu writers, namely Rabindranath Tagore, Radha-
krishnan, Mahatma Gandhi, Sri Aurobindo Ghosh, and the Rama-
krishna Movement and Vivekananda - all with a view to bring¬
ing out existential elements contained in their writings.
It will be noted that these Hindu theologians, 'religio-
philosophical thinkers of modern Hinduism' in the language
1. A.M. Mundada, "Hindu and Christian Views of History" in
History and Contemporary India, ed. John C.B. Webster
(London, 1971), p. 86.
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of Dr. S.J. Samartha, sought to distinguish what is central
in Hinduism from what is just accretion. They also realized
that their understanding of Hinduism involves a re-statement
of the fundamentals of Hindu religion in terms of its doc¬
trine of man, of its view of worldlife and history. Hence it
is of interest to note that in their re-statement of the
main propositions of classical Hinduism some are understood
to be of secondary importance while others are understood to
be timeless truths to which due weight must be given and
which must be alive today. For instance, the belief in karma
has had a powerful hold in the past on the minds of the or¬
dinary people and of the considerable number of the orthodox
among the educated classes; but from the time of renascent
Hinduism the doctrine of karma has not seemed to have the
same sway as before. Tagore affirmed that "man must regen¬
erate himself and pass through a series of fresh beginnings
-i
and continual changes to the old ". So too, for
Radhakrishnan, man is no longer caught or held in the iron
grip of karma; man is free and "he is not at the mercy of
inexorable fate. If he wills, he can improve on his past
p
record. There is no inevitability of history".
Moreover, the traditional understanding of karma seemed to
have stood in the way of meaningful evaluation of history.
Hinduism has been called an "a historical" religion. But
1. Tagore, The Religion of Man (London, 1931), PP- 55~56.
2. S. Radhakrishnan, Recovery of Faith (New York, 1955), P» 4-.
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modern Hindu thinkers are found to stray away from the tradi¬
tional view of history and realize the felt need of today to
orientate the view of history to a new dimension. E.G.
Gokhale argues that modern Indian historians are making their
own contribution to a new view of history. In particular, he
mentions three as important, namely K.M. Panikkar, Sir Judu-
nath Sarkar and K.M. Munshi. K.M. Panikkar emphasizes "the
faith that moves them to great deeds". Sir Judunath Sarkar
looks for the reason "why things happened as they did
actually happen". Munshi wants history "to investigate and
uphold values". Thus these thinkers, he says, "in some sense
pass into the realm of the philosophy of history". The im¬
plication is that this tendency to develop a philosophy of
history takes into account two basic assumptions, namely
1) the cyclic movement of time as in classical Hinduism is
no longer wholly acceptable; and 2) the time has come to be¬
come responsive to new tides of life and thought. Dr. S.J.
Samartha aptly phrases this new understanding of history as
follows: "These thinkers (Tagore, Aurobindo, Radhakrishnan)
desire to remove somehow the futility of cyclical movement
p
and make room for the emergence of the new in history".
Moreover, the concept of untouchability is no longer consi¬
dered to be a religious and social ethic. Modern Hinduism
has become ashamed of it. This social awakening was the
1. cf. B.G. Gokhale, Indian Thought Through The Ages: A
study of some dominant concepts (London: Bombay, 1961),
p. 3, cited in History and Contemporary India, p. 75.
2. cf. S.J. Samartha, The Hindu View of History, Classical
and Modern (Bangalore, 1959), PP. 24-26, cited m History
and Contemporary India, p. 77.
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result of the vigorous social - programme of Gandhi who
succeeded in throwing open temples to the outcaste. It was
Gandhi's lasting contribution to the Indian nation that he
helped India to adopt the policy of education and uplifting
the submerged classes in society.
As for the renascent Hindu thinkers' insistence on timeless
truths, the fundamental truth of the self as well as of the
universe which was contained in the saying: "Tat Tvam asi,
That art Thou", i.e. the knowledge of identity of the self
and Brahman is still held with utmost vigour. Also impor¬
tant is the belief that the knowledge of identity of the
self and Brahman is the outcome of a self-discipline which is
frequently referred to as part of the make up of the self in
the writings of the theologians of renascent Hinduism. With
these introductory observations we shall now begin to make
a careful examination of the system of ideas of each of
recent Hindu theologians.
Rabindranath Tagore (1861-194-1)
Tagore was a poet of world-wide reputation. His religious
thought came out most clearly in three of his books namely,
12 8
Sadhana, Personality, and The Religion of Man. In langu¬
age common to renascent Hinduism Tagore affirmed the idea of
soul force and felt compelled to urge people to tap the po¬
tential in the human soul. Even though he had no particular
1. Sadhana: The Realization of life (London, 1913); 2. Perso¬
nality, (London, 1921); and 3. The Religion of Man, being
the Hibbert Lectures for 1930 (Published in 1931, London}.
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philosophical affiliation yet his concept of religion gave
a characteristic colouring to the framework of his thought
and it is in this sense that his works merit careful consi¬
deration.
Tagore was an active member of the Brahma Samaj founded by
Raja Ram Mohun Roy in 1928. He described his religion as
a "poet's religion" and in contrast to the Advaitists' con¬
cept of one's salvation as losing his self in the Absolute
he stressed the idea that the personality of the individual
in his union with God is not lost but completed and fulfilled.
He affirmed: "The hall of union is there, where dwells the
Lover in the heart of existence. When a man reaches it he
at once realizes that he has come to Truth , and he is
glad with a gladness which is an end and yet which has no
2
end". The influence of the religious movement called the
Bauls is also noticeable in Tagore's writings and therefore
certainly merits our attention and consideration. Tagore
writes: It /the sect of the Bauls/" gives us a clue to the
inner meaning of all religions. For it suggests that these
religions are never about a God of cosmic force, but rather
1. This is the earliest reform Movement in Hinduism. It
opposed all idolatry, caste, priest caste, discrimination
against women in society, and above all secured the aboli¬
tion of sati (wife-burning). It also promoted education
in the sciences. As a religious movement it favoured
rational theism as against Vedanta non-duality. Though
no longer powerful, its social ideals have gone into the
making of the nation a secular state.
2. Tagore, The Religion of Man, p. 106 f.
3. See add. note on the Bauls.
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about the God of human personality". The number of in¬
stances where he refers to the hauls' poets and their songs
perhaps explains the deep and enduring inspiration which he
2
drew from this cult.
It has also been remarked that Tagore was a Vaishnavite in
his own way. (Incidentally, it is to be noted that the reli¬
gion of Vaishanavism has obviously modified the philosophy
of the Upanisads a great deal by emphasizing the aspect of
devotion and obedience to a personal God). He says: "But
such an ideal of the utter extinction of the individual se-
parateness /as is the case with the Vedanta religion7 has
not a universal sanction in India. There are many of us
whose prayer is for dualism, so that for them the bond of
devotion with God may continue for ever"/ Further, a cen¬
tral element in Tagore's conception of God is love. The
Upanishadic statement is: "From joy does spring all this
creation", Tagore interprets it as: "It is his love that
creates, ".^
That his understanding of religion also stemmed from his
theistic background can be discerned from the following
passages: "But as our religion can only have its significance
in this phenomenal world comprehended by our human self, this
absolute conception of Brahman is outside the subject
1. Tagore, The Religion of Man, p. 19»
2. cf. Ibid., p. 110 f., Rabindranath Tagore, My Reminiscences
(London, 1917)? P» 207-; Rabindranath Tagore, Creative
Unity (London, 1922), p. 76 ff.
3. The Religion of Man, p. 202.
4-. Sadhana, p. 78 f.
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of my discussion. What I have tried to bring out in this
book (The Religion of Man) is the fact that whatever name
may have been given to the divine Reality it has found its
highest place in the history of our religion owing to its
human character, giving meaning to the idea of sin and sanc¬
tity, and offering an eternal background to all the ideals
of perfection which have their harmony with man's own nature".
"And I say of the Supreme Man that he is infinite in his
essence, he is finite in his manifestation in us the indivi-
duals". There are two points to be noted m these passages.
Firstly, Tagore plays down traditional absolute conception
of Brahman and he insists that the ultimate reality cannot
be understood apart from humanity, a distinctive aspect of
his religion which is fundamentally different from the reli¬
gion of the Vedanta. Secondly, his God is the Supreme Man,
2
or God humanized, in the words of Prof. P.T. Raju. For
Tagore, the absolute of the Vedanta is personality, the
Supreme Person.
How does he define this personality? He writes: "Limitation
of the Unlimited is personality: God is personal where he
z
creates". Elsewhere he writes: "As science is the liberation
of our knowledge in the universal reason, , religion is
the liberation of our individual personality in the universal
Person who is human all the same". "It is for us to realize
1. The Religion of Man, pp. 205, 118.
2. P.T. Raju, Idealistic 'Thought of India (London, 1955),
P. 524.
5. Contemporary Indian Philosophy, eds. S. Radhakrishnanand
J.H. Muirhead, (London, 1956), p. 57.
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the Person who is in the heart of the All by the emancipated,
consciousness of our own spirituality". "The consciousness
of the real within me seeks for its corroboration the touch
of the Real outside me". "In this self of ours we are con¬
scious of individuality, In our soul we are conscious
of the transcendental truth in us, the Universal, the Supreme
Man; and this soul, the spiritual self, has its enjoyment in
the renunciation of the individual self for the sake of the
supreme soul". He further describes the relation of the
Supreme Person to the manifold appearances by saying that the
Supreme is the unity of the manifold. Just as a true poem is
not a construction according to the rules of rhyme and metre,
but an expression or creation, so also the world is not a
2
construction but an expression or creation. In his explana¬
tion to Einstein of his concept of relation of God and the
world he said: "If there be any truth absolutely unrelated
to humanity, then for us it is absolutely non-existing". In
the same conversation he said that "The infinite personality
of Man comprehends the Universe. There cannot be any thing
that cannot be subsumed by the personality, and this proves
that the truth of the Universe is human truth". Further,
U.S. Sarma observes: "Tagore speaks of God as King, master,
friend, father, poet, bridegroom or lover, and not as any
4
mythological deity or avatar". For Tagore "Reality is the
1. The Religion of Man, pp. 193, 115, 131, and 181-182.
2. cf. Creative Unity, pp. 34—35-
3. The Religion of Man, pp. 225, 222.
4-. D.S. Sarma, The Renaissance of Hinduism (Benares, 194-4-),
p. 388.
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the expression of personality, like a poem, like a work of
art. The Supreme Being is giving himself in his world and
I am making it mine, like a poem which I realize by finding
myself in it Prom this ...I know that it has been given
to the personal me by a personal being". "This feeling of
perfection in love, which is the feeling of the perfect one¬
ness, opens for us the gate of the world of the infinite One,
who is revealed in the unity of all personalities; ".
All this leaves no doubt on the matter that for Tagore God
was an infinite Personality in whom the subject and object
2
are perfectly reconciled. And this is the most outspoken
rejection of Sankara's impersonal Brahman and the repudiation
of the Vedanta identification of the subject and object in
religion, the attempt to merge completely the personal self
in an impersonal entity which is without any quality or
definition .
However much Tagore defined his religion in the thought-forms
of the theistic conception of the God of the Brahma Samaj he
still held the age-long conception of liberation as found in
the traditional Vedantic religion. He affirmed: "The indivi¬
dual I am attains its perfect end when it realizes its free¬
dom of harmony in the infinite I am. Then is its mukti, its
deliverance from the thraldom of maya, of appearance which
- 3
springs from avidya, from ignorance; ". Tagore men-
1. Personality, pp. 69, 83-84.
2. cf. The Religion of Man, p. 106.
3. Sadhana, p. 85.
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tions the Upanishads as his support, according to which
"the key to cosmic consciousness, to God-consciousness, is
in the consciousness of the soul". He says that the separa-
teness of our self from Brahman is an illusion or maya,
p
"because it has no int_-rinsic reality of its own". All
these statements of Tagore obviously reflect the overlapping
of two trends in his religious thought, namely traditional
Hindu thinking and the theistic influence of the Brahma Samaj.
The former trend can perhaps be traced back to the structure
of thought displayed in his writings earlier than The Reli¬
gion of Man in which the latter trend came more into view.
Hence traditional Hindu thought may be taken as being anci¬
llary to his strong belief in a personal God; for him life
should be a journey through spiritual scenery of the most
majestic kind and therefore the whole web of change in life
should be a means to that end rather than a hindrance. To
that extent, he differs from the Vedantists. That is to say,
by reason of his religious cast of mind, Tagore is more inter¬
ested in man than in the impersonal Brahman of Sankara. He
believes that God is truth to be known through love and not
through knowledge as in Sankara. Although Tagore has little
sympathy for Sankara's impersonal Brahman yet he agrees with
Sankara in saying that man is the appearance of Brahman.
Tagore explains what he means by that appearance. For him
the paintings on the canvas are more important than the can-
1. Sadhana, p. 30-
2. Ibid., p. 79.
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canvas on which they are painted. He writes: "The dream
persists; it is more real than even bread which has substance
and use. The painted canvas is durable and substantial; ...
But the picture which no factory can produce is a dream, a
maya, and yet it, not the canvas, has the meaning of ulti-
1
mate reality".
A little more detailed consideration of his works shows that
Tagore also understood anthropology from his religious point
of view. He observed: "We must not forget that life is here
to express the eternal in us Life is perpetual creation:
2
xt has its truth when xt grows xtself in the infxnite". Else¬
where he pointed out that "every true freedom that we may
attain in any direction broadens our path of self-realization,
which is in superseding the self This implies a his¬
tory of constant regeneration, a series of fresh beginnings
and continual changes to the old ". Further, Tagore
held that "there was a great chapter in the history of life
on this earth when some irresistible inner force in man
D.
found its way into the scheme of things ". He went on
to point out that "the immediate consciousness of reality
in its purest form, unobscured by the shadow of self-in¬
terest, gives us o'oy as does the self-revealing per¬
sonality of our own" and the "I am" in me crosses
1. Tagore, Creative Unity, (London, 1922), p. 10.
2. Personality, p. 65.
5. The Religion of Nan, pp. 55-56.
4. Contemporary Indian Philosophy, p. 27-
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its finitude whenever it deeply realizes itself in the "Thou
art" " "Andthus life, which is an incessant explosion of
freedom, finds its metre in a continual falling back in death.
Every day is a death, every moment even" , because dir¬
ectly a poem is fashioned, it is eternally freed from its
genesis, it minimizes its history and emphasizes its indepen¬
dence". "I believe that the vision of Paradise is to be
seen in the beauty of the human face and the wealth of
human life, ".
Tagore's two basic ideas can be deduced from the above state¬
ments, namely 1) for him life is like a poem; 2) and through
the exercise of his freedom man can and should regenerate
himself. All this is very suggestive when religion is under¬
stood from the standpoint of anthropology. Whatever the worth
of such an understanding of one's religious experience may be,
Tagore leaves no doubt on the matter that the achieving of
one's authentic life depends basically upon freedom to take
decisions - historical decisions. It is perhaps in this sense
of Tagore's insistence on man's historical decisions orienta¬
ted to fresh beginnings and continual changes to the old that
striking parallels between his scheme of thinking and Bultmann's
understanding of man in his radical historicity become obvious.
How Tagore understands history depends on how he understands
the traditional key concept called Maya. For Sankara Maya
is neither real nor unreal: it neither is nor is not. But
Tagore declares: "These /gold and lead, the rose and the
1. Contemporary Indian Philosophy, pp. 35 -36, 38, 4-3 and 4-5.
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thorn, the sun and the planets/ are dance-steps of the numbers
in the arena of time and space, which weave the maya, the
patterns of appearance, the incessant flow of change that
ever is and is not". He pictures Maya as "envelopment of
avidya; the black smoke that presages the fire of love".
And elsewhere he speaks of it as the process by which finitude
is woven by the Supreme Person, just as an artist weaves the
2
art-product out of his imagination. For him, the world,
Maya, is matter of greater importance than the pure reality
of the indeterminate and impersonal Brahman as his analogy of
the picture and the canvas indicates. All this goes to show
that his understanding of Maya is different from that of
Sankara. As we have seen, the modern theologians of Hinduism
do not separate history and the cosmic process, and we only
need to call attention to the fact that for Tagore this dis¬
tinction consists in "a change of rhythm" as shown in the
passages. Tagore pointed out that " I would rather look
forward to the opening of a new chapter in his /man's/ his¬
tory, after the cataclysm is over and the atmosphere rendered
clean with the spirit of service and sacrifice ". Further,
Tagore attaches signal importance to drawing or painting on
the canvas. It is in this sense that we can detect a note of
historiological presupposition in Tagore's system of ideas.
1. The Religion of Man, p. 141 and cf. also Contemporary
Indian Philosophy, p. 38.
2. Sadhana, p. 80, and cf. The Religion of Man, p. 141.
3. As quoted by D.S. Sarma, op. cit., p. 3^-4.
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This close examination of Tagore's works suggest that in his
system of ideas there are embedded three existential elements
similar to those of Western existentialism. (i) Tagore in¬
sists on the individual's freedom to make decisions in his
historic existence either to gain his true freedom or lose
it. (ii) He cannot think of the ultimate reality apart from
humanity. Just as existentialists insist that truth has no
reality except in the existence of men so also does Tagore
insist that "the truth of the Universe is human truth", (iii)
In his language the drawing or painting is of value for us
and not the canvas on which it is done. This means that he
lays emphasis on personal history rather than world history.
S. Radhakrishnan (1888- ).
It has been well said that Prof. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan is
the most important creator of modern Hinduism. Since his
eloquent exposition of modern Hinduism is highly academic, it
is proper for us to make an appreciative analysis of the dis¬
tinctive ideas of his religious thought and see how in some
aspects his scheme of thinking comes close to Bultmann's exis¬
tentialist theology. It is admittedly true to say that while
Radhakrishnan is greatly influenced by the western Idealism
he still remains the ablest exponent of Sankara's Idealism,
viz. monism. Not only does he reflect Sankara's position
correctly but he also vehemently argues for it. That by his
own theory of integral experience, which will be discussed
later in this chapter, Radhakrishnan improves upon Sankara's
idea of the human personality can hardly be denied. He has
written a considerable number of books and articles which
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display his detailed understanding of the major religions of
the world. His writings may be compared to those of the Gam-
bridge philosopher, the late Charles Dunbar Broad, in so far
as lucidity and grace of style go. His influence as a philo¬
sopher and as one of the greatest statesmen of the Republic
of India is highly significant. His comments on the materi¬
alistic understanding of life and his appraisal of social
and political movements, as spelled out in an autobiographi¬
cal essay, "My Search for Truth", in Religion in Transition
are admirable. Also in the same essay he sets forth his own
definition of religion: "Religion is essentially a concern of
the inner life Its roots lie in the spirit of man
The deepest depths of the soul reflect the divine, when they
are kept undimmed To this end intense spiritual labour
and moral activity are needed".
Marlow observes that "Radhakrishnan's starting point is the
Upanishads, as he shows in his early work, The Reign of Reli¬
gion in Contemporary Philosophy, but he has a unique view¬
point in that he is steeped in Western as well as in Eastern
philosophy and has lived in the west as scholar and a man of
affairs"
As is well known, the most typical formulation of modern
Hinduism is that the destiny of the individual is not Just
a liberation from the bonds of nature, but a full realization
1. S. Radhakrishnan, "My Search for Truth" in Religion in
Transition, ed. Vergilius Eerm (London, 1937) PP. 20-21.
2. Radhakrishnan:An Anthology, ed. A.N. Marlow (London, 1952),
p. A.
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of man's divine possibilities. To this idea, Radhakrishnan
draws attention, explaining it, in classic fashion, from his
idealistic view of life. .Further, he has also given the weight
of his advocacy to Prof. A.N. Whitehead's definition of reli¬
gion: "What the individual does with his solitariness" and
he qualifies it by saying that "it /religion? is an attempt
to discover the ideal possibilities of human life, a quest
for emancipation from immediate compulsions of vain and petty
moods". The ideal for him is the experience of the sage or
the Hindu seer, "who finds his God in his deeper self
2
The seers see the Supreme in the self, and not in images".
Sankara's philosophy had made a lasting impression on Radha¬
krishnan. Sankara was the most outstanding thinker of classi-
3
cal Hinduism. Radhakrishnan's unalterable conviction is
that the logic of the indeterminate Brahman of Sankara is
unassailable. However, the negative teaching of Sankara is
not wholly accepted by Radhakrishnan. He writes: "The anxi¬
ety to be loyal as far as possible to Vedantism appears
to be the explanation of much of the inconsistency of Sankara's
philosophy But when, with the Buddhist he /Sankara as a
Vedantin? admits that the finite is illusory, his absolute
becomes something in which all is lost and nothing is found
again But there is no denying that the positive method
1. S. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life (London, 1932),
p. 88.
2. S. Radhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life (London, 1927),P« 32.
3. See add. n. on Classical Vedanta.
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Sankara intends to pursue as a Vedantin and the negative
method he does sometimes pursue as an interpreter of Buddhism
end in conflict and contradiction". But later on in his
writings Radhakrishnan qualified this statement by saying:
"The Upanisads and Sankara try to express the nature of the
ultimate being in negative terms". "The eye goes not thither
nor speech nor mind". There is a danger in these negative
descriptions. By denying all attributes and relations we
expose ourselves to the charge of reducing the ultimate being
2
to bare existence which is absolute vacuity". For Sankara
the world is neither being nor non-being. But Radhakrishnan
seems to be inclined towards looking upon it as both being
and non-being. He writes: "The being of which we have experi¬
ence is not absolute being. Whatever falls short in any de¬
gree of absolute reality has in it admixture of non-being. In
the world of experience, we have a conflict between being and
non-being. In and through their mutual hostility, the world
3
exists. If there were no non-being, there would be no being".
This indicates that Radhakrishnan advocates the theory that
the world both "is" and "is not" as against Sankara's theory
of the world. That is, he slightly altered Sankara's con¬
cept of the world by bringing into focus the idea of the
"relative reality of the world". Radhakrishnan's theory es¬
tablishes a certain intelligible connection between the world
1. S. Radhakrishnan, The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore
(London, 1918), pp. 116-117-
2. S. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, pp. 101-2.
3- Contemporary Indian Philosophy, p. 283-
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of change and the unchanging being. For him as P.T. Ra.ju
explains "maya is not illusion for man; it is real. The
world is real, It is real as man himself".
Radhakrishnan also reinterprets Sankara's Absolute who is
beyond human description and the conceptual understanding of
man. For Sankara the Absolute is eternally cut off from the
appearances: Brahman alone is real, without qualities, a pure
being. Radhakrishnan, on the other hand, understands the
Absolute as the universal mind. He observes: "God as the
universal mind working with a conscious design, who is at
once the beginning of the world, the author of its order, the
principle of its progress, and the goal of its evolution, is
not the God of religion unless we take into account the facts
A Q
of religious consciousness". He elsewhere characterizes
the Absolute as follows: "The Absolute is joy: God is love.
Joy is self-existent reality, an absolute which does not de-
2
pend on objects but only on itself". Radhakrishnan brings
out a new dimension of the Absolute not implied in classical
Hindu writers* thought. He writes: "Becoming, which is the
union of the two principles of being and non-being, is alone
real ". ^
From these passages it can be noted that there are striking
similarities between his understanding of the nature of Brah-
1. P.T. Raju, The Philosophical Traditions of India (London,
1971), P. 231.
1a.An Idealist View of Life, p. 333»
2. Contemporary Indian Philosophy, p. 282.
3. The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy (London,
1920); p. 168.
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man and that of Tagore and also that of Aurobindo Ghosh which
we will see when we discuss his religious thought. Tagore's
Absolute is the Supreme Person, "humanized", and only thus
can human beings understand him. Radhakrishnan understands
Brahman as definable by certain epithets or categories such
as joy. How his definition of Brahman is akin to Aurobindo's
view of the ultimate reality will be shown when we explain
Aurobindo's position. On the whole, one cannot resist the
conclusion that Radhakrishnan's chief contribution to Indian
absolutism is his making clear that the Absolute can be reached
positively, and not merely negatively as maryorthodox Advaitins
seem to hold.1
Another key concept with which almost every modern Hindu writer
deals is that of the concept of karma. This single concept
has had a profound and far-reaching influence on Indian think¬
ing. Radhakrishnan as a logician and a religious-philosopher
of modern Hinduism reinterprets the concept of karma as fol¬
lows: "It is the psychological principle that our life carries
p
within it a record that time cannot blur or death erase". In
one sense, Radhakrishnan does not seem to go beyond the fata¬
listic interpretation of karma. For him "it is the law of the
conservation of moral energy. The vision of law and order is
revealed in the Rta of the Rg-Veda. According to the princi-
• •
pie of karma there is nothing uncertain or capricious in the
z - -
moral world. We reap what we sow". He adds: "The Mahabha-
1.1 owe this idea to P.T. Raju, Idealistic Thought of India,
p. 350.
2. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy I (London, 1923)
P. 350.
3. Ibid., p. 244.
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rata believes in the force of karma, or the fatality of the
act Attempts are made to reconcile the law of karma
with the freedom of man". He concedes that this fatalistic
interpretation assumes some importance in the popular under¬
standing of the doctrine of karma. He argues that "there
adhisthana, or the basis or centre from which we work, kartr
•
or doer, karana or the instrumentation of nature, cesta or* » J
effort and daiva or fate. The last is the power or powers
othertban human, the cosmic principle which stands behind,
modifying the work and disposing of its fruits in the shape
p
of act and its reward". Krishna says: The fourfold order
was created by Me according to the division of quality and
work "Gita IV. 13". Radhakrishnan comments that "the
emphasis is on guna (aptitude) and karma (function) and not
— 5
jati (birth)". In his book, The Philosophy of the Upanigads,
he writes: "There is no doctrine that is so valuable in life
and conduct as the karma theory karma inspires hope for
the future and resignation of the past". And in the same
book he claims that "as a matter of fact, the Upanishads hold
that we can be free from karma only by social service
karma rightly understood does not discourage moral effort ...
q.
.... For Radhakrishnan, as B.G. Gokhale comments: "while
1. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy I (London, 1923),
p. 24-5.
2. S. Radhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgita (London, 194-8), p. 4-8.
3. Ibid., p. 160.
4-. S. Radhakrishnan, The Philosophy of the Upanigads (London:
New York, 1924), pp. 125, 121-22. '
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karma is social, mukti is individual and it is only when
the social role is played socially that individuality can
find perfection". There are two points to be noted in
Radhakrishnan's statement quoted above: 1) In saying that
'we can be free from karma only by social service' he is
probably making it plain that he cannot agree with the idea
that karma doctrine is inconsistent with social service. 2)
The individual's salvation or freedom cannot be completed
apart from the collective experience of the community. His
own words are: "What looms over us is no dark fate but our
own past. We are not victims of a driving doom". "When we
2
perform disinterested work we reach freedom". Moreover, in
Radhakrishnan's view the ideas of heaven and hell which had
been worked out by the Vedic seers came to be associated with
the more intellectual and metaphysical doctrine of karma.
Hence for him, as Gokhale explains "karma was developing as
a concept of value with ethical as well as social implications
3
and had cosmic as well as psychological aspects". All these
statements obviously indicate that in Radhakrishnan's opinion
karma is an attempt to explain the universe in rational terms
since "it is the law of the conservation of moral energy".
One wonders whether Radhakrishnan's interpretation of karma
understood in terms of psychological, social and cosmic de¬
mands of life has not stemmed from his understanding of the
1. B.G. Gokhale, op. cit., p. 115.
2. S. Radhakrishnan, The Philosophy of the Upanisads, p. 122.
3. B.G. Gokhale, op. cit. , p. 123-
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western Christian Church and its doctrines. It is probably
correct to say that Radhakrishnan was trying to show to the
western world that the age-long conception of karma is in
one sense metaphysically and epistemologically a sound doc¬
trine.
However, there is a positive approach to the understanding of
karma in his thinking. That is, he seems to go far beyond
the popular conception of karma. He strongly affirms the
individual's freedom as over against the fatalistic concep¬
tion of that concept; he clarifies its mechanical aspect in
such a way that human freedom is safeguarded. For Radha¬
krishnan karma leaves room for freedom, whereby an individual
has the chance to improve his lot. He makes this point clear
by using the game of cards as an illustration: "The cards in
the game of life are given to us. We do not select them.
They are traced to our past Karma, but we can call as we
please, lead what suit we will, and as' we play, we gain or
-i
lose. And there is freedom". "Karma is not so much a prin¬
ciple of retribution as one of continuity". "Karma or conne¬
ction with the past is not inconsistent with creative free-
2 _
dom". He writes: "He /man7 is mightier than his karma. If
the law is all, then there is no real freedom possible ....
The spiritual nature is the basis of his initiative and
endeavour. The mechanical cart is under constraint". He
1. The Hindu View of Life, p. 75^
2. An Idealist View of Life, pp. 275 and 276.
3. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy I, pp. 246-4-7,
and The Philosophy of the Upanisads, p. 122.
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further argues that "we are not puppets moved hither and
thither by the blind impersonal necessity of omnipotent
matter or the sovereignty of divine providence". "The
freedom of will possessed by self-conscious individuals
makes possible sin and discord". "It is our community with
the Eternal that endows us with the creative quality. It
-i
helps us to remake the environment ". He further
explains that karma is not inconsistent with freedom. It
is a condition not a destiny. In the Gita it is even a
creative force. "While it /karma7 regards the past as deter¬
mined, it allows that the future is only conditioned ".
"Unfortunately, the theory of Karma became confused with fa¬
tality in India when man himself grew feeble and was disin¬
clined to do his best. It was made into an excuse for inertia
and timidity and was turned into a message of despair and not
of hope ..... I have said enough to indicate that such a
philosophy of despair is not the necessary outcome of the
p
doctrine of Karma". The twofold idea of divine grace and
necessity of performance of one's assigned karma in the spirit
of yoga to secure that grace ultimately led Radhakrishnan to
recognize that "Karma is not a mechanical principle but a
spiritual necessity". It is precisely in this sense that
Radhakrishnan goes far beyond the fatalistic view of karma.
Moreover, his insistence on "the idea of freedom of the will
1. S. Radhakrishnan, "Fragments of a Confession", in The
Philosophy of S. Radhakrishnan, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (New
York, 1952), pp. 42 and 43.
2. The Hindu View of Life, pp. 75, 76-77-
3. Ibid., p. 73-
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as that which can remake the environment" reflects a new
and positive meaning he gives to history as opposed to the
traditional understanding of history. This is, indeed, a
point of comparison with Bultmann's understanding of history
as embodying meaning in the moment of decision.
We have alluded already to the fact that Radhakrishnan was
greatly influenced by Sankara's logic and religious thought.
Hence it is not surprising that Radhakrishnan never tires of
explaining his own view of religious experience in Sankara's
idealistic fashion: "In the experience of itself the self is
wholly integrated and is therefore both the knower and the
known, but it is not so in any intellectual description of
the experience". He adds: "The consubstantiality of the spi¬
rit in man and God is the conviction fundamental to all spi¬
ritual wisdom The greatest text of the Upanishads affirms
it tat tvam asi (That art Thou). It is a simple state-
ment of an experienced fact". Whatever the logical force of
such an argument, Radhakrishnan's insistence on the knowledge
of one's self as being consubstantial with the divine being
perhaps springs from the principle of self-awareness derived
from introspection - an indefinite enlargement of one's inte¬
grated self. This sequel to mystical experience as the source
and goal of life is repeatedly stressed in his writings. The
quality of mystical knowledge is described by the terms, "self-
2
established", "self-evidencing", self-luminous". For him,
1. An Idealist View of Life, pp. 96, 105-4-.
2. Ibid., p. 92.
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mystical intuition is described as "supreme awareness, the
intimately felt presence".
All this eloquent explanation of mystical experience, more
specifically, integral experience, points to his burning con¬
viction that "the unchanging substance of all religious ex-
p
perience is the evolution of man's consciousness". This
obviously, in turn, implies self-consciousness which enables
man to look reflectively and critically at himself, at his
powers. For Radhakrishnan, "the reflective capacity of the
human mind ..... is the essence of self-conscious intelli¬
gence to look before and after and to vary action according
to circumstances". In this direction indicated here he goes
one step further to argue that "to inquire into his true self,
to live in and from it, to determine by its own energy what
it shall be inwardly and what it shall make of its outward
circumstances, to found the whole life on the power and truth
IL
of spirit is moksa or spiritual freedom".
One cannot avoid the impression that for Radhakrishnan inte¬
gral experience is the sole and sure means of spiritual free¬
dom.
It is against this background of his understanding of one's
religious experience that Radhakrishnan goes on to explain
that the "foundation of St Raul's Christianity is a vision,
1. S. Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought
(Oxford, 1959), p. 50. ~ "
2. S. Radhakrishnan, "Fragments of a Confession" in The
Philosophy of S. Radhakrishnan, p. 77*
5. An Idealist "View of Life, p. 262.
4. Eastern Religions and western Thought, p. 552.
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not an external revelation "And the direct appre-
2
hension of Reality is incommunicable (II Cor. 12:2)". In
so far as Paul's experience as stated in II Cor. 12:2 is
concerned, Radhakrishnan puts it briefly and pointedly that
the direct vision of Reality is beyond human speech. His
statements about Paul's experience show that he finds it
hard to accept that Paul's conversion experience is not a
matter cf self-awareness derived from introspection.
Further, in Radhakrishnan's system of ideas the man-ward
aspect of religion appears with particular urgency. For
instance, as a comment on the verse in the Gita 9:34- be
observes: " The way to rise out of our ego-centred
consciousness to the divine plane is through focusing of
all our energies, intellectual, emotional and volitional
on God. Then our whole being is transformed and lifted up
into the unity and universality of spirit". This obviously
reflects his traditional Hindu philosophic position, but one
wonders whether this position can escape the difficulty of
inwardizing one's religious experience. Taking his stand
on the Upanishadic teaching: "Some one who is wise, desiring
eternal life, sees the inner self by turning the eyes inward",
Radhakrishnan brings out with explicitness the implications
of the theory of inwardization. He comments: "Inward medita-
tion is the way to spiritual insight".
1. Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 221.
2. S. Radhakrishnan, Religion in A- Changing World, p. 105.
3. S. Radhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgita, pp. 254—55.
4-. S • Radhakrishnan, Religion and Society (London, 194-7),
p. 67, cited by W. Stewart, India's Religious Frontier
(London, 1964-), p. 98.
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This makes it clear that Radhakrishnan's theory of the man-
ward aspect of religion undoubtedly individualizes the cate¬
gory of freedom of the will giving supreme and sole importance
to the idea of the God-ward endeavour of the human spirit.
This distinctive idea of individualizing the category of free¬
dom in his scheme of thinking may well be similar to Bult-
mann's idea of an authentic life on the basis of the indivi¬
dual's historical decisions for God.
Furthermore, Radhakrishnan points out that "Each individual is
his own authentic self ..... Each has to tread his path". He
writes: "Man's true and essential greatness is individual. The
scriptures could point out the road but each man must travel
2 - 3
it for himself". "The finite as finite must be transcended".
A brief survey of Dr. Radhakrishnan's understanding of self
would shed some light on his main position. For him "the hu¬
man self is an emergent aspect of the world process and not a
4
substance different in kind from the process itself". Arapura
paraphrases D.M. Datta's statement of Radhakrishnan's concept
of self as follows : "It /the human self7 is an organized whole
The more he unifies his life in pursuit of ideals, the
more organized, integrated and perfect does his life become"
1. Recovery of Faith, p. 180.
2. Eastern Religions and 'Afestern Thought, p. 354-.
3. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy II (London, 1926), p. 626.
4-. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, p. 266.
5. J.G. Arapura, Radhakrishnan and Integral Experience (London,
1966), p. 145.
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Radhakrishnan's understanding of self is well brought out by
Prof. D.M. Datta in this way: "The more self is developed the
greater is the reality it can absorb and identify itself with".
Radhakrishnan writes: "The peculiar privilege of the human self
is that he can consciously join and work for the whole and em-
2
body in his whole life the purpose of the whole".
It is worthy of note that this tendency, namely the human self
in the context of the whole in Radhakrishnan's thinking is in¬
deed significant and definitely an improvement on the traditi¬
onal Hindu conception of salvation which is so completely in¬
dividualistic. This means that, while Sankara's conception
of salvation concerned itself with an intuitive knowledge of
Brahman as the surest means of one's ultimate end of life (Tat
Tvam asi, That art Thou), Radhakrishnan, does not rest content
with such a concept of individualistic salvation. For him,
the idea of the self as achieving its true fulfilment within
the context of community is utterly lacking in classical Hin¬
duism. Hence, he insists that the experience of the true
yogin or 'Jeevanmukta' cannot be complete apart from his com¬
plete involvement with society. This important current in his
thought explains a more definite point of difference between
the modern Hindu interpretation of the individual and the trad¬
itional Hindu understanding of the human self in which far too
little attention was given to the place of the individual in
the community.
1. D.M. Datta, The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy
(Calcutta, 1952), p. 90, quoted by Arapura, op. cit~ p. 152.
2. An Idealist View of Life, pp. 273-74.
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Radhakrishnan1s chief further contribution to the modern ver¬
sion or formulation of Hinduism is that he develops his own
concept of history. In one sense he seems to give a spiritual
interpretation to the meaning of history. For him, "The mean¬
ing of history is to make all men prophets to establish a king¬
dom of free spirits". "History" for him, "is not a cyclic
movement. It is full of new things, because God works in it
"i
and reveals Himself in it ". In another sense, he breaks
a new ground in the traditional understanding of history. He
holds that "man is not at the mercy of inexorable fate. If he
wills, he can improve on his past record. There is no inevita-
2
bility of history". "By a change in mental and spiritual dis¬
position, we can check the rapid decline and prepare for our-
selves a new destiny". Elsewhere he argues that "man is esse¬
ntially a remaker. He is not content with the pattern of the
past ". "In Indian thought we have both existentialist
distress and rational reflection". "Man not only is, but he
knows that he _is. His being is open to himself". "The contin¬
gency of history is due to the free choice of men There
is no predetermined pattern. There is the play of the contin¬
gent, the unforeseen; the human will is unpredicatable". "The
future is boundless and its possibilities unlimited" "It
is wrong to think that we are in the grip of relentless deter¬
minism, and cannot alter the shape of things to come". "Man
1. S. Radhakrishnan, "Fragments of A Confession" in The Philo¬
sophy of S. Radhakrishnan, pp. 30, 42, quoted by B.G.
Gokhale op. cit., p. 21.
2. Recovery of Faith, p. 4.
3. S. Radhakrishnan, 'My Search for Truth" in Religion in
Transition, pp. 52-53-
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can cause new currents to surge up in history No blind
impersonal fate rules the world" "Karma is used to
account for the conditions of life but man directs his des¬
tiny". "He /man/ can fling a flaming torch into the darkness
of the future". For him, "history is not a meaningless re¬
petition but a creative process determined by the free acts of
the individuals We can remake the earth in its likeness
2
if we truly believe and practise the life of spirit".
Furthermore, in his discussion elsewhere on the concept of
human freedom Radhakrishnan remarks: "The future has yet to
be made. Our present choices give a new form even to the
3
past so that what it means depends on what we do now". It
is exactly here that Radhakrishnan comes close to the exist¬
entialists' understanding of the human being in history.-
"Existentialism, as he understands it, is a Transitional Phase
4
of Individual Development". He never ceases to emphasize
- - 5
that "he /man/ has to realize new possibilities".
These statements explain why he gives a new and positive
meaning to history. This survey of Radhakrishnan's religions
thought suggests that there are striking similarities between
his thought and existentialist thinking. For instance, (i) he
brought out a new dimension of reality, i.e. "Becoming which
1. S. Radhakrishnan, Religion in A Changing World, pp. 16, 61,
67, 137, 14-2-45, and 153.
2. Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p.. 129.
3. S. Radhakrishnan, "Fragments of a Confession" in The
Philosophy of S. Radhakrishnan, p. 42.
4. Ibid., p. 59.
5. Religion in exchanging World, p. 95.
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is the union of two principles of being and non-being, is
alone real". Kierkegaard also reached the same conclusion:
"As soon as the being which corresponds to the truth comes
to be empirically concrete, the truth is put in process of
becoming, ". For him "God, the absolutely Eternal, is
p
to be grasped in the becoming of existence, Just as
existentialists questioned philosophical idealism which could
not establish an intelligible relation between the eternal and
the temporal so also did Radhakrishnan question the traditio¬
nal concept of Brahman as it is itself, as immutable and as
eternally cut off from appearances, (ii) Over against the
fatalistic conception of karma he insisted on human freedom,
"freedom of the will possessed by self-conscious individuals
which helps us to remake the environment". For him,
man is essentially a remaker. (iii) Just as the wholehearted
champions of existentialism insist on personal history and the
play of the contingent so also does Radhakrishnan lay a con¬
sistent emphasis on the idea of history as a creative process
determined by the free acts of the individuals. For him, "the
contingency of history is due to the free choice of men". That
is, Radhakrishnan stresses an existential understanding of
history as embodying meaning in the moment of decision.
Mahatma Gandhi (1869-194-8)
Gandhi's idea of Swaraj ('self rule', national freedom) paved
1. Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Tr. from
the Danish by David F. Swenson (London, 194-1), p. 170.
2. Kierkegaard: Concluding Unscientific Postscript, as quoted
in The Search for Being, p. 51•
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the way for the self-respect of his countrymen that first
earned him the title of Nahatma (Great Soul). It was Rabi-
ndranath Tagore who first addressed him in this form.
Gandhi's programme of self-purification for the touchable
Hindu through the service of the untouchables was particularly
telling and constituted a challenge and a call for the whole
nation. C.F. Andrews remarks that Gandhi did not belong to
any of the new reforming sects of Hinduism. He is a conserva¬
tive in religion. But, nevertheless, it will be noted that
just as the most important thinkers of renascent Hinduism es¬
pecially Radhakrishnan believed in the idea of soul - force so
Gandhi affirmed that the substantial strength of one's reli¬
gious experience springs from within - his ultimate appeal was
always to the still small voice within. D.S. Sarma put Gandhi's
whole religion in a nut-shell as follows: "(1) his absolute
faith in God, (2) his perfect surrender to His will, (3) his
belief in the brotherhood not only of all human beings but of
all living beings, (4-) his spirit of renunciation and (5) his
-1
ideal of continual service to his fellow creatures". S.K.
George observes: "Gandhi's whole philosophy of thought and action
is? rooted in the bed-rock of Truth". "It is a practical appli¬
cation of the teaching of Christ that he that loseth his life
shall find it; that one realizes one's true and large life in
the pursuit of the eternal values, even though the way to it
p
may lie through the physical body". It is not difficult to
1. D.S. Sarma, op. cit., p. 566.
2. S.K. George, Gandhi's Challenge to Christianity (London,
1939), pp. 36, 48.
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show that this idea of the denial of the self as the principle
of gaining one's life comes very close to the focal point of
Jesus' teaching on true discipleship: 'If any man would come
after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross and
follow me', Mk. 8:34-. It is generally admitted that Gandhi
was probably greatly influenced by Jesus' words and adopted
them as one of the essential principles of his religious life.
Gandhi's understanding of man's nature points to the fact that
evil in human nature takes away its bloom and beauty. He points
out that "man's destined purpose is to conquer old habits, to
overcome evil in him and to restore good to its rightful place
Not until we have reduced ourselves to nothingness can
we conquer the evil in us". For him, "The word 'Satya'
(Truth) is derived from 'Sat' which means being. And nothing
is or exists in reality except Truth. That is why 'Sat' or
Truth is perhaps the most important name of God. In fact it
is more correct to say that Truth is God than to say that God
p
is Truth". Elsewhere Gandhi writes: "Of late, instead of
saying God is Truth I have been saying Truth is God, in order
more fully to define my religion Denial of God we have
known. Denial of Truth we have not known". This Truth,
Gandhi declares, is the Law of the Universe. He writes:
"
; there is an unalterable Law governing everything and
every being that exists or lives. It is not a blind law; for
1. Young India, 20-12-'28, quoted in M.K. Gandhi, Hindu Dharma
(Ahmedabad, 1950), pp. 107, 109.
2. Extract from Yeravda Mandir by U.K. Gandhi (Ahmedabad, 1932)
quoted in Selected Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, ed. Ronald
Dunean, (London, 1971)* p. 4-1.
3. Contemporary Indian Philosophy, p. 21.
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no blind law can govern the conduct of living beings
That Law, then, which governs all life is God. Law and law-
it 1
giver are one".
Further, Gandhi says: "One can realise Truth and ahimsa /Law
of life/ only by ceaseless striving Realizing the limi¬
tations of the flesh, we strive day by day towards the ideal
with what strength we have in us". "Nirvana", as Gandhi
understood it, "is undoubtedly not utter extinction
Nirvana is utter extinction of all that is base in us, all
that is vicious in us, all that is corrupt and corruptible
in us. Nirvana is not lite He black, dead peace of the grave,
but the living peace, the living happiness of a soul which is
conscious of itself, and conscious of having found its own
2
abode in the heart of the Eternal". In Gandhi's opinion,
"the act of renunciation is a deliberate act, not done in
ignorance. It is therefore a regeneration". " renunci¬
ation is essential for our very existence, for our soul".
"The secret of happy life lies in renunciation. Renunciation
is life".^
Gandhi's social concern was, indeed, remarkable as he made
a landmark in the history of uprooting social injustice, es¬
pecially untouchability. His social concern or the ideal to
which he urged the nation to attain must be understood from
1. Gandhi's Ideas, ed. C.F. Andrews (London, 1929), p. 4-5.
2. Hindu Dharma, pp. 225-24-, and 242.
3. Harijan 50-1-'57; Harijan, 24-2-'4-6, quoted in Hindu
Dharma, pp. 58, 40 and 42.
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two angles. As a Sanatani Hindu he held fast to the idea of
Varna Dharma; he meant by the Varna Dharma the four divisions
of people in India, as these define duties; they confer no
privileges. Gandhi regarded Varandharma as healthy division
of work based on birth and stated that the ideas of caste are
a perversion of the original intention. He writes: "There is
no question with me" of superiority or inferiority. "It is
purely a question of duty". And as a social reformer he
characterized the theory of untouchability as being "repugnant
to reason and to the instinct of pity or love". He adds: "Let
us not deny God by denying to a fifth of our race the right
2
of association on an equal footing".
5
To him "Religion is the service of the helpless ".
"The purpose of life is undoubtedly to know oneself The
instrument of this knowledge is boundless selfless service".
The meaningful content of Gandhi's two important ideas, namely
renunciation and 'ahimsa' or 'Law of life' must now be dis¬
cussed at some length. For him runciation for all practical
purposes is the same as nirvana and both these terms mean
nothing but regeneration of the individual. His understand¬
ing of renunciation as regeneration implies that for him the
rule of life was no longer the whole round of ritual but had
1. Young India, 23-4-25.
2. Gandhi's Idea, pp. 41 and 42.
3. Young India, August 14, 1924, quoted in The Essential Gandhi :
An Anthology, ed. Louis Fischer (London, 1963), p. 229.
4. Letter to an English friend, Muriel Lester, June 21, 1932,
quoted in Mahadeva Desai, The Diary of MahadevI,(Ahmedabad,
1953), p. 184.-
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to come to terms with the new dimension of life. How can man
achieve regeneration? Gandhi's answer is: man cannot achieve
regeneration unless he risks himself. This idea of regenera¬
tion is indeed a striking parallel to Tagore's idea of life as
a history of constant regeneration, a series of fresh beginn¬
ings and continual changes to the old.
For Gandhi, "Non-violence in its dynamic condition means con¬
scious suffering. It does not mean meek submission to the
will of the evil-doer, but it means the pitting of one's whole
soul against the will of the tyrant". Non-violence is not
just a negative quality but a positive force of love and pa¬
tience, born of the conviction that human beings can be per¬
suaded and morally converted so as to make them act in the
2
ways of truth and righteousness. "Non-violence is nothing
other than the omnipotence of love which forgives instead of
punishing, which suffers for the other instead of wounding
him, which does not externally force (a person into doing a
thing) but conquers from within. The power of such non-vio¬
lent love transforms an erring man into a true man", (my tr..
.... Gewaltlosgkeit ist also nichts anderes als die Allmacht
der Liebe, die statt zu strafen vergibt, die statt zu verwun-
t
den fur den anderen selber leidet, die nichtauBerlich zwingt,
sondern von innen her uberwindet. Die Macht solcher gewalt-
losen Liebe schafft irrenden Menschen in wahre Menschen urn").^
1. Extract from Non-Violence in Peace and War by M.K. Gandhi
(Ahmedabad, 194-2), cited in Selected Writings of Mahatma
Gandhi, p. 4-9.
2. cf. Selections from Gandhi, ed. N.K. Bose (Ahmedabad, 194-8),
Chap. IX, pp. 14-2 ff.
3. 0. Wolff, Mahatma Und Christus (Berlin, 1955), p. 27.
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"For me", says Gandhi, "non-violence is not a mere philoso¬
phical principle. It is the rule and the breadth of my life
Not violence, not untruth, but non-violence, Truth is
the law of our being". For him, "Ahimsa means moksa and
2
moksa is the realization of the Truth". "I cannot practise
ahimsa without practising the religion of service, and I can¬
not find the truth without practising the religion of ahimsa.
x
And there is no religion other than truth". "Ahimsa is the
Law of life and the progressive recognition of the Law and its
application in practice is the fundamental distinctiveness of
4
man from the beast". Gandhi also affirmed the identity of
ahimsa with "uttermost selflessness" which, he said, "means
5
complete freedom from regard to one's body".
All these statements show how Gandhi advocated the theory of
ahimsa taking his stand on the religion which hinges on two
basic assumptions, namely Truth and the law of the universe
which for him is Love. Hence P.T. Raju summarily gives the
1. Extract from Non-Violence in Peace and War by U.K. Gandhi,
cited in Selected Writings of Malaatma Gandhi, p. 58.
2. Young India, 12-11-'25, cited in Hindu Dharma, p. 138.
3. Young India, 14—8-'24-, cited in Hindu Lharma, p. 11.
4-. Haritjan, 26 Sept. 1936.
5. As quoted by M.M. Thomas, The Acknowledged Christ of the
Indian Renaissance (London^ 1969), p. 196.
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__ A
essentials of Gandhi's philosophy of Truth (Satyagraha) as
follows: 1. God is Truth and Truth is God, the two are iden¬
tical 2. Since God is Truth, Truth is the Law of life;
the Law and the Lawgiver are one. 3« The essential nature of
God is love. So the Law of Truth is the Law of Love 6.0ne
should also abide in Love, since Truth is God and God is Love.
Satyagraha will then mean abiding in Love The above is,
in essence, the spiritual and philosophical basis of Gandhi's
practice. Satyagraha is obstinate and unflinching adherence
2
to the Law of Truth and Love so to non-violence".
This summary makes it clear that Gandhi's understanding of non¬
violence or 'ahimsa' springs from his concept of God and his
relation to the world. In this sense, his religious thought
expressed through the categories like Law of life, satyagraha,
non-violence and above all love is built upon his own reason
and conscience, to be more precise, his understanding of the
philosophy of religion.
Muzumdar observes: "While he was an absolutist in his philoso¬
phy of life and in his fundamental loyalties, Gandhi was a
relativist and pragmatist in his mode of operation"
'For, under Swaraj, too, I would not hesitate to advise those
5
who would bear arms to do so and fight for the country'".
In his famous editorial on The Doctrine of the Sword (Young
India, August 11, 1920) Gandhi categorically affirmed that
when there was "only a choice between cowardice and violence",
he would advise violence". "Cowardice is wholly inconcistent
1. See add. note on satyagraha.
2. P.T. Raju, The Philosophical Traditions of India, pp. 223-24.
3. H.T. Muzumdar, Mahatma Gandhi:Peaceful Revolutionary (New
York: London, 1^52), pp. 102-3 quoting Young India, 1919-1922,




Gandhi never denied the reality of the world but he never ex¬
plained what he meant by Maya. And as for his teaching on God
he never ceased to emphasize that the essential nature of God
is Love. For him, the Law of Truth is the Law of Love. He
writes: "(Whilst) everything around me is ever changing, ever
dying, there is underlying all that change a living power that
is changeless, that holds all together, that creates, dissolves
and recreates. That informing power or spirit is God God
is life, Truth, Light, He is Love".^ "To me God is Truth and
Love, God is ethics and morality, God is fearlessness He
is all things to all men He is ever forgiving for He al¬
ways gives us the chance to repent. He is the greatest demo¬
crat the world ever knows for He leaves us "unfettered" to make
3
our own choice between evil and good ". In Gandhi's own
words: "I am part and parcel of tie whole, and I cannot find Him
apart from the rest of humanity If I could persuade myself
that I should find Him in a Himalayan cave, I would proceed there
Ll
immediately. But I know I cannot find Him apart from humanity".
For him, "His divine essence is both Truth (Satya) and Harmless-
ness (Ahimsa)". From these statements it becomes obvious for
1. Extract from Non-Violence in Peace and War by M.K. Gandhi,
cited in Selected Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, p. 55.
2» Young India, October 11, 1928, quoted in The Essential Gandhi
An Anthology, p. 229.
3. Young India, March 5, 1925* quoted in Hindu Dharma, op. 228-
2^r~"
A. The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi, eds. R.K. Prabhu and U.R. Rao
(2nd ed. Madras, 194-8), p." 30, auoted by H.T. Muzumdar, op. cit.,
po. 30-31.
5. Gandhi's Ideas, p. 47.
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us that there is a striking similarity between Gandhi's under¬
standing of God and Tagore's Absolute described as the Supreme
person. Like Tagore, he contends that he cannot understand
God apart from humanity. His understanding of God gives us
the clue to his concept of human freedom. That is, we detect
here ample evidence for his crystallized teaching on the as¬
pect of human freedom and Truth and Ahimsa as essential attri¬
butes of the divine being.
Another aspect of Gandhi's religious thought concerns his con¬
cept of history. A -philosophy of history is not a dominant
concept in Gandhi's thought. However, a close examination of
his works suggest that in his system there is an implicit exi¬
stential understanding of history even though he does not
consistently elaborate it. Lor Gandhi, "History is really a
record of every interruption of the even working of the forces
of love or of the soul", and that "the sum total of the energy
of mankind is not to bring us down but to lift us up, and that
is the result of the definite, if unconscious, working of the
law of Love". Gandhi maintained: "Only remember that Truth
is not one of the many qualities that we name. It is the liv¬
ing embodiment of God, it is the only life, and I identify
Truth with the fullest life, and that is how it becomes a con¬
crete thing. God is his whole creation, the whole existence,
and service of all that exists Truth is service of
2 _ _
God". The central teaching of the Gita which he so unwaver-
1. As quoted by B.G. Gokhale, op. cit., p. 20.
2. Hari,jan, 25 May. 1935.
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ingly followed had left him with an impression that "man is
the maker of his destiny in the sense that he has the free¬
dom of choice as to the manner in which he uses that freedom,
/put man cannot control results, and when he thinks he doe§7,
he comes to grief". A moment's reflection of these last two
statements will convince one that in Gandhi's thinking there
is embedded the idea of panentheism which is more fully deve¬
loped in the Western school thought associated with process
philosophers like A.N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. That
is, in Gandhi's system, as with the process philosophers, and
more so with the Bultmannian wing, the idea of God is not a
mere abstraction but is revealed in the contingent stuff of
human living - God is not a being "out there" in an immutable
tmtroubled perfection but is in time and history.
Moreover, Gandhi's acceptance of an essential connection be¬
tween the individual and the general good, more precisely, of
the principle that he was his brother's keeper, forms the
organic centre of his philosophy of life.
This study of Gandhi's system of ideas shows that there are
implied in his thought certain existential elements. For
instance: (i) Gandhi identifies truth with the fullest life
and he cannot think of transcendent Being apart from humanity.
Just as existentialists maintain truth has no reality except
in the existence of men so also does Gandhi hold that the being
of God is not a mere abstraction but concrete reality. For
1. Hari.jan, 23 March. 191-0.
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him also, as with Tagore, the truth of the universe is human
truth, (ii) As opposed to the traditional fatalistic concept
of karma Gandhi insists that God leaves us "unfettered" to
make our own choice between evil and good. Just as existen¬
tialists insist that man achieves his existence in concrete
situations, in the here and now, in his individual responsi¬
bility and decision where in hazarding himself he can gain or
lose himself so also does Gandhi insist that man cannot achieve
regeneration unless he risks himself, (iii) Just as existen¬
tialists stress the idea that man's being is open to himself
and that the human being chooses its genuine existence by be¬
coming a "resolved" self so also does Gandhi stress the idea
that "man is the maker of his destiny in the sense that he has
the freedom of choice as to the manner in which he uses that
freedom". This means that he lays emphasis on man's use of his
freedom of the will. Man achieves the possibilities of life
through his decisions in his historic existence. Every moment
is the now of responsibility, of decision. It is this philo¬
sophy of human existence which issues in the unity of history
for existentialists. For Gandhi, this unity of history is
understood from the standpoint of "every interruption of the
even working of the forces of love or of the human soul".
(Incidentally, it is to be observed that the phrase "the forces
of the human soul" is a terminology peculiar to the Hindu
theologian like Gandhi. In fact, it means the power of the
human will. Here in this connection, it may suggest the idea




Writing in 1928 about the Neo-Vedantic movement started by
Swami Vivekananda, Ramain Rolland says in his book - Prophets
of the New India:- "The most noble representative of this great
Neo-Vedantic spirit was - and still is - Aurobindo Ghosh, the
foremost of Indian thinkers, from whom intellectual and religious
p
India is awaiting a new revelation". At the age of seven Auro¬
bindo was sent to England and given the education according to
the western tradition. During his student career he proved him¬
self to be a classical scholar of note. On his return to his
motherland he served in the education service of the state of
Baroda. Later on, by taking an active part in politics some¬
times involving violent activities, he associated himself with
the then nationalist leaders whose lot it was to suffer, even
to be jailed, for the cause of national independence at the
hands of the British regime. Accordingly he was arrested by
the British. It was the most momentous change in his life
when Aurobindo left politics and began a life of renunciation
and resignation. That is, during his imprisonment he had under¬
gone a dramatic spiritual change in his life - he turned philo¬
sopher and yogi. After release he left British India and went
to Pondicherry which was at that time under French rule. There
he began practising yoga and expounding his philosophy.
Aurobindo had a profound belief in evolution, the goal of which
he saw to be the divinization of man. He held fast to the idea
1. See add. n. on Neo-Vedanta.
2. Romain Holland, Prophets of the New India, tr. E.F. Malcolm-
Smith (London, 1930), p. 502.
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that humanity can be spiritually unified and collectively
redeemed, and if this ideal is actualized the whole universe
will then be transformed into "Kingdom of God on earth", to
use his oft-repeated phrase. Through the literature circulated
from the centre of the Ashram founded by him at Pondicherry,
S. India, his life and work still exert a considerable influe-
nee on the intellectuals of India.
His teaching on anthropology can be seen from the study of his
metaphysical masterpiece, his magnum opus, The Life Divine.
It was to his credit that Sri Aurobindo condemned the rigidi¬
ties of organized religion, be it orthodox Christianity or
Hinduism, with its pettifogging legalism and the hard crust of
the doctrine of the Law of karma. He writes: "I am a Tantric.
I regard the world as born of Ananda (bliss) and living by
f
Ananda, wheeling from Ananda to Ananda. Ananda and Sakti,
2
these are the two real terms of existence". (A tantric is
generally a follower of the Sakta philosophy and is a wor¬
shipper of Sakti, the feminine and energy aspect of the abso¬
lute as Siva). His philosophy can be traced back particularly
to the Saiva and Sakta Agamas (Agamas literally mean Scriptures,
generally sectarian scriptures a.s distinguished from the
Sruti (i.e. that which is heard or given) or Veda which is a
non-sectarian scripture).
1. His greatest works are: The Life Divine, (2 Vols., 1939-4-0)
The Message of the Gita. as interpreted by Sri Aurobindo
(ed. Anilbaran Hoy, London^ 1938); The Ideal of Human Unity
in the Human Cycle, etc. (Pondicherry, 1962); The Yoga and
Its Objects (6th ed. Pondicherry, 1952); The Future Poetry
(Pondicherry, 1953); The Mother (8th ed. Pondicherry, 1956).
2. As quoted by P.T. Raju, Idealistic Thought of India, p. 299.
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Aurobindo abandoned the cohcept of karma as a mechanical de¬
terministic entity. He held the view that "we have first to
observe that a law or a chain of Karma is only an outward
machinery and cannot be elevated to a greater position as the
sole and absolute determinant of the life-workings of the cos¬
mos, unless the cosmos is itself entirely mechanical in its
character Our spirit, our self must be greater than its
karma. There is a Law, but there is also spiritual freedom:
; an inner freedom already begins to intervene and, the
more we go within, the soul's power of choice is increasingly
felt: It is not conceivable that the spirit within is an
automation in the hands of Karma, a slave in this life of its
past action: ". "The idea of retribution of karma as a
compensation for the injustice of life and Nature is a feeble
basis for the theory, for it puts forward a shallow and super¬
ficial human feeling and standard as the sense of the cosmic
Law and is based on an unsound reasoning; there must be some
2
other and stronger foundations for the law of Karma". "Our
life is affected not only by its own energies but by the ener¬
gies of others and by universal Forces, and all this vast inter¬
play cannot be determined in its results solely by the one fac¬
tor of an all-governing moral law and its exclusive attention
to the merits and demerits, the sins and virtues of individual
7
human beings". This implies that he did not agree with the
1. Sri Aurobindo , The Life Divine Revised and enlarged ed.
2 Vols. (In 3) (Calcutta, 1939) II, pp. 784-85.
2. Ibid., pp. 790-91.
3. Ibid., p. 795.
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notion of causality of karma and for him it does not provide
"an answer to a search for the true significance of life".
It is of interest to note that in explaining the meaning of
the key concept, namely karma for the present day Hinduism
both S. Radhakrishnan and Sri Aurobindo made the same affirma¬
tion that "man or man's self is greater than his karma". Never¬
theless, on a close examination of all these statements of Sri
Aurobindo one cannot fail to see the difference between his
interpretation of karma and that of Radhakrishnan. Aurobindo's
line of criticism of the popular understanding of "karma" is
geared to the logical Justification of the rejection of a great
deal of what had surrounded the karma doctrine in classical
Hinduism. This clearly reflects his profound rationalization
and the boldness with which he tried to enlighten people's
minds on the problem of "karma". This certainly commands one's
intense admiration and respect for Aurobindo as one of the in¬
fluential figures of contemporary Indian thought. Radhakrishnan,
on the other hand, whose treatment of the same doctrine we have
already alluded by insisting on the idea of karma as "the law
of necessity" or "a principle of continuity", seeks to show to
the western world that karma is a metaphysically and epistemo-
logically sound dogma of modern Hinduism. And yet at the same
time in his positive approach to the doctrine Radhakrishnan
displays some sign of being influenced by the western interpre¬
tation of human freedom.
1. Sri Aurobindo;., The Life Divine Revised and enlarged ed.
2 Vols. (In 3) (Calcutta, 1939) II, P. 780.
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From this we can draw the preliminary conclusion that Sri
Aurobindo1s deeper understanding of the design of all exis¬
tence had perhaps given him an incentive to bridge the gulf
between the ancient eternal truths, which, as he claimed, are
contained in his Hindu religion and the foremost efforts of
modern man. His achievement, at all events, lies in his lay¬
ing of the foundation for a new understanding of man's higher
levels of consciousness beyond intellect. Traditional Hindu¬
ism has laid down the four ends of man as follows: 1. The
aesthetically beautiful exnression of his desires and natural
instincts (kama); 2. material prosperity (artha); 3- the ethi¬
cally sound life (dharma); A-. and the spiritually free life
(moksa). The first three are related to man's empirical life,
while the fourth refers to his spiritual life. Against this
background, Sri Aurobindo has tried to explain the destiny of
man in a number of significant sayings. He says: "To fulfil
God in life is man's manhood. He starts from the animal vi¬
tality and its activities, but a divine existence is his ob-
gective". "The spiritual aspiration is innate in man; for he
is, unlike the animal, aware of imperfection and limitation
and feels there is something to be attained beyond what he now
is , the aspiration to exceed himself is delivered and
p
articulate within him; ". "Man is there to affirm him¬
self in the universe but also to evolve and finally to
exceed himself: ; he has to realize his individuality ....,
1. The Life Divine I,p, 56.
2. Ibid. II, pp. 838-39.
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an ultimate arrival at a free and wide harmony and luminous-
ness of knowledge and will and feeling and action and character,
is the evident intention of his nature;
A little further on he defines more precisely what 'man is
there to affirm himself in the universe' really means: "What
is suggested is nothing so revolutionary and astonishing, but
only the capacity in the human mentality, when it has reached
a certain level or a certain point of stress of evolutionary
impetus, to press towards a higher plane of consciousness and
2
its embodiment in the being". The gist of all these state¬
ments is that human being is raised to a higher level. But
how does this happen? To make this consummation possible
three things are necessary, namely "consciousness, plasticity,
and unreserved surrender, the nature of each of which is beau¬
tifully described at pp. 75-77 of the book The Mother".^ Auro-
bindo affirmed: "It is in his human nature, in all human nature,
to exceed itself by conscious evolution, to climb beyond what
4
he is". On the basis of this statement J.N. Mohanty, author
of Modern Philosophical Anthropology and the Concent of Man in
Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy (Bombay: 1956), observes that "the
cardinal principle of this philosophy is the principle that
man is what he can be; that human existence is full of possi¬
bilities; This coincides with the findings of such re-
1. The Life Divine I, pp. 593-4.
2. Ibid., p. 837-
3. S.K. Maitra, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Sri
Aurobindo, (Calcutta, 194-1), p. 12.
4. The Life Divine II, p. 644.
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searchers as Martin Heidegger: human existence consists
in its possibilities. Heidegger, however, is concerned with
what may be called 'horizontal* possibility: the possibility
of oscillating on the genuine dimension of existing. Sri
Aurobindo supplements this phenomenological with a genetic
evolutionary standpoint. Man has not only the possibilities
of leading a more inwardized, more self-conscious (i.e. the
existentialistic) life as contrasted with the externalized
1
life of the sensational man; ". Incidentally, Dr.
Mohanty does not explain what 'the possibility of oscillating
on the genuine dimension of existing' in Heidegger's writings
really means. To me, it probably means the Heideggerian con¬
cept of "ec-sistence" to express the historicity of Dasein.
Being in history as a characteristic element of the existence
of man points to the fact that in each "now" of decision man
is responsible for the past and future.
for Aurobindo, "our imperfect mental instrumentation is not
2
the last word of our possibilities; ". "But where then
is the kingdom of their fulfilling? It comes to them by the
3
exceeding of themselves". The "possibility of man exceeding
of himself" is a terminology peculiar to the philosopher stee¬
ped in the Hindu understanding of the ultimate end of man as
the culmination and fulfilment of the individual - i.e. the
1. J.N. Mohanty, "Integralism and Modern Philosophical An¬
thropology" in The Integral Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo,
eds. H. Chaudhuri and F. Spiegelberg, London, 1960),
pp. 157-58.
2. The Life Divine II, p. 667.
5. The Life Divine I, p. 68.
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general uplift of all the different spheres of existence,
physical, vital and mental. In this sense it is a matter
of different terminology rather than a matter of different
connotation (note Aurobindo's insistence on the aspect of
unreserved surrender of the self for the operation of the
divine to bring about consummation of life) between Aurobin¬
do's understanding of the consummation of one's life and
Bultmann's concept of true freedom. Of course, Bultmann,
as a Christian existentialist theologian uses the terms like
"genuine life" or "authentic existence" possessed in the mo¬
ment of decision for God. It is precisely here that the
possibility of comparison between Aurobindo's anthropology
and that of Bultmann is not too far to seek.
It may be said that Heidegger's analysis of philosophy of
existence calls for a man's direct experience with things.
Just as Heidegger's system plays down the importance of rea¬
soning and inference in apprehending reality so also does
Indian epistemology which Aurobindo represents underscore the
obRectification of reality. It is this ruling out of "the over¬
emphasis and overestimation given to the objective thought
which has no relation to the existing subject at which both
Heidegger's thought and Aurobindo's thought most readily me-
et. Further, there can be a comparison between Aurobindo's
thought and Heidegger's phrase: through decision and by deci¬
sion in the iace of -encounter. Macquarrie explains that'the philo-
1. cf. F. Spielgelberg, "Sri Aurobindo and Existentialism"
in The Integral Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo, p. 52.
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sophy of existence is not a speculative metaphysic but pheno-
menological self-analysis. 'It is not a speculation detached
from man, but man himself, as he understands himself'".
This brings us now to Sri Aurobindo's "integral yoga" which
is his special contribution to contemporary Indian philosophy.
For him, the actual insight into being can be termed as intui¬
tion (cp. Bergson's idea of intuition going beyond the pure
reason). Elsewhere Aurobindo defined more fully the idea of
"intuition" as follows: "Intuition has a fourfold power. A
power of revelatory truth-seeing, a power of inspiration or
truth-hearing, a power of truth-touch or immediate seizing of
significance a power of true and automatic descrimina-
tion of the orderly and exact relation of truth to truth, -
2
these are fourfold potencies of Intuition". He did not see
the opposition of intuition to the conceptual fictions of pure
Reason. "It /Intuitive experience/ is valid only so far as it
proceeds and it errs by stopping short of the integral experi-
z
ence".
For Aurobindo the world is real and has significance. One
important question is: How far did Aurobindo subscribe to the
Vedantist's view of the universe, namely Brahma-vivartha-vada
of Sankara? For Aurobindo, "Spirit is the soul and reality of
that which we sense as Matter; Matter is a form and body of
that which we realize as Spirit".
1. J. Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p. 238.
2. The Life Divine II, p. 1000.
3. Ibid. I, p. 118.
4. Ibid. I, p. 368.
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He writes: "Maya is one realization, an important one which
Sarikara overstressed, because it was most vivid to his own
experience. For yourselves leave the word for subordinate
_ -i
use and fix rather on the idea of Lila a deeper and more
penetrating word than Maya. Lila includes the idea of Maya
and exceeds it; nor has it that association of the vanity of
all things useless to you who had elected to remain and play
with Srikrsna in Madhura and Brndavan". He adds: "All that is
• • • •
2
the play of His caitanya in His infinite being, His manifes¬
tations, and therefore all are real He is in no way limi¬
ted by that which we see or think about Him. That is the Maya
from which we must escape, the Maya of ignorance which takes
z
things as separately existent and not God, no caitanya,....".
This indicates that like a true follower of the Sakta philoso¬
phy, Aurobindo does not believe in Maya as understood by San-
kara since for Aurobindo, "phenomenon is not phantasm; pheno-
h
menon is the substantial form of a Truth". Hence, Prof.
Charles A. Moore rightly remarks that "Aurobindo formulates
a philosophy which eliminates that alleged negativism and
5
illusionism of traditional Indian philosophy".
The cardinal principle of Aurobindo's philosophy is that at
the heart of things there is a Consciousness - Force and
1. Play.
2. Consciousness.
3- As cited by P.T. Ra.ju, Idealistic Thought of India, p. 300.
4. The Life Divine I, p. 49.
5. A Source Book in Indian Philosphy, eds. S. Radhakrishnan
and C.A. Moore (Princeton: Bombay, 1957), P- 526.
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therefore "all creation or becoming is nothing but this self-
manifestation". From the viewpoint of this statement it seems
hard to resist the conclusion that "the descent of the Absolute
into the finite, which would be inexplicable on the basis of
Sankara's negativistic interpretation is necessitated in Auro¬
bindo's view as the inevitable expression of the essential
2
power of Brahman".
One interesting feature of his system as contrasted with the
traditional philosophical understanding of Reality is that for
3
him "Becoming is the only being". It is precisely in this
sense that both Radhakrishnan and Aurobindo radically modifieed
or even deliberately changed the age-long conception that the
Absolute alone is real and that all else is neither real being
nor non-being in the language of Sankara.
One other important question is: "How far did Aurobindo empha¬
size the Spirit as personal being? It is a commonplace to say
that Aurobindo has probably been influenced by Bergson's Philo¬
sophy of Creative Evolution. There are some passages in Auro¬
bindo's writings which suggest Bergson's influence on him al¬
though he never acknowledged this openly in any of his major
works^. Aurobindo's statements like "Duration then, , is
the sole absolute" as compared with Bergson's idea of dura¬
tion, probably calls attention to the fact that the concept of
1. The Life Divine I, p. 169.
2. A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, eds. S. Radhakrishnan
and C.A. Moore, p. 575.
3. The Life Divine I, p. 117.
4. See add. n. on the question of the influence of Bergson on
Aurobindo.
5. The Life Divine I, p. 117.
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Consciousness revealing itself in matter and life is the point
at which both Aurobindo and Bergson most readily meet. In his
book, The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy, Radha-
krishnan devoted two chapters to Bergson's Absolute Idealism
in which he pointed out that Bergson's idea of matter and life
could be traced back to Consciousness and that all reality is
spiritual. For Bergson the whole is spirit. Bergson's system
is a spiritualistic monism. From this Radhakrishnan argued
that Bergson's elan vital, as the metaphysical principle of
reality and historical evolution, stood for the Absolute, the
Eternal Spirit in its manifestation in the contingent . It
is perhaps in this sense also that one can discern a certain
similarity between Aurobindo's system and that of Bergson.
Just as Bergson's Spirit could hardly be taken as a personal
being so also Aurobindo's eternal spirit was, in my opinion,
far from being personal, divine being whose function it is to
meet man as person with his transforming power.
It is of further interest to note that in Aurobindo's scheme
there are two ideas intertwined, namely the idea of atmasa-
marpana - an absolute and unconditional surrender of the indi¬
vidual to God issuing in power of God to transform him; and
that of self-realization. D.S. Sarma comments: "Aurobindo
insists on this primary condition /atmasmarpana7 throughout.
Man can achieve nothing by his own unaided effort. It is the
power of God - the Divine. Sakti - coming down into the soul
p
that can effect the transformation which is desired". In
1. cf. S. Radhakrishnan, The Reign of Religion in Contemporary
Philosophy (London, 1920) pp. 159> 161-162.
2. D.S. Sarma, op. cit., pp. 338.
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his reply to his critics who were disappointed at his retire¬
ment to a life of solitary quest Aurobindo made it clear that
"to be ourselves liberated from ego and realize our true selves
is the first necessity; all else can be achieved as a luminous
1
result, And as for the light which a Yogin should
seek, Sri Aurobindo gives the following caution in one of his
letters: "One must see what is the nature of the light ....one
must therefore be on one's guard and distinguish: the true dis¬
crimination has to come by the growth of the psychic feeling
p
and a purified mind and experience". Aurobindo writes:
"There must be then a conscious self-direction of the mental
being in us towards this change, this substitution of Super-
nature for the old nature, this transcendence".
Prom all these statements it can be seen that however eloquently
Aurobindo speaks of the unconditional surrender of the indivi¬
dual as a necessary condition for bringing down the power of
God to transform him, his traditional Hindu idea of self-
4.
abnegation or psychic preparation still comes into clear focus.
1. Sri Aurobindo, The Life Divine II, p. 512.
2. As quoted by D.S. Sarma, op. cit., p. 54-0.
3. The Life Divine II, p. 9&9-
4-. It is in view of this strand of thought in Aurobindo*s
system that one can raise an objection to the suggestion
made by Dr. Robin Boyd in his assessment of the structure
of Ghenchiah's theology in connection with the influence
of Bergson in both Aurobindo's philosophy and Chenchiah's
own thought. Dr. Boyd observes "The aspects of thought
which helped him /Chenchiah7 most were the idea of a spi¬
ritual power which comes from outside with a transforming
strength and that of the evolution empowered by the des¬
cent from above The influence of Bergson is to be
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Another important theme in Aurobindo's system concerns his
understanding of cosmic history. For him history has a
definite direction and purpose. "The life of the individual
must have the same rhythm of significance, the same law of
progression as the cosmic life; its place in that rhythm
cannot be a stray purposeless intervention, it must be an
abiding instrumentation of the cosmic purpose". "In our
present life of Nature, in our externalized surface existence,
it is the world that seems to create us; but in the turn to
the spiritual life it is we who must create ourselves and our
world". "At present mankind is undergoing an evolutionary
2
crisis in which is concealed a choice of its destiny; ".
H. Jai Sing points out that "through it and in it the eternal
spirit seeks its self-realization The crisis, however,
is upon us when the veil that separates the human from the
Supreme would be lifted ". One can immediately discern
that Aurobindo's concept of history obviously reflects how
close he comes to Hegelian Idealism according to which the
seen here both in Aurobindo and in Ghenchiah's own thought".
That is, both Chenchiah's and Boyd's understanding of Auro¬
bindo's idea of transformation of the individual through
spiritual power seem to stop short of his idea of self-
realization. To put it bluntly, they both emphasized Auro¬
bindo's idea of transforming soiritual power at the expense
of his idea of the traditional concept of self-abnegation;
but as a true believer in the power of Sakti Aurobindo em¬
phasized equally the power o f Brahman to transform the
jiva.
I. R.H.S. Boyd, An Introduction to Indian Christian Theology,
(Madras, 1969), P. 146.
2. The Life Divine II, pp. 708, 1108, 1159.
5. H. Jai Singh, Sri Aurobindo: His Life and Religious Thought
(Bangalore, 1962), p. 57.
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principle of differentiation and the wholeness of the Absolute
are held together. Moreover, there is a combination of two
ideas, namely history having a goal and a strong sense of cri¬
sis on the part of the individual, for Aurobindo realizes
that any theory of the world which does not recognize the
reality of history is of little use. His criticism of San-
kara's view of the world is: it leaves part of our being "out
in the cold to perish in the twilight of the unreal reality
of maya". In the sense of the second idea there is an in¬
teresting parallel between Aurobindo's understanding of his¬
tory and that of Bultmann.
The concept of the 'gnostic' being and the community is the
last theme of Aurobindo's system of ideas. His understanding
of 'gnostic' being is more or less the same as the Upanishadic
concept of "Jeevanmukta" or the liberated soul or the true
yogin of the Gita, which means that the self of the individual
has been delivered, only Aurobindo used a different and a
more comprehensive terminology to define more fully what the
essential nature of a jnanin should be. For him, "the gnos¬
tic being will have indeed an inmost existence in which he is
alone with God, one with the Eternal, self-plunged into the
depths of the Infinite, ". "The liberated soul extends
its perception of unity horizontally as well as vertically.
Its unity with the transcendent One is incomplete without its
unity with the cosmic Many". "The spiritual man has not stood
back altogether from the life of the community; for the sense
1. S.J. Samartha, The Hindu View of History^Classical and
Modern, pp. 26-29, cited in History and Contemporary India,
p. 78.
2. The Life Divine II, p. 1045.
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of unity with all beings, the stress of a universal love and
compassion, the will to spend the energies for the good of all
creatures, are central to the dynamic overflowing of the spirit:
"The Buddhist elevation of universal compassion, karu-
na and sympathy (Vasudhaivakutumbakam, the whole earth is my
•
family), to the highest principle of action, the Christian
emphasis on love indicate this dynamic side of the spiritual
being"
This is an admirably ingenious attempt by Aurobindo who has
interpreted the nature of the •gnostic' being in terms of the
fundamental principle of life, i.e. in living for others the
purpose of our life will be realized. It is in this sense that
Aurobindo's contribution to the history of the liberated indi¬
vidual in the context of the community is highly significant
when seen from the perspective of Indian society.
This survey of Aurobindo's thought brings to light the fact
that in his system there are embedded existential elements,
namely (i) like Radhakrishnan, Aurobindo maintains that "Be¬
coming is the only being". This is a radical attack against
the Advaita of Sankara. Aurobindo identifies the ultimate
reality with becoming, which in turn means that the transcen¬
dent Being cannot be understood except in relation to existing
human being. Just as Kierkegaard insists that "God, the abso¬
lutely Eternal, is to be grasped in the becoming of existence"
so also does Aurobindo insist that being is none other than
1. The Life Divine I, p. 62; II, p. 900 and fn.
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becoming:, (ii) Over against the fatalistic conception of karma
Aurobindo emphatically defends the aspect of human freedom. For
him, "our imperfect mental instrumentation is hot the last word
of our possibilities". Just as existentialists insist that
man's being is a potentiality to be so also does Aurobindo in¬
sist that human existence consists in its possibilities. Au¬
thentic temporality takes place in the moment of decision. As
we have noted, for him, "the possibility of man exceeding of
himself" basically means the general uplift of all the different
spheres of existence, physical, vital and mental. (iii) Just
as existentialists insist that "history is a call to histori¬
city" so also does Aurobindo insist that "in the turn to the
spiritual world it is we who must create ourselves and the
world". For him, the crisis is upon us. This means that by
implying a strong sense of crisis on the part of the individual
Aurobindo lays emphasis on 'personal history' rather than
'world history'.
The Ramakrishnan Movement Vivekananda
The founder of this movement was Sri Ramakrishna (1856-1886)
Whose original name was Gadadhar. From 1855 he was a priest
at the Kali Temple at Dakshinesvar, six miles north-west of
Calcutta. His spiritual career was marked by the most remark¬
able feature that he was not satisfied with any one system of
religious discipline. He was an unwearied experimenter in
religion. He therefore passed through Tantric Sadhana (dis¬
cipline), the various types of Vaishnava Sadhana, and Advaita
Sadhana. His zest for spiritual adventures finally even led
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him to go through spiritual disciplines outside Hinduism, namely-
Muslim and Christian experiences and he eventually formed his
own concept of religion. He held the view that Reality mani¬
fests itself to mortal minds in various ways, and hence no one
religion can claim to possess complete truth. His own words
are: "I had to practise all religions once, Hinduism, Islam
and Christianity, and I have walked the paths of the different
denominations of Hinduism again - And I have found that
it is the same God towards whom all are travelling, only they
are coming through diverse ways".
Another remarkable thing about his understanding of God is that
he knew the joys of Samadhi as union with God, but he resisted
the temptation to be lost in it. He cried out: "Oh mother,
let me remain in contact with man; do not make me a dried up
p
ascetic". (Incidentally, it will be noted that for him the
Absolute expressed in terms of the relative is termed as Divine
Mother). Further, Sri Ramakrishna wholeheartedly supported
the idea of world-affirmation. Sarma observes: "He disapproved
of those who say that this world is a dark, miserable place or
that it is a dense forest. He said that, on the contrary, to
those who cling to God in weal and woe, it was a mansion of
7
joy". Against the idea of man as weak and miserable sinner
he stoutly defended the idea of man's ability to pursue his
1. As cited by D.S. Sarma, op. cit., p. 24-7-
2. As cited in Swami Vivekananda Centenary Memorial Volume, p. 253-
3. D.S. Sarma, op. cit., p. 251.
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goal of realization. On the basis of these two ideas namely
"world-affirmation", and "man capable of pursuing his goal"
one can safely assume that his teaching also strikes a note
of man's absolute freedom to reach his destined goal.
The germs of Neo-Vedantism as well as its rationale and the
beginnings of its practical application are to be found in
the teaching of Sri Ramakrishna but its philosophical deve¬
lopment is due to Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902). It was
through Swami Vivekananda's leadership that the Ramakrishna
movement bedame widely recognized. He was also acclaimed as
the master exponent of the practical Vedantic Advaitism. While
he attempted to persuade people to give due recognition to the
ethical teaching of the Vedanta school he vigorously worked to
present to the world the doctrine of "practical Vedanta". It
was in the light of this that he was applauded at the parlia¬
ment of Religions at Chicago in 1893 as the reformer of Hindu
faith and a champion of the cause of inter-religious under¬
standing and unity. He never ceased to emphasize Sri Rama¬
krishna' s two principal goals, first "to realize the Truth"
2
and the second, "to help the world". What he claimed to
seek was: "A religion which will give us faith in ourselves,
a national self-respect, and the power to feed and educate
the poor and relieve the misery around us If you want to
z
find God, serve man. "And as for the Theosophical Society,
1. See add. note on Neo-Vedanta.
2. As quoted by M.il. Thomas, op. cit. , p. 125.
3. Romain Holland, Prophets of the New India, 237i cited by
W. Stewart, op. cit., p. 55-
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the Swami roundly declared that its "occultisms and esoteri-
cisms" would only make Indians, who were already weak and
superstitious, weaker and more superstitious. "Give up these
weakening mysticisms", The rationalist in him made
him speak out against ignorance and superstition, though some¬
times he would explain them fatalistically by saying that
2
such a low state of affairs was "India's Karma, her fate".
However, one of the special merits of Vivekananda's religious
thought is that he never ceases to emphasize the idea that
without the impulse to be free there would be no progress in the
world. He writes: "This idea of freedom you cannot relin¬
quish. Your actions, your very lives will be lost without it.
Every moment nature is proving us to be slaves, and not free.
Yet, simultaneously rises the other idea, that still we are
free. At every step we are knocked down as it were, by Maya,
and shown that we are bound, and yet at the same moment, to¬
gether with this blow, together with this feeling that we are
bound, comes the other feeling that we are free. Some inner
z
voice tells us that we are free". For Vivekananda, "In all
yogas renunciation is necessary. This is, the real
heart of all spiritual culture-renunciation. This is reli-
1. As cited by D.S. Sarma, op. cit., p. 295.
2. Ihe Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vols. I-VIII (Maya-
vati, 1956-1960) V, p. 190, cited by B.G. Gokhale, "Swami
Vivekananda and Indian Nationalism", The Journal of Bible
and Religion Vol. XXXII (1964), p. 39.
3* Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda II, 9th ed. (Calcutta,





This statement of Vivekananda suggests that for him, as
Sarma observes "religious regeneration of the land through
2
renunciation and service". This, conversely, anticipates
the regeneration of the individual which is renunciation for
Vivekananda. This implies that in Vivekananda also the idea
of regeneration occurs with particular urgency as it does in
Tagore and Gandhi.
Speaking of religion he said: " Religion is not in doc¬
trine or dogmas, nor in intellectual argumentations. It is
being and becoming. It is realization". If Vivekananda
had subscribed to the traditional understanding of Brahman as
formless as in the Advaita of Sankara, that could be termed
as the negative movement of his thought. But that is hot the
whole story. In Vivekananda's understanding of the Vedanta
there are two movements of thought, a negative and a positive.
To understand Brahman, he says: "We have to go through the
4
negation; and then the positive will begin ". Also,
according to the positive movement of thought, the world is
not unreal for him as it is in Sankara's theory of the world.
1. What Religion IS in the words of Swami Vivekananda, ed.
John Yale (London, 1962), p. 177-
2. D.S. Sarma, op. cit., p. 284.
5. As cited in Swami Vivekananda Centenary Memorial Volume,
P. 257.
4. Swami Vivekananda, Jnana Yoga, p. 173 (Ihe Complete Works of
Swami Vivekananda ll~j 9th ed. (Calcutta, 1958), op. 57-
288J:
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According to Sankara Brahman alone is real and the world is
false or illusory (brahma satyam, jaganmith.ya) . In short,
for Vivekananda, the world of objects is not totally negated
in Brahman, but in a sense the world also is real. That is,
he subscribes to the view of affirming the world in God. He
points out that what the Vedanta teaches is not that we should
denounce the world but deify it. The Swami says: "Deify it
(the world); it is God alone"; and he cites the opening verse
of the Isopanishad which says: "whatever exists in this uni¬
verse, is to be covered with the Lord". He goes on further
and says: " The whole world is full of the Lord. Open
your eyes and see Him. This is what Vedanta teaches".
In his philosophy of the Neo-Vedanta he combines jnana, karma,
bhakti and yoga. What he wants is a religion that will equally
be acceptable to all minds and must be equally conducive to
action. Further, the traditional view of self-realization
through self-abnegation or renunciation has been understood
by the Swami from a different angle. As he reneatedly says
"the Order of the Ramakrishna Math and Mission is to serve a
double purpose - Salvation of one's own self and good of the
p
world". "" From this point of view he interprets the Upani-
shadic teaching in this way: The Upanishad declares - "May
your mother be God to you; may your father be an object of
worship to you; may your preceptor be an object of adoration
1. Swami Vivekananda, Jnana Yoga, pn. 140-141.
2. The Cbmplete Works of Vivekananda VI, 6th Ed. (Calcutta, 1956),
p. 504, cited in Swami Vivekananda Centenary Memorial
Volume, p. 322.
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to you". To this he adds: "May the suffering millions be
the object of worship to you; may the illiterate mass be
1
the object of reverential service to you". All this indi¬
cates that the Swami saw clearly that selflessness is the
life and soul of all kinds of service.
Vivekananda affirms: "Buddhism says to men: 'Realize that all
this is illusion', while Advaita Vedanta says: 'Realize that
2
in illusion is the Real'". This statement reflects the claim
he makes about the Vedanta. This is how he interprets it and
this interpretation is, in fact, a rather outright breaking
out of Sankara's understanding of the world and of the rela¬
tion of the ultimate reality to it. The expression "Realize
that in illusion is the Real" obviously reflects his intense
interest to relate the Absolute who is thought to be immutable
to the reality of the world. This implies that over against
the Advaita of Sankara he tries to establish an essential
connection between the realms of appearance and reality, be¬
tween the possible and the actual. This is perhaps a striking
example of an existential element in contemporary Indian
thinking. This obviously shows that Vivekananda unmistakably
pointed to the growing tendency towards existentialism as the
eastern corollary and counterpart of the western existential¬
ism associated with Kierkegaard, M. Heidegger, Jaspers, and
so on. Swami Saradananda has therefore no hesitation in
summing up Vivekananda's philosophy of history thus: "Truth
1. The Complete Vforks of Vivekananda VI, 6th ed. (Calcutta, 1956)
p. 288, cited in Swami Vivekananda Centenary Memorial
Volume, p. 523-
2. Conversation with Sister Nivedita in London, cited by
V.S. Naravane, op. cit., p. 93.
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does not pay homage to any society ancient or modern, society
has to pay homage to it or die". In this statement one can
detect Vivekananda's attempt to establish an intelligible
connection between the eternal and the temporal, between nou-
menon and phenomenon as a deliberate and challenging denial
of Sankara's idealistic scheme.
Furthermore, "Of the Swami's numerous triumphs, say his bio¬
graphers, "One of the greatest was the conversation of his
Gurubhais / his brother monks _7 from the individualistic to
the national idea of religious life, in which public spirit
2
and service to fellow-men occupied a prominent place". One
cannot fail to be impressed by the fact that Vivekananda was
not satisfied with the individualistic salvation of classical
Hinduism. His understanding of one's religious experience is
not a flight into a fantasy of individualism, but to serve
one's fellow-men is for him the all-consuming purpose of life.
This indicates that the idea of the individual as reaching the
fulfilment of his personality in the service of the community
is certainly far more movingly portrayed in Vivekananda's
writings than in' any contemporary Hindu writer's work.
This study of Vivekananda's religious thought shows that there
are some existential elements implied in his system. For in¬
stance, (i) however eloquently he speaks of the Vedanta as a
strength-giving religion he breaks out of the full-fledged
idealistic scheme of Sankara by emphasizing the fact that
1. As cited in Swami Vivekananda Centenary Memorial Volume.
P. 3^4.
P. As ouoted by D.S. Sarma, op. cit., p. P84.
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Reality cannot be understood except in relation to the rela¬
tive reality of the world. For Kierkegaard contemporaneity
with the eternal has various aspects, the most important of
which is that the eternal is related to the historical. Just
as existentialists insist that the ontological being has no
reality except in the existence of men so also does Vivekanan-
da insist that theuLtimate being cannot be understood apart from
the historical, (ii) Over against the fatality of karma he
emphasizes the aspect of human freedom. He contends that "we
make the thread out of our own substance and spin the cocoon
...". This means that he stresses man's freedom which is
indeed a remarkable insight of his into the philosophy of
life when seen from the perspective of inexorable fate at
whose mercy man was thought to be. (iii) For existentialists
the historical decisions of individuals make up history. Go-
garten explains that "these decisions are such that they do
not reach beyond history in order to secure criteria and
2
standards from a super-reality about it". Just as existen¬
tialists insist on the play of the contingent so also does
Vivekananda insist that "Truth does not pay homage to any
society ancient or modern, society has to pay homage to it
or die". This language is peculiar to the Hindu theologian
for whom the uplifting of society is an important issue. This
means that Vivekananda is interpreting the meaning of history
in terms of society and for him, the meaning of history lies
1. As quoted in Swami Vivekananda Centenary Memorial Volume,
P. 257. " ~ ~ ~
2. F. Gogarten, "Theology and History", Journal .for Theology
and. the Church, Vol. Four (1967), p. 58.
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not so much in universal history as in the free acts of the
individuals as he insists that "society has to pay homage to
Truth or die".
In our inquiry into "Existential elements" in recent Indian
thinking we have concentrated on bringing to the fore how
modern Hindu theologians restated some of the main propositions
of classical Hinduism from their viewpoint of Western philoso¬
phy and culture and the felt need of the modern world. In
their restatement of Hindu beliefs they were prepared even to
alter the structural presuppositions of the Vedanta system in
the light of their new understanding of the age-long and car¬
dinal concepts of Hinduism such as karma, Maya, transcendence,
and self-realization. That is, they encouraged an abandon¬
ment of karma as a fatalistic principle and subordinated it
to the category of the freedom of the will. In their inter¬
pretation of maya they emphasized the reality of the world,
thereby according meaning to history, and eventually developed
their own philosophy of history.
Further, they reinterpreted the age-long concept of self-
realization in terms of the regeneration and renunciation of
the individual. This idea of self-renunciation gained a new
meaning over against the traditional concept of self-realiza¬
tion which entailed an idea of salvation which was wholly
individualistic. It was against this individualistic salva¬
tion that these Neo-Vedantic thinkers revolted and consequently
emphasized the idea of the liberated individual's place in the
context of the community. Moreover, their understanding of
transcendence was no longer within the circle of the accepted
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categories of the idealistic scheme of Sankara but was greatly-
developed under the theistic influence - namely, they were no
longer interested in the pure being of Brahman and apart from
humanity they could no longer postulate it as it is in itself.
They endeavoured to establish an intelligible connection be¬
tween the eternal and the temporal.
All these new trends in the thought of the religio-philosophi-
cal thinkers of renascent Hinduism may well suggest that cer¬
tain parallels can be drawn between their concepts of human
freedom, transcendence, regeneration of the self and history
and of the kind of thinking which Bultmann in the Christian
tradition represents, a fuller treatment of these parallels
will be the subject of the next chanter.
ADDITIONAL NOTES
1. Add, note on the Bauls: The word Baul means madcap, from
bayu (Skt. Vayu) in the sense of nerve current and has become
the appellation of a set of people who do not conform to es¬
tablished social usage. They look down upon those who have
less creativity. This can be seen from one of their poems:
It
Pursuers of the path of man's own handiwork,
Who follow the crowd, gleaning their false leavings,
What news can they get of the Real?".
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"It is hardly to be wondered at that people who think thus
should have no use for history I". Their ideas about pil¬
grimage come into clear focus in a song, the last line of
which runs thus: "At every step I have my Mecca and Khasi;
2
sacred is every moment", Mecca and Khasi are the most
sacred places of pilgrimage for Muslims and Hindus respec¬
tively. The followers of the Sahaj cult, another name for
the Bauls, believe only in living religious experience. "Our
sahaj (simple, natural) religion is timeless, it has neither
beginning nor end, it is of all time". They held that "Truth
has two aspects, inert and living. Confined to itself truth
has no value for man. It becomes priceless when embodied in
a living personality".
2. Add, note on Classical Vedanta and Neo-Vedanta: The founder
of classical Vedanta was Sankara (788-828), a Brahmin from
^erala in South India. He was an advaitavadin (non-dualist) ,
i.e. a preacher of absolute monism. Of the ten monastries
he founded on the Buddha's model four still survive. It is
generally acknowledged that his philosophic profundity and
genius of explanations of the Upanishadic texts made him the
greatest of all expositors of classical Hinduism. It is pro¬
bably correct to say that even though Ramanaja's interpreta¬
tion of the Vedanta-Sutras (Badarayana's systematization of
Upanishadic thought) was considered to be more in line with
1. The Religion of Man, p. 214.
2- Ibid., p. 215.
3» Ibid., p. 215.
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their general purport than that of Sankara, .yet Sankara
represented the main thought of the Upanishads more corr¬
ectly.
Sankara developed his own critical theory of the distinction
between the para-vidya (transcendent) and apara-vidya (pheno-
menological) knowledge - the vyavahara - satya (the conven¬
tional truth) and the paramarthikasatya (absolute truth).
But essential to Sankara's position are two propositions,
namely the belief that real truth is unstata^e and the doc¬
trine of super-imposition implied in the popular view, e.g.
when, to quote the stock example, a piece of 'mother-of-pearl
is mistaken for silver'. That Sankara's vyavaharika views are
realistic and that he admits degrees of reality, or unreality,
in the objects of dream experiences, the normal world and
illusions, respectively, - all experiences have objects real
in respective degrees - is a well-known concept of his theory
of knowledge of Brahman, the ultimate reality.
One important question is whether the Advaita notion, i.e.
the relation of Brahman - atman is not really implicit in
the whole subsequent literature. To put it differently,
what is the relation of the Advaita notion to the sectarian,
faiths? In general we may remark that as a matter of fact,
the post-Sankara period is marked by resurgences and new
developments of Vaishnavism and Saivism represented respec¬
tively by the Krishna-bhakti of the Gita-Govinda, Vithoba
and the Ghaitanya school in the north-east and the following
of Basava, and other important movements in the south. This
is evidenced by the fact that Tagore explained the nature of
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the ultimate being in personal categories. "Limitation of
the Unlimited", he writes, is personality": God is personal
where he creates. This kind of thinking is a sign of moving
away from Glassical Vedanta which can be termed as Neo-Vedanta.
Another important asnect of Classical Vedanta concerns the
concept of karma. The word karma literally means 'a deed'.
The traditional Hindu belief is that what one does in this
life determines one's destiny not only in respect of one
future life but also in respect of the next in a chain of
future lives. This is still the background of much popular
and semi-educated thought. But the origin of this doctrine
goes back even to the Vedic period. Keith notes that the
Vedic technical term Ishtapurta may be regarded as a distinct
precursor of the later theory of karma . It is also possible
to hold as in the case of 'dharma' that the theory of the Rta
2
may also have been an anticipation of the law of karma.
Rta understood as dharma appeared in social life as the con-
•
tinuation, the consequence and reflection of the cosmic bind¬
ing order. The earliest twin theory of karma and rebirth can
be found in the Satapatha Brahmana wherein it is said: "Every
man is born in the world fashioned by himself", VI, 2,2,27.
The Chandogya Up. takes this a stage further: "Just as he acts,
just as he behaves, so will he be born ", Chandogya Up.
Ill, 14, 1. So in classical Hinduism too, karma is regarded
as the stern administrator of retribution.
1. cf. A.B, Keith, Religion and Philosophy of the Veda
(Cambridge (MassJl 1925) I, p^ 250; II*, p. 478.
2. cf. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy I, p. 109, and
G.H. Mees, Dharma and Society (The Hague, 1935), p. 10.
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As is well known, the most important thinkers of classical
Vedanta were wrestling with the problem of the relation of
the ultimate reality to the world. Brahman was thought
to be one abiding principle behind all phenomena of the uni¬
verse. According to the Upanishadic teaching Brahman is the
Absolute, Chandogya Up. VI, 2, 1: Taittireya Up. IT, 7«
Brahman stands at the limit of the intellect, .just be¬
yond it(cp. the wonderful description of the Purusa in MUn-
• •
daka Up. II, 1, 7$. The theologians of classical Vedanta
tried to define the nature of the Absolute taking their stand
on the Upanishads. Consequently there emerged two types of
definitions of the nature of the ultimate being, namely Nir-
guna Brahman and Saguna Brahman. Brahman was called Nirguna
• • •
when it was considered to be the unattainable goal towards
which the finite intellect strives, while it was called Sa¬
guna when it was thought to have attributes descriptive of its
essential nature and so conceived of as a personal being.
Recent Hindu theologians did not seem content with the thought-
forms of classical Vedanta, more specifically, with Sankara's
definition of Brahman according to which the Supreme being is
devoid of all qualities and distinctions (nirguna and nirvi-
sesa). The theologians of Neo-Vedanta exemplify a kind of
thinking which can be called a synthetic Vedanta which recon¬
ciles dualism and non-dualism and may be called concrete mon¬
ism in so far as it holds that Brahman is both qualified and
without quality; it has forms and is also formless. As a
movement the Neo-Vedanta provided the Hindu intellectual
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sufficient justification to remain a Hindu, although he was
not unwilling to admit that there are valuable ethical tea¬
chings in Christianity not found in Hinduism.
Another important feature of Neo-Vedanta is that the law of
karma is no longer thought to be the law of moral causation
essentially representing the cosmic power. Over against the
deterministic', aspect of the concept of karma modern Hindu
writers imply that what we can be in the next life depends
on what we make of this. For instance, Prof. R.N. Dandekar
in reply to an objection to the doctrine of karma as being
determinative of one's present, points out that "our past
deeds also produce indirect results in the form of innate
tendencies which prompt us to act one way or another. It is
necessary to emphasize that these innate tendencies prompt
but do not compel us to act in a particular manner, thus
affording ample scope for initiative and self-determination
on the part of the individual". This reflects the shift of
emphasis in modern Hindu theology from the mechanical con¬
cept of karma to the aspect of human freedom.
5. Add, note on Gandhi's idea of Satyagraha: Etymologically
the word Satyagraha means persistence in truth (from satya
"truth" and Igraha "holding onto, grasping"). This persis¬
tence is understood to have a peculiar power, hence Satyagraha
is said to be Truth-force. Gandhi writes: "Satyagraha is
literally holding on to Truth, and it means, therefore, Truth-
1. R.N. Dandekar, "The role of man in Hinduism" in The Basic
Beliefs of Hinduism, ed. K.W. Morgan (Calcutta, 1955)»
P. 127.
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force. Truth is soul or spirit. It is, therefore, known as
soul-force. It excludes the use of violence because man is
not capable of knowing the absolute truth and, therefore, not
competent to punish. The word was coined in South Africa to
distinguish the non-violent resistance of the Indians of South
Africa from the contemporary 'passive resistance' of the suff¬
ragettes and others. It is not conceived as a weapon of the
1
weak". Gandhi further tells us that Truth is not only God
but is also Love. Satyagraha is the force of love and not of
hatred. It must express love and vindicate truth, not by
infliction of suffering on the opponent but on one's self.
I. Add, note on the question of the influence of Bergson on
Aurobindo: Aurobindo held that "we must judge of existence
not by what we mentally conceive, but by what we see to exist.
And the purest, free form of insight into existence as it is
shows us nothing but movement. "Two things alone exist, move¬
ment in Space, movement in Time, , Space and Time are
real We are and the worldis a movement that continually
progresses and increases by the inclusion of all the success¬
ions of the past in a present which represents itself to us
as the beginning of all the successions of the future, - a
beginning, a present that always eludes us because it is not,
2
for it has perished before it is born..." "Indivisible in
the totality of the movement. Each movement of Time or Con-
1. As cited by P.T. Raju, Idealistic Thought of India, p. 293-
2. The Life Divine I, pp. 116-117-
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sciousness may be considered as separate from its predecessor
and successor, ; but this does not abrogate continuity
without which there would be no duration of Time or coherence
of consciousness. A man's steps as he walks or runs or leaps
are separate, but there is something that takes the steps and
makes the movement continuous". "Duration then, is the
2
sole absolute". We can comnare this to Bergson's idea of
the 'elan vital', according to which the whole is a flux. The
universe endures. For him, "duration is the very sub-
stance of the world in which we live". From the point of
view of these statements of Aurobindo it is possible to argue
that he may have been influenced by Bergson's book, Creative
Evolution. However, we can hardly find a direct reference in
his major works to such influence.
1. The Life Divine I, p. 117 fn.
2. Ibid., p. 117.




A comparison and a critique of the anthropology of Bultmann
and modern Indian thought.
The conceptual framework of anthropology in modern Hindu
thinkers was sketched in the preceding chapter in such a
way as to bring out points of comparison and to a lesser
extent, of contrast with that of Bultmann. In that chapter
we attempted to show that the mainspring of their concern
(modern Hindu theologians') was to expound the ancient teach¬
ings of their religion in their relevance to the present age.
That is to say in the efforts of these recent Hindu apologists
the focus of attention was shifted to the philosophy of his¬
tory as over against the age-long view of a cyclic movement
of time, to self-understanding in terms of regeneration and
renunciation as substituting for the traditional concept of
self-realization, to Brahman as humanized and the concept of
human freedom as replacing the age-long conception of karma
as the fatalistic principle of life.
It is our purpose in this chapter to make a brief excursion
into the system of ideas of each of them, namely Tagore, S.
Radhakrishnan, Gandhi, Aurobindo Ghosh and Swami Vivekananda
to draw out more fully the lines of comparison between their
anthropology and that of Bultmann. That is, in this project
we shall attempt to investigate the question whether some
aspects of Bultmann's anthropology may be said to have been
foreshadowed in the framework of these neo-Vedantic thinkers
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and also make a critical estimate of the anthropology of
these two schools of thought.
It is perhaps not too much to say that these men show a grow¬
ing alienation from the past, especially from Sankara's idea¬
listic scheme of thinking. To put it differently the nature
of God, God in his significance for the individual, or better
yet, for humanity has become crucially significant for the
frame of reference of renascent Hinduism which acknowledges
human experience as the means of revelation. Bultmann's theo¬
logy is, of course, characterized by a profound phenomenologi-
cal analysis of Christian faith in that the individual must
recognize his self-responsibility either to gain or lose his
own authentic existence. He points out that philosophical
instruction can clarify the meaning of human existence and can
lead the hearer to a mode of self-reflection in which he is
faced with the question of his authentic existence.
What he contends is that in traditional theology the necessity
of a personal "choice" has been obscured, and he is therefore
at great pains to remove all false securities on which faith
may like to rely. He vehemently advocates the necessity of
costly faith and commitment. He further argues that God is
not revealed through events without a personal response and
Christian faith must arise out of the depths of a person's own
existence. There is no knowledge of God without existential
relevance for that person. Revelation for Bultmann, is not
1. cfi Rudolf Bultmann, "Echte und Sakularisierta Verkundigung
im 20* Jahrhundert, 1955" in Glauben und Verstehen III cited
as (G.V.III) (Tubingen, 1962), p. 122 as tr. in E.J. Long,
Jaspers and Bultmann: A dialogue between Philosophy and
Theology in Existentialist Tradition (Durham (North Carolina),
1968), p. 102.
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simply the communication of objective knowledge but consists
of faith "in an occurrence in Jesus Christ, who died and was
raised for us". "Revelation is an occurrence that puts me
2
in a new situation as a self, Elsewhere he expresses
more succinctly the meaning of encounter explaining his *kery-
I
gmatic theology : "Entering into decisive encounters I may
achieve a totally new self-understanding as a result of the
3
love which is bestowed upon me, "
All this Bultmann is anxious to assert in keeping with his
view of the transcendent dimension reflected in his dialec¬
tical theology (God himself remains entirely hidden in his word
of revelation while man is revealed to himself in the event)
or "germs of revelation theology" in the words of Gogarten
(D. Cairns qualifies this phrase by saying "what is here des¬
cribed is not a continuity between God and man, but a continued
4
gracious approach of God to man"). All this evidently stems
from his being influenced by Kierkegaard's principle of a
qualitative difference between infinite and finite. Bultmann's
understanding of history may be said to imply the idea that
the truest objectivity is attained not through pretentious
neutrality but through the most "agitated" and "concerned" in¬
volvement. The following statement will make his point of view
of history clear: "We do not stand outside historical forces
1. Existence and Eaith, p. 74.
2. Ibid., p. 59.
3. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 75*
4. D. Cairns, God Up There? (Edinburgh, 1967), p. 42 fn.
171
as neutral observers; we are ourselves moved by them;
History, however, does not speak when a man stops his ears,
that is, when he assumes neutrality, but speaks only when he
1
comes seeking answers to questions which agitate him". With
these introductory remarks regarding Bultmann's theology let
us now go on to institute a comparison, if we can, between
the anthropology of modern Indian thought and that of Bultmann.
A. Comparison of Tagore's anthropology with that of Bultmann:
In the foregoing chapter we have described Tagore's under¬
standing of man in some detail. For our present consideration,
we select two salient passages. "Every true freedom that we
may attain in any direction broadens our path of self-reali¬
zation, which is in superseding the self This implies
a history of constant regeneration, a series of fresh beginn-
2
ings and continual changes to the old ". '"The "I am"
in me crosses its finitude whenever it deeply realizes itself
in the "Thou art" " "And thus life, which is an incessant
explosion of freedom, finds its metre in a continued falling
back in death. Every day is a death, every moment even
because directly a poem is fashioned, it is eternally freed
from its genesis, it minimizes its history and emphasizes its
independence". "I believe that the vision of Paradise is to
be seen in the beauty of the human face and the wealth
of human life, ".
1. Jesus and The Word, p. 4-.
2. Tagore, The Religion of Man, pp. 55-56.
3« Contemporary Indian Philosophy, pp. 36, 38, 4-3, and 4-5.
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These statements amply manifest Tagore's view of 'authentic'
life as being basically depedent on human freedom to take
decisions in one's historic existence. This obviously leads
us to make a careful consideration of some of Bultmann's
statements. He observes: "Philosophical analysis shows what
existence in the abstract means. By contrast, existential,
personal self-understanding does not say what existence means
in the abstract, but points to my life as a concrete person
in the here and now". "I understand myself in my con-
crete encounters". For him, man's new understanding of him¬
self is one which arises only in the encounters which question
2
him and demand his decision. Bultmann elsewhere explains
that "man's unity, therefore, is not a unity of substance,
nor does it consist in the context of a psychologically com¬
prehensible mental process, It must rather be seen as
historical; that is, as unity which is given through man's
3
being claimed by a Thou". What Bultmann so stoutly argues
is that the questionableness of man is the structure of human
existence - man called in question, and thus he can only ans¬
wer with himself. The above statements of Bultmann make it
clear that his understanding of man is characterized by cer¬
tain categories, namely "the experience of the whole man",
"involvement" and "existential encounter". The other pro¬
nounced aspect of Bultmann's thought is that he attempts, as
1. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 74 and Kerygma and Myth I,
p. 203.
2. cf. Essays, p. 155.
3. Faith and Understanding I, p. 163.
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his teacher W. Hermann did, "to comprehend human being as
1
'being-in-history'". He also affirms that "man's being is
not thought of as a phenomenon of nature, ; it is achie¬
ved in his response to God's claim on him, and therefore in
2
his action".
When we consider these foregoing passages from Bultmann's
works in comparison with those of Tagore as shown above, one
can hardly fail to see some common words like freedom, true
freedom (authentic life), decisions, moment, 'I' confronted
by 'Thou', and so on occurring in their writings and reflect¬
ing almost the same content of meaning in their thought-forms,
except that Bultmann describes man's true being as issuing
from God's gracious act in Christ. Moreover, the traditional
Hindu concept of self-realization gains a new meaning in
Tagore's thought in that it is understood in terms of super¬
seding the self, a history of constant regeneration, a series
of fresh beginnings and continual changes to the old. This
perhaps comes close to Bultmann's concept of self-understan¬
ding which he describes as follows: "This personal self-
understanding is put to.the test, is called into question
(ist in Frage gestelt) in every situation of encounter".
"Now it should be clear that I cannot possess this self-un¬
derstanding as a timeless truth, a conviction accepted once
and for all. For my new self-understanding, by its very nature,
must be renewed day by day, so that I understand the impera-
1. Essays, p. 260.
2. Faith and Understanding I, p. 163.
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1
tive self which is included in it". Tagore's expressions
like 'a series of fresh beginnings and continual changes to
the old' probably imply that his idea of regeneration is not
something possessed once for all and in his view it is to be
obtained continuously since for him "every day is a death,
every moment even ". It is precisely in this sense that
there is a point of resemblance between Tagore's idea of re¬
generation and Bultmann's concept of self-understanding.
Another interesting parallel between these two views can be
drawn. Tagore makes practically no mention of divine opera¬
tion in bringing man to decide for God. He lays a consistent
emphasis on the idea that the achieving of one's authentic
life depends basically upon his historical decisions. Bult-
mann also puts so little emphasis on divine operation, i.e.
there is no objective revelation of God to man and he needs
no props of objectivity to decide for the Creator. This
should not blind us to the fact that Bultmann constantly in¬
sists on the act of God, i.e. God's prevenient deed of grace
in the Christ-event. But it is possible to argue that man
does need God's operation to awaken his faculties to make an
act of obedient self-commitment to God. This point of view
is denied by Bultmann, and in this sense he plays down the
role of divine operation. And it is probably correct to say
that this playing down of divine operation in his scheme of
thinking is a counterpart to his rigid separation between
history and eschatology. This even makes him deny the possi-
1. Jesus Christ and Mythology, pp. 74-, 75-6.
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bility of history having an eschatological goal. for Bult-
mann, "God's future /is7 the realization of human life".
For him, "eschatology has wholly lost its sense as goal of
history, and is in fact understood as the goal of the indi-
2
vidual human being".
When we look at these statements of Bultmann and the fore¬
going statements of Tagore we must affirm that there is much
in common that rings true to anthropology. And this is cer¬
tainly highly instructive when religion is understood from
the point of view of anthropology. But one wonders whether
they give due attention to the fact that in religious experi¬
ence one becomes conscious of the fact that God possesses his
soul far more than one is able to cling to God and to the
belief that commerce between the divine spirit and the human
spirit is at least possible, as Paul conceives of it - a
reciprocal activity of these two distinctive spirits. There
is a notable portrayal of this important truth in Dr. illi-
stone's affirmation which is vivid in its imagery and entirely
apposite of the Pauline perspective— the interplay of the
divine operation and human response to it: "The Spirit brings
power from on high to build up spiritual strength out of the
very weakness and infirmity of human instruments , for
it actually strengthens and invigorates men with divine ener¬
gies just as the agencies of the natural order revive the
1. Rudolf Bultmann, "The Christian Hope and the Problem of
Demythologizing-continued", The Expos. Times, Volume The
Sixty-Fifth (1953-'54), p. 278.
2. Rudolf Bultmann, "History and Eschatology in the New Testa¬
ment", N.T.S., Vol.1 (1954-'55), p, 13.
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flagging energies of their physical life". It is true that
they both make a most forcible appeal to human freedom, "human
decisions on the level of existence". But there hardly seems
any reason why the personal 'I' be not related to the call of
a personal character from One who stands not only in a quite
singular relation to me but also closer to me than any other
being.
In the preceding chapter we have dealt to some extent with
Tagore's concept of history and made it clear that the con¬
ceptual framework of the key concept called Maya as in Bar¬
bara's system is not wholly acceptable to him. He speaks of
Maya as the process by which the finite is woven by the Sup¬
reme person, just as an artist weaves the art-product out of
2 . .
his imagination. He holds that it is the drawing or painting
that is of value for us and not the canvas on which it is done.
For Tagore, the distinction between history and the cosmic
process precisely consists in "a change of rhythm" and this
means that Tagore chiefly adverts to the idea of drawing or
painting on the canvas.
We must now go on to look more closely at some of Bultmann's
statements reflecting his concept of history. It is axioma¬
tic for Bultmann that history as a whole is to be grasped as
my history. He observes: "Qenuine historical knowledge de¬
mands a very personal aliveness of the understanding subject,
1. F.W. Dillistone, The Holy Spirit in the Life of Today
(London: Edinburgh, 1946), p. 64.
2. cf. Tagore, The Religion of Man, p. 141.
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the very rich unfolding of his individuality", a little
further on, he quotes with approval R.G. Collingwood's famous
statement: "History is thus the self-knowledge of the living
A
mind". Later on he affirms: "Of course, to ask for meaning
in history is not allowable if one is asking for meaning in
the sense of goal. The meaning in history is immanent in his¬
tory, because history is the history of mind". "And, further¬
more, it must be said that historicity in its full sense is
not self-evident natural quality of the human individual, but
a possibility which must be grasped and realized. The man
who lives without self-knowledge and without consciousness
of his responsibility is a historical being in a much lower
degree, Genuine historicity means to live in responsi-
2
bility and history is a call to historicity".
All this goes to show that Tagore and Bultmann both emphasize
the idea of the "person's dialogue with history". The last
statement of Bultmann does indeed, strike a note of resem¬
blance between his understanding of history and that of Tagore,
particularly in view of the latter's attaching importance to
the drawing or painting of the individual on the canvas of the
world scene. And a striking parallel with Bultmann's thought
becomes apparent when we compare Tagore's emphasis on "a
change of rhythm" with Bultmann's view of history, i.e.
'genuine historicity means to live in responsibility and his¬
tory is a call to historicity'. However, it may be profitable
1. History and Eschatology p. 122.
2. Ibid., pp. 135, 136.
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to point out here that as an academic existentialist theo¬
logian Bultmann takes account of the historicism of the Ital¬
ian philosopher Benedetto Groce, and the existential under¬
standing of history found in Dilthey, Heidegger and so on.
Whereas Tagore develops his own concept of history over aga¬
inst classical Hindu understanding of the cyclic movement of
time, and Sankara's doctrine of Maya and his theory of the
world. This means by implication that Tagore's concept of
history does not go beyond the circle of the Indian schools
of thought. Nonetheless, the most striking feature in both
writers is that they both emphasize 'the historicality of
history'.
These views suggest that what has happened is that the dis¬
tinction between history and eschatology is dissolved to the
extent that they become identified. In passing, it must be
observed that in Tagore's system there is very little impor¬
tance given to the idea of God fulfilling his purpose in his¬
tory, which is understandable from the viewpoint of his reli¬
gious background. The idea of eschatology does not govern
Tagore's thought any more than it governs Bultmann's. If this
position is pushed to its logical conclusions, we are left
with no other alternative except to say that the infinite,
the indispensable element of history has no part to play.
And thereby we fall into the trap of a deistic position
according to which God is utterly remote from nature and man.
The point which I chiefly advert to is that man is essentially
a created responsive being, answerable to God's demands on
him (a position Bultmann so stoutly upholds), and in pursuit
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of this position we may perhaps go even further to hold that
the transcendent reality is thought to be winning man over to
responsive love without impinging on his freedom. Only thus
can we establish a relation between a transcendent world and
the world of human history. (Incidentally, Bultmann speaks of
God in analogical terms and we shall deal at some length with
it later on in our discussion of his conception of the keryg-
matic message). This position of mine is perhaps better ex¬
pressed in Jurgen Moltmann's learned and suggestive book,
Theology of Hope, wherein he says: "Without a cosmic eschato-
logy there can be no assertion of an eschatological existence
of man The very mode of our experience of the world is
not adiaphorous. On the contrary, world-picture and faith are
inseparable - precisely because faith cannot suffer the world
to become a picture of God nor a picture of man".
Furthermore, there is another dimension of the God-man rela¬
tionship. If we recognize that God is the creator of the world
(incidentally, as a theist, Tagore affirms that out of love
God created the world), i.e. the world is the sphere of the
rule and providence of God, we may probably take the further
step of saying that the world can still be the "theatre of
God's glory" as order, progress and beauty can be seen as re¬
flection of divine glory (a position with which the poet
Tagore would be in fullest agreement). It is for this reason
that history as a whole cannot be reduced to 'my personal




B. Comparison of Radhakrishnan's anthropology with that of
Bultmann:
We have shown in some detail in the section on Radhakrishnan
how he vehemently argues for mystical experience culminating
in the integral experience of the individual. He not only
advocates the idea that integral experience is the sole and
sure means of spiritual freedom but also assumes that all those
who have attained a 'genuineness of life' irrespective of their
confessional faiths would have obviously passed through the
same mystical experience. And on the same score, he inter¬
prets Paul's conversion experience on the Damascus road in
terms of mystical vision - an experience of self-awareness
derived from introspection. His own words are: "For Paul,
Jesus is only the Lord and not God If the name of Jesus
is employed, it is only in a symbolic way, He certain¬
ly warns us against over-estimating the historical instead of
looking upon it as the symbol of metaphysical truth The
foundation of St. Paul's Christianity is a vision, not an ex-
ternal revelation".
Whatever may be the worth of this statement, an objection can
be raised against his contention that the foundation of Paul's
Christian faith is a vision of God in the mystical sense of
the term. His explanation of Paul's conversion experience a£
arising merely out of mystical vision would seem to be a per-
1. Eastern Religions and Western Thought, pp. 220-21.
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sonal interpretation of an incident which for Paul was a
dramatic spiritual experience of divine intervention in his
life. One cannot simply refuse to recognize the fact that
Paul's deepest insight into the divine purpose for his life
and the divine intervention in his life was that he had the
direct revelation of the Son of God so that he might become
the preacher among the Gentiles, cf. Gal. 1:12, 16. In this
connection it is pertinent to recall the comment of G.W.H.
Lampe: "Whatever Paul precisely meant when he said that God
'revealed his Son en emoi', he intended to say more than
that he had seen an apocalyptic vision of Christ in glory.
It involved the transformation of his whole life through
faith that Jesus had not only been exalted to heaven but was
a present spiritual reality 'in whom' Paul now lived and who
2
lived in him". All this implies that we will be able to
grasp the meaning of Paul's conversion experience more clearly
if it is construed as an event of God's revelation of himself
to the individual in his historical existence. The following
statement of Abraham J. Heschel admirably summarizes my line
of argument: "The trouble is that religion has become "reli¬
gion" - institution, dogma, ritual. It is no longer an event.
Its acceptance involves neither risk nor strain There
is no substitute for faith, no alternative for revelation,
x
no surrogate for commitment
1. NEB: 'To me and through me'; Gal. 1:16.
2. G.W.H. Lampe, "The Holy Spirit and the Person of Christ"
in Christ, Faith and History, eds. S.W. Sykes and J.P.
Clayton (Cambridge, 1972), p. 111.
3. As quoted in John Cogley,"Religion in a Secular Age
(London, 1968), p. 4.
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One other aspect of Radhakrishnan's understanding of one's
religious experience is that of the man-ward aspect of reli¬
gion - inwardizing of one's religious experience. This can
be seen from the following quotation as referred to earlier:
"The way to rise out of our ego-centred consciousness to
the divine plane is through the focusing of all our energies,
intellectual, emotional and volitional on God. Then our
whole being is transformed and lifted up into the unity and
universality of spirit". From this statement one can infer
that Radhakrishnan's emphasis on the man-ward aspect of reli¬
gion unmistakably individualizes the category of the freedom
of the will which is accorded supreme and sole importance.
In like manner, Bultmann also emphasizes the aspect of human
freedom to make decisions in one's historicity. This becomes
obvious when we look at some of his recurring statements. For
p
Bultmann, man's essence resides "in the will". Earlier on
in the first chapter we observed that Bultmann i s so strongly
opposed to the Greek science because it does not see man in
his historicity. He makes his argument with considerable
force and persuasiveness as the passage-^ shows.
While on the one hand he so untiringly stresses the indivi¬
dual's freedom to make decisions, on the other hand, with
1. S. Radhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgita, pp. 254-55-
2. Primitive Christianity In Its Contemporary Setting, p. 180.
3. Rudolf Bultmann, Existence and Faith, p. 214, quoted
on pp. 63-64.
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equal force he argues for the idea of authentic existence,
viz. openness to the future as God's gift offered to man ( a
burning conviction of Bultmann which is not shared by Radha-
krishnan. In view of this there can scarcely be any doubt
that Bultmann's chief purpose is to emphasize two aspects of
one's 'genuineness of life' - the individual's freedom to act
for himself and his willingness to accept authentic existence
as a gift from God.
This seems quite cogent and convincing in so far as it affirms
the indispensibility of decision. What is so much in the fore¬
ground of these writers (Radhakrishnan and Bultmann) is their
characteristic insistence on the individual's freedom of the
will as being the essential, if not the sole means of achiev¬
ing one's authentic existence. But the primary and most pro¬
found issue in our understanding of true freedom is whether
we can so inwardize the category of the freedom of the will
as these two thinkers are inclined to do. To put it more
plainly, the crucial question remains whether, in their account
of it, the man-ward aspect of religious experience does not
take precedence over the divine aspect of one's religious ex¬
perience. It is true that Bultmann characteristically empha¬
sizes the fact that the believer experiences the possibility
of faith-decision as grace, it is only as a gift of grace that
he can understand his decision. This explanation perhaps does
not immediately command assent since, on his own showing, faith
decision in the first place is "a venture", an "absolute deci¬
sion" - "a leap into the abyss" - but when the individual
looks back to consider whether he has made the right decision
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or not, only then does he realize that it was because of God's
grace that he has made a right decision. We can hardly con¬
fuse the faith-decision with the life of the individual under
grace. Time and again Bultmann emphatically stresses that a
faith-decision needs no props of objectivity which means that
the man-ward aspect is obviously emphasized at the cost of
divine operation. Of course, Bultmann contends that the Keryg-
matic message challenges the hearer to decide either for God
or against him. But his contention of the power of the pro¬
clamation of the Church is another issue which needs fuller
discussion and we shall return to this later on.
The root of the trouble either in the existentialist theology
of Bultmann or in Eastern existentialism, in my opinion, lies
primarily in their characteristic emphasis on the man-ward as¬
pect of religion. As a result, the exponents of both these
schools of thought are reluctant to consider the divine opera¬
tion in one's religious experience. It is perhaps in this
sense that a comparison of Bultmann's system of ideas with
that of Radhakrishnan is most justified.
Radhakrishnan's understanding of the human self has been ex¬
plained in some detail in the preceding chapter. It is no
inconsiderable merit of his entire discussion on the meaning
of the self to have brought richer and more living content to
it with respect to its role in the community. Perhaps the
most lasting impression he leaves is that in his works the
'neo-orthodox' reaction against Sankara's individualistic
concept of salvation reached its fullest elaboration. Radha¬
krishnan 's consistent emphasis on the nature and role of the
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individual in the context of the community comes out, as
referred to earlier, in the following statement: "The peculiar
privilege of the human self is that he can consciously Join
and work for the whole and embody in his whole life the pur-
pose of the whole".
In a similar manner, the late F.H. Bradley, the master builder
of western idealism raised this place of individuality to an
appreciably new clarity when he improved on Goethe's saying:
"'Be a whole or Join a whole'" by adding "'You cannot be a
2
whole, unless you Join a whole'" This striking similarity
between Bradley and Radhakrishnan may suggest that the latter
has not only taken account of western idealism but also was
greatly influenced by it.n And as the ablest apologist of mo¬
dern Hinduism Radhakrishnan sought to lay the ground for a far-
reaching and profound improvement on the traditional Hindu
understanding of the self.
Let us now examine what Bultmann has to say on the nature and
place of the individual in community. He observes: "The will
to be one's self is the presupposition of real community - for
only men who are 'persons', that is, who are each one of them
their selves, can be in a real community". "It is an estab¬
lished fact for Christian belief that man can only receive his
self from God, and that he only receives it when his withdrawal
from the world - which in the last analysis means his self-
surrender - is a radical one". "In bringing him to himself,
1. An Idealist View of Life, pp. 273-74.
2. F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1927), p. 79-
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and liberating him from himself, God's grace has liberated him
for his neighbour". "God's words and God's demand make man
-i
an isolated individual being". Perhaps the implication of
all these observations is as Dietrich von Oppen explains, that
the "individual, who, in the last analysis, is alone and un-
2
able to be represented by another..., ..." And Bultmann's
point of view is even better explained by Baker when he says
that "man is a slave to his own anxieties, he cannot be him-
self, and thus he cannot give himself away to others in love".
Of course, Bultmann understands man exclusively in relation
to God and he repeatedly stresses that "the genuiness of life"
is a gift offered to man from God. This is, indeed, his most
convincing theological proposition. However, it must be said
that his theology is so much couched in the language of the
individual's authentic life which has little to bear upon the
life of the community. (Incidentally, it will be noted that
Bultmann's idea of the authentic person as being open to the
neighbour is rightly pointed out but perhaps not consistently
elaborated in his system). It is in this sense that in the
hands of Bultmann the whole sphere of the ethical is perhaps
reduced to man in his radical openness. Besides, it has long
been a commonplace of both Christian and western thought that
man is not a lonely stranger in the universe; on the contrary,
his life is united with all that exists. Existence is not
1. Essays, pp. 293, 302, 303 and 78.
2. Dietrich von Oppen, "Man in the Open Situation", Journal
for Theology and the Church, Vol. Two (1965), p. 145.
3. T.G.A. Baker, "Rudolf Bultmann"in The New Theologians:
Bultmann, Bonhoeffer, Tillich, Teilhard de Chardin (London,
1964), p. 5.
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gust a private affair; it is 'societal'. This is all the
more true of the believer, or, if one prefers, the member
of the Christian community. Understood from this angle, Bult-
mann's idea of the individual in his historicity is open to a
number of formidable objections. One major charge against him
is that for all its many merits his theology revolves around
the individual's inwardization with almost ..no mention of comm¬
unity in the structure of which one finds the true fulfilment
of his individuality. For it is only within the order of com¬
munity that man develops to the full his separateness as a
person. In point of fact, one of the distinctive ideas of
Paul's thought is that God's purpose is not fulfilled simply
in the "authentic individuals", to use the Jargon of the
'theology of existence', but in the redemption of humanity.
The foregoing discussion makes it clear that in so far as
Radhakrishnan so stoutly upholds the idea of the individual's
true freedom within the context of community one cannot avoid
the impression that his distinctive idea of the self scores
over Bultmann's understanding of the human self.
If, however, Bultmann were asked why he places so much empha¬
sis on the individual in his historicity his answer would be
that Kierkegaard's understanding of existence is the pointer
in the right direction. In fact, Kierkegaard held that exist¬
ence in being related to itself knows itself related to the
transcendent power which establishes this relationship. Bult¬
mann's writings prove beyond doubt that this is also his own
conviction and his defence of which has become a rather hotly
debated issue in dialectical theology. At this point, how-
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ever the question becomes insistent whether the attainment
of personhood does not consist in our granting personhood to
others and in helping them to actualize it. The concern of
Bultmann's more cautious critics like Buri and of his left
wing critics like Jaspers is to expand this more individual¬
istic conception of Bultmann to include being with others.
Buri contends: "God is the great 'Thou' about whom I do not
1
know unless I know this 'Thou1 within the co-human sphere".
This is further fortified by Jasper's comment: "In religion
there flows a stream of communal life that lies beyond the
2
reach of philosophy ..." All this makes it clear that a
theology of community is a necessary supplement to the "theo¬
logy of existence'.
While dealing with Radhakrishnan's concept of history in the
last chapter we have shown that his thought unquestionably
displays an intense interest in personal history rather than
in a cyclic movement of history as in the case for classical
Hinduism. His concept of human freedom reflects not only the
outright disapproval of the fatalistic conception of karma but
also the limits of his agreement with classical Hindu theo¬
logians in general. This shows that he has made a major
contribution to the development of a new understanding of his-
5
tory. As we have seem Radhakrishnan holds the view that
1. As quoted by E.T. Long, "Jasper's Philosophy of Existence
as a Model for Theological Reflection", International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. III. No.1.
(Spring, 1972), p. AO.
2. Karl Jaspers, "Myth and Religion" in Kerygma and Myth II,
ed. H.W. Bartsch, tr. R.H. Puller (London, 1962), p. 175.
3. See above, p. 121.
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man directs his destiny and the free act of individuals gives
a new form and meaning to history.
In order to make our comparison of Radhakrishnan's view of his¬
tory with that of Bultmann more intelligible, at the risk of
repetition let us look again more closely at some of Bultmann's
statements reflecting his view of history. It has long been
known that his concept of history is sharply opposed to the
traditional Christian understanding of history, as a linear
process. Bultmann's "punctilear" view of time lays stress on
the present moment, the eschatological now of decision. In
the first chapter we have alluded to the fact that Bultmann
is not only largely influenced by Dilthey's philosophy of
history but also has a lively admiration for the work of
Collingwood. The difference between Dilthey's understanding
of history as well as of hermeneutics and Collingwood's view
of history is explained by Brown as follows: "Dilthey drew a
sharp distinction between history and the natural sciences
and insisted that in historical research we relive the experi¬
ence of the person studied". But for Collingwood, "the histo¬
rian thinks himself into the action to discern the thought of
the agent. Not a clinical observation of what happened but
an existential relation between the historian and the event
is called for. This leads to self-understanding on the part
of the historian". This makes it clear that Bultmann evi¬
dently takes his thought-forms from these schools of thought.
In his book, History and Eschatology, Bultmann has given a
1. Raymond E. Brown, S.S. "After Bultmann What? - An Intro¬
duction to the Post-Bultmannians", The Catholic Biblical
Quarterly, Vol. XXVI (1964), p. 7 fn. 5 and pp. 7-8.
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more adequate expression to Collingwood's view of history.
He affirms: "History gains meaning only when the historian
'i
himself stands within history and takes part in history".
Heidegger's significant statement that "the poverty of the
'categorical' means at our disposal, and the unsureness of
the primary ontological horizons, become the more obstrusive,
the more the problem of history is traced to its primordial
p
roots" must have been also the background of Bultmann's con¬
cept of history. This is seen from his quoting with appro¬
val an important observation of Heidegger: "Following the
hints of Dilthey, Heidegger says in his analysis of the human
being as temporal-historical that the human being chooses its
genuine existence by resolution and is thereby brought into
3 4
simplicity of its destiny". As we have seen, Bultmann's own
view of history is that the responsible decisions of indivi¬
duals are the clue to the meaning of history. The individual
cannot see the meaning of history as a spectator. Bultmann
writes: "A 'Weltanschauung', we may say, is the more legiti¬
mated the more it expresses the historicity of the human
5
being".
From these foregoing statements it becomes obvious that Bultmann
never ceases to emphasize that Historie must become Geschichte
1. History and Eschatology, p. 119.
2. M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trg. ,.J. iiacquarrie and E.
Robinson (London, l9^5Tr~P^~"^29.
3. History and Eschatology, p. 146.
4. See above p. 78.
5- History and Eschatology, p. 149.
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which qualifies one's existence here and. now. And this view
of history is part of his programme for demythologizing and
the existential interpretation of faith. He firmly believes
that the present and the past become together as one in faith's
response to the Word. The logical implication of this view
is, as Ott observes, that for Bultmann, 'genuine historical
reality exists only in the now of "historical" action, in the
now of understanding and decision". Bultmann explains per¬
sonality, one's personal history in terms of "encounter" with
God who judges and challenges one in the kerygma. From this
he argues that the true skandalon is an event in which the
selfhood of the believer is actually altered, It is
not a logical contradiction but an existential event, an occur¬
ence in the present in which one experiences freedom from one's
2
old self and freedom for one's new self. From the above sta¬
tements of Bultmann it is evident that by revelation he means
that God comes to man in the kerygma. And he not only ex¬
plains with clarity and ingenuity the relation of the histori¬
cal to revelation but also puts us in his debt by bringing to
clear focus the idea that: "Radical freedom would be freedom
from himself But man cannot get such freedom by his own
will and strength, for in such effort, he would remain 'the
5
old man'; he can only receive this freedom as gift". This
is the distinctive presupposition of Bultmann's existentialist
1. Heinrich Ott, "Objectification and Existentialism" in
Kerygma and Myth II, p. 323.
2. cf. Rudolf Bultmann, 'Das Befremdliche des Ohristlichen
Glaubens' in G.V. Ill, p. 205 as tr. in E.T. Long, Jaspers
and Bultmann, p. 71•
3. History and Eschatology, p. 150.
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theology and in this sense there is that basic difference be¬
tween his understanding of soteriology and that of Radhakrish-
nan.
But where then do these two writers converge? It is in their
understanding of human personality that they express similar
viewpoints. That is, it is from their concept of history
that we can institute a comparison between them. In order to
do this one need recall what Bultmann means by personality.
For him, personality is also temporal-historical and is con¬
stant only as a possibility which is ever to be realized in
terms of human will and decision. For Radhakrishnan also, to
possess a true personality "one has to realize new possibili¬
ties". "Man can fling a flaming torch into the darkness of
the future". "There is the play of the contingent". As a
Christian theologian Bultmann affirms: "That man is in the
world is due to an event, to the creation of God; it is not
to be deduced from the eternal necessity of a cosmic continu¬
um". "I live in my decisions in which I myself am at stake,
either to win my self or lose it". For Radhakrishnan, a
"neo-orthodox" Hindu thinker, "Each individual is his own
2
authentic self, ..... Each has to tread his path". For
him, the human self is an aspect of the world process and
he can become an organized whole if he can unify his life.
This makes it clear that for him the achieving of authenti¬
city of the human being is left to himself. This is in line
1. Existence and Faith, pp. 208, 214.
2. S. Radhakrishnan, Recovery of Faith, p. 180.
193
with his traditional Hindu dogma. At this point two remarks
have to be made: 1) for both Bultmann and Radhakrishnan it is
the contingent that matters most; 2) both give supreme value
to the will and decisions of man in his historical existence,
a position which gives something relative a status of an ab¬
solute. This inversely, hinges upon their basic presupposi¬
tion that man is a self-choosing subject and it is he who is
at stake. It is precisely in this sense that we can infer a
striking similarity between these two systems of thought.
One cannot fail to see the force of their argument that the
human will is the primary, if not the sole means of the indi¬
vidual to display the degree of personality to which he can
reach. It is also true that the personal categories are the
most adequate aids for one's religious experience. But the
crucial question is whether this exercise of one's will, un¬
aided as it is, can be constantly conducive to a continuous
search after truth. If it can why is it that a person like
Paul failed to do the right knowing what was good and what
was evil? He confessed to the same feeling in this manner:
"The good which I want to do, I fail to do; but what I do is
the wrong which is against my will; and if what I do is against
my will, clearly it is no longer I who am the agent, but sin
that has its lodging in me". (Rom. 7:19-20, NEB).
We may fully agree with Bultmann and Radhakrishnan that the
will is the crucial element of the human being. However, it
may be pointed out that it is ineffective to live in humble
believing obedience on God. Is there any escape from the
ineffectiveness of the human will to decide for God? Can
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either the 'rational' or the personal consciousness of the
being be the sole motive force of making him responsive to
the source of all being? It would appear that existentialist
philosophy be it Western or Eastern tends to be part of a way
of thinking that so emphasizes the one aspect, i.e. man as a
choosing agent that the rest is lost sight of, viz. the aspect
of divine operation. Bultmann however, may argue that the
'revelation theology' or his 'kerygmatic theology' challenges
man to decide for God. And with this I would not quarrel save
to suggest that in practice this has not proved very convincing.
If, on the other hand, in accordance with Bultmann's view, the
proclamation of the Church had been able to convert the human
will it would have made all the difference in the world.
In his theology Bultmann shifts the weight of theological
opinion to 'revelation theology' and 'personal history'. This
position of Bultmann perhaps stems from Heidegger's concep-
■tion of the individual which was brought under the magnify¬
ing glass by Martin Buber when he observed: "For him
/Heidegger/ the individual has the essence of man in himself
and brings it to existence by becoming a "resolved" self".
It is true that Bultmann's conclusion that God comes to man
in grace and judgment constituting his call to man to repen¬
tance has been drawn with the greatest clarity and consistency.
This shows that Bultmann sees man from the perspective of
'kerymatic theology'. At this point one can ask with apparent
justice whether with this point of view we are not coerced
1. M. Buber, Between Man and Man, tr. R.G. Smith (London, 194-7).
p. 171.
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into allowing personal history to swallow up universal his¬
tory, as Paul conceives of it. In this connection it is in¬
structive to note what Bishop L. Newbigin says: "/The world¬
wide mission of the church has/7 a faith regarding the final
consummation of God's purpose in the power of which it is
possible to find meaning for world history which does not
make personal history meaningless, and meaning for personal
history which does not make world history meaningless".
If the shift of emphasis in Radhakrishnan and Bultmann is
turned to the man-ward aspect of religion, how then do they
explain the transcendence of God? They both are characteris¬
tically silent on divine transcendence as it is in itself. All
that Bultmann says is that the paradigm of personal relations
is thought to be the most adequate analogy for our talk about
God and that 'kerygmatic theology' understood from the existen¬
tial principle of 'encounter' is the key to our understanding
of God's being and action. By reason of these two principles
Bultmann firmly believes that he gives due recognition to the
transcendent reality of God since for him the revelation takes
place in the word of preaching. He affirms: "Revelation is
not illumination or the communication of knowledge, but rather
an occurrence, Thus revelation must be an occurrence
that directly concerns us, that takes place in us ourselves",
"I am given a knowledge, namely, of myself, of my immediate
now, in which and for which the word of proclamation is spoken
1. J.E. Lesslie Newbigin, Honest Religion for Secular Man
(London, 1966), p. 4-6.
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to me".''
One can ask whether Bultmann's insistence on the extraordinary
reliability of the preached word taking the place of Offenba-
rwerden can carry conviction. Can the objectivity of the Word
of God be located solely ' - in the kerygma? One would be tem¬
pted to say that Bultmann's insistence on the power of kerygma
definitely underscores the other possibilities of God's reve¬
lation - God himself reaching out to his own creation. Cer¬
tainly, there are other divine possibilities of human response,
e.g. the transcendent Reality revealing itself not in some ob¬
ject in the world but in the inner consciousness of man.
C. Comparison of Gandhi's anthropology with that of Bultmann:
To institute a comparison between Gandhi's understanding of
man and that of Bultmann one can begin by asking how they both
understand the historicity of man. In Gandhi's opinion, man
cannot regenerate himself unless he hazards for himself. Bult¬
mann also argues that man achieves his existence in the sphere
of concrete situation, in his individual responsibility and
2
decisions.. Bultmann characteristically insists on man's
creatureliness - 'man's being is removed from his control'.
Gandhi also speaks of the God-man relationship in a similar
fashion. He writes: "/man cannot control results, and when
he thinks he does/, he comes to griefGiven the assump¬
tion that Gandhi is not an academic philosopher, in the words
of P.T. Raju, one finds less use of philosophical terminology
1. Existence and Faith, pp. 78 and 88.
2. cf. Essays, p. 78, quoted on p. 4-4-.
3. Harijan, 23 March 194-0.
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in his system than in that of an existentialist theologian.
Nevertheless, the idea of 'man being unable to control re¬
sults' in Gandhi's thought perhaps strikes a note parallel
to Bultmann's idea of man's being not at his own disposal.
Both these men speak of human freedom in eloquent and glow¬
ing terms and at the same time equally emphasize the "infi¬
nite qualitative difference between God and man", following
Heidegger's existentialist analysis of human existence Bult-
mann repeatedly stresses that man is on each occasion called
to decision and stands at risk. Seen from this perspective
of human existence his explanation of man's relation to God
comes more into view in his essay 'The Crisis in Belief* where
he says: "Real belief in God is not a proposition which one
can have ready to hand in order to evade the challenge of the
'moment'", "one which is never a question of knowledge gained
by research and preservable possession, but is always one of
the will and responsiveness to the 'moment'.
The implication is that the concept of God as he is in himself,
viz. theological objectification as in some circles of classi¬
cal Christianity is an untenable doctrine in Bultmann's opinion.
His contention is: "Jesus Christ cannot be objectively estab¬
lished as an Eschatological Event, so that one could there and
then believe in him. Rather he is such - indeed, to put it
more exactly, he becomes such - in the encounter when the Word
2
which proclaims him meets with belief: " By this he
1. Essays, pp. 7 and 19.
2. Ibid., p. 286.
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indeed sheds light upon the traditional conception of God by-
showing the relevance of the living word of God to man's exis¬
tence. If he thus sheds light he also arouses embarrassment
by refusing to recognize the other theological position that
God is always interested in this world which he has made,
more accurately, actively interested in it and concerned about
it. In other words, he finds it hard to accept the proposi¬
tion that God is the maker of history. As a historian he can¬
not agree that God acts in history. For him, as J.C.G. Greig
explains, "eschatology is discourse about the challenge of God
to the individual in his individual situation, ..." So the
view that God acts in history, in Bultmann's argument, makes
God into an object among other objects and hence cannot escape
the fallacy of immanentism. For him, God is Subject and never
object for man - the basic presupposition of the exponents of
dialectical theology.
But if we are to do justice to the New Testament teaching of
the God-man relationship it may well be necessary for us to
recognize that there are two trains of thought, especially in
Paul. That is, God is immanent in an impersonal way, and
imminent (i.e. close to,'nearer than nearness' in a personal
way. To put this differently, does the absence of faith for
Paul mean that God will be shut out of his world and unable to
act within? No, Paul could never think this way! On the con¬
trary he might say that God's activity would take a different
and terrible form. To this form of God's activity, the oppo-
1. J.C.G. Greig, "Some Aspects of Hermeneutics: A brief Survey",
Religion A Journal of Religion and Religions, Vol. I
(Autumn, 1971), p. 138.
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site of salvation, Paul gives the name 'wrath', (Rom. 1:18;
2:5? 8). Dodd explains this in his comment on the phrase
the "wrath of God" as follows: "Paul carefully avoids ever
making God the subject of the verb "to be angry". ""The
wrath of God", therefore, as seen in actual operation, con¬
sists in taaving sinful human nature to "stew in its own
juice""
But, if on the other hand, Bultmann refuses to recognize this
New Testament affirmation of God's dealings with the world and
holds fast to his principle of 'moment' or 'encounter', it is
a fair judgment to say that at the hands of Bultmann the
eternal is 'psychologized' - a private inward realm of being
becomes a focus of God's encounter and nowhere else. To put
it more plainly, Paul's doctrine of God is turned into anthro¬
pology. If Robinson's remark that "Bultmann's emphasis upon
the formal character of God's demand which sin rejects is
2
too absolute", is valid, then it is equally valid to say
that the relative experience of the individual is absolutized.
As a result, except for the individual's experience, the tran¬
scendent remains the unknown beyond the limit - God appears
to be totally removed from the reality of the world.
Another aspect of Gandhi's anthropology concerns his under¬
standing of God. It is worthy of note that his teaching on
God reflects a strong sense of his theistic background. He
1. C.H. Dodd, The meaning of Paul for Today (London, 1920),
p. 63.
2. N.H.G. Robinson, "REVIEW" Theology of the New Testament,
by R. Bultmann 2 Vols.", N.T.S., Vol. IV (1957-58), p. 34-1.
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writes: "(Whilst) everything around me is ever changing, ever
dying, there is underlying all that change a living power
that is changeless, that holds all together, that creates,
dissolves and recreates. That informing power or spirit is
God God is life, Truth, Light. He is Love".'' It is
indeed admirable that like Tagore, Gandhi cannot think of the
nature of the ultimate being apart from the contingent stuff
of human living. He observes: " I identify Truth with
the fullest life, and that is how it becomes a concrete thing.
2
God is His whole creation, the whole existence
All these observations of Gandhi unmistakably make it clear
that he cannot understand God apart from humanity ( a view
similar to that of Tagore). In Bultmann's thought also, the
fundamental truth of the Biblical teaching is that the 'God
whom we believe is known only concretely'. For him, God is
known not to perception. Tillich's definition of God as the
ultimate ground of human being is given a new meaning by
Bultmann in that 'His being ultimate can be known only through
his being historical for us - hence he in several instances
speaks of the incursion of the transcendent, "of the word
made flesh" into history. His own words are: "The transcen¬
dence of God is not as in myth reduced to immanence. Instead,
we have the paradox of a transcendent God present and active
in history: 'The Word became flesh'". When Julius Schniewind
1. Young India, October 11, 1928, cited in The Essential Gandhi:
An Anthology, p. 229.
2. Hari.jan, 25 May 1935.
3. Kerygma and Myth I, p. AA.
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writes that the scandal concerning the person of Jesus is
what "the Christian Church has always asserted, /that7 our
salvation is One who was involved in all the relativity of
history", Bultmann answers that he is in definite agreement
2
with him. He wishes to say exactly the same thing.
When we look at the affirmation of these two writers, i.e.
Gandhi and Bultmann, we must conclude that these men see at
pains to establish one basic presupposition for the philoso¬
phy of religion, namely that God in his significance for hu¬
manity is known concretely - confrontation between man and
God is possible and Being is known not as a pure, absolute
Thou but as involved in the contingent. It is precisely in
this sense that Gandhi's understanding of God comes close to
that of Bultmann.
It is of particular interest to note that Gandhi develops
his own concept of history. For him, as referred to earlier,
"the sum total of the energy of mankind is not to bring us
down but to lift us up, and that is the result of the definite,
7.
if unconscious, working of the law of love". For much of his
religious thought the Gita was the enduring inspiration and
from it he drew a conception of man as well as of history.
He writes: "Man is the maker of his destiny in the sense
that he has the freedom of choice as to the manner in which
4.
he uses that freedom ". He views man's freedom not
1. Kerygma and Myth I, p. 69 •
2. cf. Ibid., p. 111.
3. As cited by B.G. Gokhale, Indian Thought Through The Ages,
p. 20.
4. Hari,jan, 23 March 1940.
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only as a postulate like the morality of Kant's Practical
Reason: 'thou canst because thou shouldst', but also as the
responsibility of each human being. This idea of freedom
is closely bound up with his conception of man as being unable
to control results. Hence we cannot find in his thought that
aesthetic pride in man which prompted Tagore to declare that
"God's need of man is as urgent as man's need of God".
Gandhi expands the idea of man's complete surrender to the will
of God. He does not however, think this takes away his act of
decision as a responsible being. "It is for God to take our
broken barge across the stream", he says, "but it is for us to
put in our best effort. It is for us to plug a whole in its
bottom or, if water gets into the boat, to throw it out. In
that case the barge will keep floating despite the hole. But
it will float only when there is God's hand behind it. I would
therefore say that man must make an endeavour and for the re-
2
suit depend upon God's grace". This indicates that the key
note of all this explanation of human freedom is the presuppo¬
sition that 'man is the maker of his destiny'.
Interestingly enough, Bultmann also reaches a similar idea of
human freedom which he explains, as we have seen in the passage.
This explains why we may probably find a point of resemblance
between these two thinkers inasmuch as they emphasize man's
1. 5J.S. Naravane, Modern Indian Thought, p. 191.
2. As quoted by Ghandrashankar Shukla, Gandhi's View of Life
(Bombay, 1954), p. 60.
3. Existence and Faith, p. 214, quoted on pp. 63-64.
203
freedom in terms of his will and decisions. Let us now con¬
sider Bultmann's concept of history and see whether there is
any point of contact between his thought and that of Gandhi.
It is probably right to say that Bultmann accepts Heidegger's
existential analysis of existence and profoundly modifies it
by emphasizing that such an analysis cannot make up a man's
mind in advance as to what the nature of that existence is to
be. His own words are: "It tells that our authentic existence
is realizable only in existence, which means existing always
in the concrete here and now. But it does not claim that the
existentialist analysis can create the existential understand-
-1
ing of the here and now " More to the point is his
adaptation of the view of history which rings true to the
philosophy of history found in the systems of Hilthey and
Collingwood. He put this very clearly and concisely: "His¬
toricity is the nature of man who can never possess his gen¬
uine life in any present moment, but is always on the way and
yet is not at the mercy of a course of history independent of
himself. Every moment is the now of responsibility, of deci-
2
sion. From this the unity of history is to be understood".
From this it appears clearly that the concept of history as
implied by both the systems of Gandhi and Bultmann does not
admit of any significance that can be given to history in gen¬
eral. This view of 'personal history' seems to accord very
1. Ker.ygma and Myth I, pp. 193-94-.
2« History and Eschatology, p. 143.
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little or no importance to the traditional Christian idea of
God 'as active in history'. This school finds it hard to see
how God really intervenes in history. To subscribe to the
view of such an intervention is to succumb to mythical thought,
in short, to suppress the paradox of faith.
Nevertheless, it must be said that the distinctive idea that
Judaism held is that God had visited and redeemed his people.
Abraham J. Heschel makes a convincing comment: "The root of
Jewish faith is not a comprehension of abstract princi¬
ples but an inner attachment to sacred events", a "commitment
1
to revelation".
Bultmann however, so strongly opposes the notion of world his¬
tory as God's history on the basis of his belief that God can
be revealed only in an 'event', 'encounter'. This contention
of Bultmann that 'personal history' is the touchstone for the
New Testament theology is now very much in the foreground of
the present century theological debate. William Temple con¬
tended that "there is the coincidence of divinely guided
2
events and minds divinely guided to interpret those events".
Following the same line of argument Leonard Hodgson writes:
"'Revelation' is God's enlightening of the minds of men when
they see the implications of any events, in the history of
*
nature or the history of men".
1. As quoted by D. Sturm, "Naturalism, Historicism, And
Christian Ethics: Toward A Christian Doctrine of Natural
Law", The Journal of Religion, Vol. XIV (1964), p. 43.
2. William Temple, Nature, Nan and God, (London, 1934),
XXIV and p. 312.
3. As quoted in P. Gerald Downing, Has Christianity A Reve¬
lation? (London, 1964), p. 245.
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Needless to say, this position is wholly unacceptable to the
Bultmannian school, because for Bultmann, to propose an alter¬
native explanation of the meaning of history, especially in
terms of God as acting in all creation, furthering his purposes,
is of dubious profit. It is however, to be noted that for
Bultmann God reconciling the world in Christ unto himself is
synonymous with the Chruch's proclamation of the kerygma. This
presupposition is closely bound up with his concept of history.
>1
He affirms: "The subject of history is man". At this point
one important question presses itself upon us: Is not this
position of Bultmann's similar to that of modern Indian
thought? A close follower of Gandhi, Vinoba Bhave, explains
God's dealings with the world as follows: "He has distributed
intelligence to each one of His creation ... And He has advised
them to seek guidance from their intelligence and act. And
so the world goes on without His having to worry Himself about
it. Indeed He has so far removed Himself from the scene that
2
some of us are led even to doubt His existence " Of
course, it is to be recognized that Bultmann does not go so
far as to doubt the existence of God. On the contrary, he
takes the trouble to affirm quite emphatically God pro me .
The point that can be made from the preceding quotation is
that modern Indian thought spells out clearly the idea that
God is apparently far removed from the plane of history. It
is perhaps in this sense that we can see the striking parallel
1. History and Eschatology, p. 14-3.
2. 'Our Unique Mission': speech at Chandil Samelan in Bihar,
9/5/53; from his Bhoodan Yajna (the act or project of land
distribution to the landless).
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between Bultmann's existential understanding of history and
that of modern Hindu thinkers like Gandhi. This point is well
brought out in a summary statement of Dr. J. McRenzie: "The
Hebrew and Christian conception that the mind and heart of God
are revealed in events within the temporal order is repugnant
to the dominant tendencies in Hindu thought, according to which
-i
the Eternal is concealed, not revealed, by the temporal".
This is, of course, not to overlook the fact that there is a
fundamental difference of presupposition between Bultmann and
Gandhi in respect to the understanding of authentic life. Bult¬
mann affirms: "The man who understands his historicity radi¬
cally, that is, who understands his genuine life as an
ever-future one, has to know that his genuine self can only
2
be offered to him as a gift by the future". Further, there
is another marked difference between Gandhi's concept of his¬
tory and that of Bultmann, namely that Bultmann repeatedly
stresses the idea that eschatology is not something that takes
place at the end of history. He understands eschatology in
terms of an event in the individual's existence. In this sense
he apparently dissolves eschatology into personal history.
Another important aspect of Gandhi's religious thought is
that of his policy of the uplift of the community through the
spirit of brotherly love towards one's neighbour. His concern
can be approached and apprehended from the way in which he
tried to handle the situation when he came up against racial
contempt and discrimination. The spirit of brotherhood and
1. J. McKenzie, Two Religions, (London, 1950), p. 94.
2. History and Eschatology, p. 150.
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unity he learned from his close study of Islam and the spirit
of service to his neighbour in need from his close association
with Christian Church leaders and from the study of the New
Testament, particularly the Sermon on the Mount, and probably
the parables of the Last Judgment in chs. 24-25 of Mt's
Gospel. His acceptance of the principle that he was his bro¬
ther's keeper has indeed constituted a challenge to the Indian
Christian Church. His conception of the role of the individual
within the context of community has been far more profound
than that of classical Hinduism according to which the indivi¬
dual's pursuit of his own salvation forms the core of reli¬
gious pattern of the day in keeping with the time-hallowed
truth that man's salvation must be found from within.
Keeping this in view we must now press our inquiry still fur¬
ther and consider what Bultmann has to say on the subject of
the connection between the individual and community. His pri¬
mary concern is to expound his hypothesis that the unchanging
substance of the message of the New Testament ought to be under¬
stood in terms of human existence, more accurately, one's own
historic existence. Hence, it is perhaps not too much to say
that Bultmann has not analysed the nature and role of the
Christian community more precisely and profoundly save to
suggest that the Christian Church is the eschatological comm¬
unity commissioned to preach God's word to man. His own words
are: " , it is phenomenon of significant history, in the
sense that it realizes itself m history". Elsewhere he
1. Kerygma and Myth I, p. 43.
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argues that "Man is asked, as it appears to me, only about the
significance of the 'moment'. If it is right that the escha-
tological event places the believer in eschatological existence,
takes him away from the world, he does not in any case have the
task of having a significant formative influence I" Bultmann
has given more sustained and conscious attention to the aspect
of individual's responsibility to choose either for God or the
world and this has more or less become a central element in
his system. So one cannot avoid the impression that in his
account of the life of faith human freedom figures much more
prominently than does love. His contention is that the possi¬
bilities of existence can be fulfilled only in the historical
decision of the individual in which man comes to his authenti¬
city. He observes: "Thus one cannot ever leave this crisis
p
or this experience behind, not even as a believer".
This is perhaps one of the deepest insights of Bultmann's in¬
terpretation of the Gospel. But one wonders whether he has
given due consideration to the idea that man grasps himself
only in the midst of a reciprocal relationship with others
and for that matter, the existence of the Church as essential
to the Gospel itself. One can argue that by reason of his
programme of demythologizing, especially the emphasis on indi¬
vidual's present decision and the encounter with the Word of
God Bultmann practically ignored the importance of the collec¬
tive experience of the Christian community which Giovanni
1. Essays, p. 289*
2. Ibid.
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Miegge describes as "the community of the Spirit, the
"Charismatic community", as being that community which is
penetrated through and through by the Spirit of the Risen
1
Christ". It is perhaps in this sense that his existentialist
theology is the science of the individual rather than, in the
phraseology of Richard Hooker, the "Science of things divine".
D. The Comparison of Sri Aurobindo's anthropology with that
of Bultmann:
In our discussion of Sri Aurobindo's concept of man in the
foregoing chapter we have discovered that Aurobindo gave the
concept of human freedom a place of prominence as over against
the fatalistic conception of karma which he condemned uncom¬
promisingly. This is too evident to need fuller explanation
here. This characteristic emphasis of Aurobindo on human
freedom is perhaps his unique contribution to history of the
understanding of man in modern Indian thought. Aurobindo ob-
2
serves: "To fulfil God in man is man's manhood ". "The
aspiration to exceed himself is delivered and articulate with-
X
in him: "He has to realize his individuality
an ultimate arrival at a free and wide harmony and luminous-
ness of knowledge and will and feeling and action and charac-
4.
ter, is the evident intention of his nature; " He fur-
1. Giovanni Miegge, Gospel and Myth in the Thought of Rudolf
Bultmann,tr. Bishop Stephen Neill (London, 1960), pi 28.
2. The Life Divine I, p. 56.
5. The Life Divine II, p. 839.
4. Ibid., p. 594.
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ther explains that "our imperfect mental instrumentation is
not the last word of our possibilities, ..."
All this makes it clear that even though Aurobindo uses a
language reminiscent of his Hindu religious background yet
his intense interest in developing a philosophy of human exis-
2
tence is perhaps not unlike that of Heidegger. F. Spiegelberg
observes that both Heidegger and Aurobindo express similar
views "very much in contrast to the high esteem, sometimes
the overestimation, in which reason and thinking is held among
all other kinds of philosophers. There is a great deal of
overemphasis and overestimation given to thinking. Herein
x
Heidegger and Aurobindo agree". Spiegelberg is right in
asserting that Aurobindo stresses the primacy of epistemology
over ontology of the Vedanta of Sankara. As earlier referred
to, Heidegger points out that "the poverty of the 'categorical'
means at our disposal and the unsureness of the primary onto-
logical horizons become the more obtrusive, the more the prob-
L\.
lem of history is traced to its primordial roots".
For Aurobindo, intuition is the hallmark of integral experience.
This is amplified in his idea of inwardization which is des¬
cribed by P.T. Raju as follows: "what one has to develop, then,
is integrality of personality. But the term 'integrality of
1. The Life Divine II, p. 667-
2. For a fuller treatment of parallels between Heidegger and
Aurobindo see J.N. Mohanty, Modern Philosophical Anthropo¬
logy and the Concept of Man in Sri Aurobindo's philosophy
(Bombay, 1956).
3. F. Spiegelberg, "Sri Aurobindo and Existentialism" in The
Integral Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo, p. 52.
4. M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 429.
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personality' is not an ethical or merely psychological term.
It is complete unification of all our being diversified into
will, cognition, action and reality".
Perhaps it is also in this sense that Aurobindo1s idea of
inwardization comes close to Heidegger's understanding of
existence. It has been remarked that the philosophy of
existence is anything but phenomenological self-analysis.
For Heidegger, "It is not a speculation detached from man,
2
but man himself, as he understands himself".
J.N. Mohanty comments that "the cardinal principle of this
philosophy /an integral philosophy of man7 is the principle
that man is what he can be; that human existence is full of
possibilities; This coincides with the findings of
such researchers as M. Heidegger In this comment one
can detect a striking similarity between Aurobindo and Heid¬
egger in that in Heidegger's existential philosophy a more
adequate expression was given to horizontal possibilities.
His position, roughly speaking, may be analysed as follows:
being-in-the world, with its three components, the world, the
being who is in-the-world, and the inherence of that being-in-
the world. Further, his idea of existence is that man's being
/
is a being-able-to be. Claude Geoffre points out that "Being
in history as a characteristic element of the existence of man
1. P.T. Raju, The Philosophical Traditions of India, p. 229.
2. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 325-
3. J.N. Mohanty, "Integralism and Modern Philosophical Anthro¬
pology" in The Integral Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo,
pp. 157-58.
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signifies that in each 'now' of decision man is responsible
for the past and the future" - the three dimensions of the
moment: coming-towards, present, future, are, for Heidegger,
"extases"; " In fact, his position has been well de¬
fined by the late Dr. John Baillie: "The leading principle of
his philosophy is that of the horizons, as he calls them, with¬
in which human life has to be lived and which delimit the
possibilities open to it. The final horizon is death the
death of the individual, but also the final death of society
2
; it is "the iron ring round existence" ".
These statements make it clear that Aurobindo does not only
appear to use terminology, quite independently of Heidegger,
of this phenomenological self-analysis but also argues for the
apparent self-sufficiency of a more inwardized, a more self-
conscious being.
In the light of these apparent similarities between Aurobindo's
understanding of man and Heidegger's philosophy of existence
it is proper for us now to examine Bultmann's anthropology
more closely and see if we can draw some lines of comparison
between the systems of these two writers. Bultmann incorpor¬
ates into his theological project the Heideggerian concept of
"ec-sistence" to express the historicity of Dasein. In other
words, in contrast to ancient philosophy, Bultmann does not
start from the reality of the things of the cosmos but tries
1. Claude Geoffre, "Bultmann on Kerygma and History" in Rudolf
Bultmann in Catholic Thought, eds. T.F. O'Meara O.P. and
D.M. Weisser, O.P. (New York, 1968), p. 171 and 171 fn.
2.John Baillie, Invitation to Pilgrimage (London, 19^-2), p.95.
213
to explain temporality starting from human reality. He fur¬
ther explains this as follows: "We believe that we understand
the being of man more truly when we designate it as historical.
And we understand by the historical nature of man's being that
"i
his being is a potentiality to be". The implication is that
because man is essentially a potentiality-for-being, he can
live in a way that is either authentic or inauthentic. For
him, "the genuine life of man is always before him; it is
2
always to be apprehended, to be realized". This he expresses
in a slightly different way m thestatement^^ 7 '
However, the distinctive feature of Bultmann's existentialist
theology is that in Christ God meets man here and now (in the
kerygma), and offers him a new possibility of understanding
his own existence. He never ceases to emphasize that one's
radical freedom would be freedom from himself and he can only
receive this freedom as a gift. This makes it unmistakably
clear that for Bultmann, however much philosophy can describe
the reality of human existence still it cannot take the place
of the liberating Word.
Keeping this in view, it is necessary to clear the ground be¬
fore we begin to institute a possible comparison between the
systems of Aurobindo and Bultmann. Aurobindo, as has been
stated above in the second chapter, was a true follower of
1. Faith and Understanding I, p. 149.
2. History and Eschatology, p. 140.
3. Essays, p. 78 quoted on p. 44.
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Sakta philosophy and hence was prepared to play down the
role of introspection, the chief tenet of Vedantism. By
indicating an alternative approach to religion, as of classi¬
cal Hinduism, i.e. by emphasizing the aspect of the unreser¬
ved surrender of the individual to power that comes from above,
Aurobindo seems to have shifted the focus of attention to
Ramanuja's concept of religion - it is all God's grace, man
depends absolutely on God. He could not persuade himself to
follow the rather influential school of the Advaita-Vedanta
and thereby incessantly emphasized man's complete dependence
on God for a consummation of his spiritual experience. To
make this consummation possible three things are necessary
namely: "Consciousness, plasticity and unreserved surrender,
„1
• • •
In Aurobindo's system the idea of atmasamarpana - an absolute
and unconditional surrender of the individual to God is a
dominant concept. All this only reveals that as a neo-Vedan-
tic thinker Aurobindo expressly emphasizes two trains of
thought, i.e. (i) man as a choosing agent has to realize his
individuality resulting in a free and wide harmony and luminou-
sness of knowledge, will, feeling, action and character; (ii)
man must unconditionally surrender himself to meet with the
power of the divine issuing in his true freedom. At the heart
of Aurobindo's position lies the fact that man cannot achieve
salvation by himself. It is the power of God - the Divine
Sakti - coming into the soul that can effect the transforma-
1. As quoted by S.K. Maitra, An Introduction to the Philoso¬
phy of Sri Aurobindo, p. 12.
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tion that is desired.
Keeping this in view let us now look a little more carefully
at what Bultmann says on the subject of transition from
inauthentic to authentic life. He affirms: "In the decision
of faith I do not decide on a responsible action, but a new
understanding of myself as free from myself by the grace of
God and as endowed with my new self, and this is at the same
time the decision to accept a new life grounded in the grace
1
of God". All this goes to show beyond a shadow of doubt
that Bultmann's adoption of the existentialists' analysis of
existence ought to be supplemented with the concept of one's
surrender to God to receive his authentic existence as God's
free gift. Further, in the light of statements about Bult¬
mann's interpretation of the Gospel cited above, one can dis¬
cern certain similarities between Aurobindo and Bultmann al¬
though they differ in details of terminology due to their
respective confessional backgrounds. That is, as an existen¬
tialist theologian Bultmann sticks to his evangelical faith
by retaining the theological proposition that the Ghrist-
event is the eschatological deed of God which cannot admit
of any demythologization and that it is unique in its effects
on human beings. Aurobindo, on the other hand, as a Sakta
philosopher, insists on the divine power to transform the
individual. (Incidentally, it is to be noted that "/In all
gnostic beings' consciousness/ personality and impersonality
are not opposite principles; they are inseparable aspects of
1. History and Eschatology, p. 152.
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one and the same reality. This reality is not the ego but
the being, who is impersonal in his stuff of nature but forms
A
out of it an expressive personality ). It is indeed ad¬
mirable that these men assert that man as a choosing agent
gains genuine life through his self-surrender to God. However,
one can ask whether this theory has not overlooked or over¬
simplified an important aspect of one's religious experience,
namely the divine operation. (Incidentally, it will be noted
that by reason of the use of the phrase, eschatologisch, coined
by himself Bultmann, at least in his intention, speaks of the
act of God facing the individual. However, his scheme of
thinking spells out very little of the idea that an effective
preaching happens only when divine event and the Spirit -
guided mind coincide. Hence, one cannot help feeling that he
leaves open the question of divine operation in the individual's
act of faith). How can man come to the stage of self-surren¬
der to God is the basic question of the philosophy of religion.
Both these men reply that it is man who has to act: "he is not
allowed to look round for guarantees, not even the quarantees
of a moral law, which take off or lighten the weight of res-
2
ponsibility, "
Christian theologyfc/as never resorted to looking for guarantees
in the act of faith even though Thomistic realism held
fast to the idea that the human will cannot be converted to
decide for God unless God converts it. Perhaps this was an
1. The Life Divine II, p. 1067-
2. History and Eschatology, p.150.
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extreme position; my own view of human response to God is
that the will of the person and the divine operation are indis-
tinguishably related to each other.
Furthermore, in Bultmann's system the language appropriate for
speaking of an act of God can only be analogical. He writes:
"The fact that the word of the Scriptures is God's Word cannot
be demonstrated objectively; it is an event which happens here
and now". He adds: "Trust in a friend can rest solely on the
personality of my friend which I can perceive only when I
trust him. There cannot be any trust or love without risk
the ground and object of faith are identical
because we cannot speak of what God is in Himself but only of
what He is doing to us and with us".
Two inferences can be drawn from these statements: I) the in¬
dividual's authentic life is achieved through a venture or
risk - faith can never lose its character as supreme risk,
the utmost adventure: II) any talk of God's operation apart
from his meeting the individual here and now in the kerygma
is fraught with mythological obJectification of God. Bult-
mann doubtless sets aside the mythological language about
God. But nevertheless, there are divergent views on the ques¬
tion of supernaturalism. R.W. Hepburn argues that "doubtless
a Christian ought not to see a miracle as a divine conjuring
trick, but should interpret the miracle in personal and moral
categories. But that does not give Bultmann warrant to say,
'the God of revelation is the God of Judgment and forgiveness,
1. Jesus Christ and Mythology, pp. 71> 72-73.
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not the Cause of abnormal phenomena". He adds: "Distortion
is inevitable when all relations come to be conceived on the
model of interpersonal encounter".
Bultmann's characteristic emphasis on the analogical and non-
mythological language about God undermines two aspects of re¬
ligion: (i) it overlooks the value of propositional statements
which are universally valid and necessary, i.e. there is an
unconditional imperative; man is finite and imperfectible;
man can live under God's guidance; (ii) the reality of the
world subsists between God and existence, or, in the words of
Bosanquet, "our world of sense of 'claims and counter-claims'
2
is rooted in reality". The human will is not the all-embra¬
cing or all-inclusive reality of human personality as some
existentialists hold and human feelings and attitudes are not
the only "observable" realities. Consciousness and cognition
are also component parts of the whole man (incidentally, Bult-
mann does take account of cognition as he develops his theme
of self-understanding). Consciousness in the sense of imme¬
diacy (in a Cartesian sense) is itself the incomprehensible
immediacy of our existing. J. Moltmann observes: "Descartes'
third Meditation on the immediate self-consciousness and the
consciousness of God therein given takes up - via the French
Augustine renaissance of the seventeenth century - the reflec-
x
tion of Augustine quoted above".
1. R.W. Hepburn, "Demytheologizing and the Problem of Validity",
in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, eds. A. Flew and
A. Maclntyre (London, 1966), pp. 233, 241.
2. As quoted in Swami Vivekananda Centenary Memorial Volume,
P. 330.
i l
3. Jurgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope, p. 63.
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This now brings us to the concept of history as understood by
both Aurobindo and Bultmann. We have made it clear in our
survey of his understanding of history that Aurobindo has
vehemently argued for the reality of the world, giving indivi¬
duality to every aspect of the universe, in contrast to San-
kara, who added a poignancy to his conviction of the unreality
of finite things, more specifically, the unreal reality of
Maya. As is well known, Sankara categorically denied the
reality of the world (jaganmithya). He held that Brahman
alone is real and the world is false or illusory. But for
Aurobindo every individual must have the same rhythm of signi¬
ficance as the cosmic life. This, indeed, springs from his
view of Reality which for him is neither the One nor the many,
but One in, through and beyond the many. His teaching is that
we have to emerge from this mental narrowness which declares
-i
that "the One is the reality, the Many are an illusion" into
"the supramental play or the truth of Maya where the "each"
and the "all" co-exist in the inseparatable unity of the one
2
truth and the multiple symbol". He maintains throughout
that freedom is to be won within the world.
It is against this background that he develops his own view
of history. As referred to earlier, he writes: "In our pre¬
sent life of Nature, in our externalized existence, it is
the world that seems to create us; but in the turn to the
1.) The Life Divine I, p. 5^ and p. 175.
2.)
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spiritual life it is we who must create ourselves and our
world". "At present mankind is undergoing an evolutionary
crisis in which is concealed a choice of its destiny;
This shows that Aurobindo seeks to lay the ground work for
an understanding of history with a strong sense of crisis on
the part of the individual.
As we have seen, Bultmann sees man primarily, if not exclusi¬
vely, as one standing before God in his subjectivity. He
holds that God's claim goes out to man and in order to achieve
the unity of his being man must turn to God in response to
God's claim on him. In his attempt to give an infinite im¬
portance to one's historical decisions Bultmann affirms that
"genuine historicity means to live in responsibility and his-
2
tory is a call to historicity". It is, therefore, imperative
for Bultmann to develop a historical method on the basis of
the individual's historicity. As earlier referred to, for
him, "history now gains the meaning of responsibility over
against the future, which is at the same time the responsibi¬
lity over against the heritage of the past in face of the
future". In this direction he goes one step further by indi¬
cating that the righteousness of God must be understood in
terms of the individual's historicity. He observes: Right¬
eousness becomes "the essence of salvation". It has its ori¬
gin in God's transcendent "grace which is his eschatological
1. The Life Divine II, pp. 1108, 1159.
2. History and Eschatology, p. 156.
5. Ibid., p. 143.
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deed". "Every "cosmic" dimension - i.e. in reality, historic
dimension "/has7 a locus in the actual living of men, which
is true "history"".
When we look at the above statements of these two writers we
can perhaps discern a possible similarity between their under¬
standing of history. Aurobindo's position displays an intense
feeling of crisis on part of the individual. This is strik¬
ingly parallel to Bultmann's characteristic emphasis on "the
actual living of men which is true history". As is well
known, Bultmann was originally involved in the theology of
crisis school.
In Bultmann's view, the historical decisions of individuals
make up history and in the words of Gogarten "these decisions
are such that they do not reach beyond history in order to
2
secure criteria and standards from a super-reality about it".
This implies that personal history is thought to be almost the
unalterable centre of reference to the understanding of cosmic
history. This view of history, in Bultmann's language, is a
key to the most comprehensive understanding of Paul's anthro¬
pology. He opposes the classical Christian concept of his¬
tory understood in terms of God's history on two counts:
I) In Heilsgeschichte general history historie and personal
history are too easily identified. The sense of Historie
as Heilsgeschichte cannot be maintained because the action of
God is not rationally intelligible and demonstrable. Hence,
1. Th. N.T. I, pp. 271 f. 289, 305.
2. E. Gogarten, "Theology and History", Journal for Theology
and the Church, Vol. Pour (1967), p. 38.
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Bultmann vehemently argues for Geschichte, i.e. "real history"
in which God encounters man. II) He sees the solution to the
problem of Heilsgeschichte (history as having an eschatologi-
cal goal) in Geschichte implying the "now" of decision for
the individual. Within this scheme of thinking, 'philosophy
of existence' is viewed as having primary authority and by
its definition of human possibilities it turns theology into
anthropology which focuses upon the reality and truth of human
existence. We are then left with the conclusion that Bultmann's
view of concrete human existence prevents him from ever making
room for a genuinely theological concept of reality and God's
revelation in history since the latter is a counterpart of the
idea of God's dealings with the world.(This view is essentially
the lynch-pin of the framework of Barthian theology and Bult¬
mann finds it hard to accept). Moreover, the idea of God's
dealings with the world is basic to Paul's theology which,
within its frame of reference of anthropology, Ghristology,
ecclesiology, and the cosmic perspective brought a transforma¬
tion of Israel's understanding of man's relation to God.
One can take exception to Bultmann's view by saying that the
relation of God to the reality of the world cannot be conclu¬
sively explained by a single principle of "encounter" in the
kerygma. As Long explains, what Jaspers argues is that "at
the limits of the knowledge of objects and the self who is
the subject of knowledge, man comes up against a boundary,
the limit of human understanding, and here he flounders. At
this limit, the manifestation of transcendent Being is possi-
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1
ble". Bultraann however, does not deny the general knowledge
of God given in creation. But this type of knowledge is only
subsidiary as seen from the perspective of revelation in the
Christ-event. He thus holds that "there is therefore revealed
in creation that knowledge about God which is given to man in
his knowledge concerning his own existence. If he would keep
this knowledge thoroughly open, then creation would
speak as God's word for him. But, in fact, man Just does not
do this: he twists this negative knowledge into a positive
2
knowledge, and so creation becomes mute for him " Obvi¬
ously, there is a Pauline note here but it seems to me that
Bultmann is perhaps overstating the sinfulness of man. His
contention is: "Only to the man who is aware of his creature-
liness does God speak in history".v
One can admit that the world is not self-explanatory, but
Bultmann insists on man being undble to allow the creation
to speak as God's Word. And for him, the idea of 'encounter'
becomes a formal criterion for his theory of 'revelation
theology'. He asserts: "Gone is the relation of man to the
transcendent as that which stands over against man and the
world and is not at their disposal, which is manifested only
L\.
through encounter, " He therefore concentrates on
phenomenological categories like "attitudes", "feelings",
1. E.T. Long, Jaspers and Bultmann, pp. 35.
2. Essays, pp. 114-15.
3. Ibid., p. 117.
4. Rudolf Bultmann, "The Idea of God and Modern Man", Journal
for Theology and the Church, Vol. Two. (1965), p. 89.
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"trust" and "risk" based on personal relations. God's reve¬
lation for him is fundamentally "an occurrence" or "an event"
in the individual. He firmly believes that these are the only
"observable realities" of human personality. It seems to me
that he is often right in what he writes and often wrong in
what he forgets. To be more precise, he often writes about
the unquestionable reality of these phenomenological events
but often forgets to take into account the effects of the
reality of one's consciousness which is part of the human
being. What about the role of consciousness which the human
being possesses and by means of which he recognizes the mea¬
sure of his moral personality? What about God's working in
the inner consciousness of man? The very high degree of
consciousness which a human being possesses is in itself an
evidence of his personality. It is perhaps in this sense
that Jasper's idea of revelation becomes more comprehensive
than that of Bultmann. Jasper's contention is as Long ex¬
plains, that "the Offenbarwerden of truth occurs in an inner
act of man in which he becomes aware of the true possibilities
of his being and his relation to Transcendence". However,
Bultmann has little sympathy for this view. Moltmann observes
that "an immediate self-consciousness and a non-dialectical
identity with himself is not possible to man - that is shown
precisely by the dialectical antithesis of world and self in
p
Bultmann". Of course, the concept of consciousness and its
1. E.T. Long, op. cit., p. 34.
2. Jurgen Iioltmann, op. cit., p. 67.
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relation to language is another major issue and it is not part
of my plan in this thesis to go into a full discussion of it.
Let us now consider Aurobindo's concept of 'gnostic' being and
the community in relation to Bultmann's understanding of one's
authentic life and community. Aurobindo points out that there
is no selfish ego in the 'gnostic' being whose life is charac¬
terized by such qualities as those of the true Yogin of the
Gita. His 'gnostic' being is not the Superman of Nietzsche;
rather the true superman is one who has not only divine power
but also divine love and divine wisdom. For him, "To evolve
in the sense of God is to grow in intuition, in light, in joy,
si
in love, in service; " "The liberated soul extends its
perception of unity horizontally as well as vertically. Its
unity with the transcendent One is incomplete without its uni-
p
ty with the cosmic Many". The first of these statements re¬
flects a type of terminology peculiar to a Hindu theologian
and at the same time spells out something of the depth of the
meaning of "man coming to one's self". Aurobindo does not
make clear how this is possible except to show that this state
of one's being is the eventual outcome of the meeting of divine
power and man's unreserved surrender. This inevitably leads
us to consider some of Bultmann's statements expressing his
idea of authentic existence. Perhaps the most lasting im¬
pression Bultmann leaves is that however much he adopts Hei¬
degger's philosophy of existence he repeatedly stresses the
1. Sri Aurobindo, The Superman (Pondicherry, 1950)5 PP« 4- - 5»
2. The Life Divine I, p. 62.
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point that man receives "genuineness of life" only as a gift.
This indicates that in his characteristic emphasis on the
transformation of the individual, understood in terms of di¬
vine power and man's surrender, Aurobindo's idea of true
freedom comes close to that of Bultmann, only Aurobindo does
|
not use terms like God's gift or God's grace.
In his explanation of the concept of the Christian Community
Bultmann points out "the union of believers into one soma
with Christ has its basis not in their sharing the same
supernatural substance, but in the fact that in the word of
proclamation Christ's death-and-resurrection becomes a possi¬
bility of existence in regard to which a decision must be
made, He goes on to say that "it /church7 is the
eschatological Congregation, and hence its existing belongs
to the eschatological salvation - occurrence". "To be "in
Christ" is also to be "of Christ" - i.e. to belong to Christ
as one's Lord (cf. Gal. 3:29 with 3:27; 5:24; II Cor. 10:7;
Rom. 8:9; 14:8)" "the lordship of the Lord is set up
2
over believers and acknowledged by them". So for Bultmann
the underlying doctrinal formulation is: "The lordship of
the Lord is set up over believers and acknowledged by them".
Elsewhere he observes: "It is the paradox of Christian being
that the believer is taken out of the world and exists, so
to speak, as unworldly and that at the same time he remains
within the world,
1. Th. N.T. I, p. 302.
2. Ibid., pp. 308, 312, 314.
3. History and Eschatology, p. 152.
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Two important inferences can be drawn from these observations:
(i) The proclamation of God's salvation deed becomes a deci¬
sion question: (ii) The important question is: does Bultmann
throw any new light on our ethical ideas of human solidarity?
The concept of community - the collective experience of the
community in terms of its impact on other cosmic phenomena or
on each other as members of the same body is given very little
attention. In making this second comment we are not suggest¬
ing that the members of the Church should sacrifice their own
integrity but only that one must discover a relationship of
creative tension between the two. for, as Dietrich von Oppen
writes: "Living with one another today demands that we respect
the secret of the other, that we lovingly make room for him
and do that which is necessary. That is what modern 'together¬
ness' requires of us, and the parallel construction, love God
and love your neighbour, says the same thing". I am all for
this point of view because we have in this statement a healthy
recognition of the truth that we cannot claim to know or love
the transcendent unless we know and love our human neighbour.
Looked at from this point of view, Bultmann's understanding
of the nature and role of the individual in community, for all
its merits, cannot claim to have a thorough-going impact on
the Church reaching out to the whole troubled world. It is
perhaps in this sense that his view of community has come
under the scrutiny and criticism of many scholars, even some
of his own followers. For instance, E. Kasemann writes:
1. Dietrich von Oppen, "Man in the Open Situation", Journal
for Theology and the Church, Vol. Two (1965), p. 148.
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"Bultmann's interpretation of faith rouses uneasiness because
1
it seems to end in individualism". Bultmann's concern, of
course, is to show that "The new people of God has no real
history, for it is community of the end-time, an eschatological
phenomenon 1 The consciousness of being the eschatological
community is at the same time the consciousness of being taken
out of the still existing world Even the Christian com¬
mand of love is negative in so far as it demands unselfishness
2
but does not set concrete goals of acting". One wonders
whether with this scheme of thihking Bultmann does not tend to
exaggerate the eschatological element in early Christianity
at the expense of Christian community life. This becomes ob¬
vious especially when he asserts that the New Testament Church
lacks a social programme and concrete goals of action. As
compared with this view of the role of the individual in commu¬
nity, we find in Aurobindo1s system a rather advanced idea of
the ethics of human solidarity. Por him, "the true Person is
3
not an isolated entity, his individuality is universal". This
suggests that the question whether the existentialist philoso¬
phy of life reflects a conceptual tendency towards the together¬
ness of human society may be answered affirmatively in the case
of Aurobindo's view of true selfhood. We can thus safely
suggest that Aurobindo's conception of the liberated self with¬
in the context of community scores over Bultmann's view of the
nature and function of the believer in the Church.
1. E. Kasemann, Perspectives on Paul, p. 6A.
2. History and Eschatology, pp. 36-37, and cf. also p. 152.
3. The Life Divine II, p. 1036.
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E. Comparison of Vivekananda's understanding of anthropology
with that of Bultmann:
In our survey of Vivekananda's system of ideas in the prece¬
ding chapter we discovered that his usual position was that
the finite is not a mere dream but a real form of the Absolute
- the relative reality of the world and of human life is a
dominant feature of his religious thought. He advocates the
idea that man represents the principle of freedom in i ts
highest form. He declares: "The original impulse as well as
the end to be achieved is the same for Science and Religion -
it is Freedom". For him, man's freedom distinguishes him
from the rest of the world in so far as man's struggle for
freedom is conducted consciously and intelligently. Moreover,
his conception of God obviously differs from the Vedantic
teaching of God. "I never read a more beautiful conception
of God than this", he says, "He is the Great Poet, the Ancient
One. The whole universe is his poem, written in infinite
2
bliss". His watchword xs: Rexnterpret the old truths accord¬
ing to the needs of the times and make them dynamic once again.
He therefore points out that "knowledge of the Yedanta has been
hidden too long in caves and forests. It has been given to me
to rescue it from its seclusion and to carry it in the midst of
3
family and social life ". Vivekananda affirms: "I can¬
not believe in a religion that does not wipe out the widows'
1. As quoted by V.S. Naravane, Modern Indian Thought, pp. 103-4.
2. As quoted by Naravane, op. cit., p. 88.
3. As quoted by V.S. Naravane, op. cit., pp. 89-90.
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tears or bring a piece of bread to the orphan's mouth". He
writes: "May I be born and reborn again, and suffer a thousand
miseries, if only I am able to worship the only God, in whom
I believe, the sum-total of all souls, and above all my God
the wicked, my God the afflicted, my God the poor of all the
2
races I..." His burning passion for religion is expressed
in these words: "'The abstract Advaita' must become living-
poetic - in our everyday life; out of the hopelessly intricate
mythology must come concrete moral forms; and out of bewilder¬
ing Yogism must come the most scientific and practical psycho-
logy".
It is from this view of religion that he developed his own
philosophy of history. He expressed a need for a school of
Indian historians steeped in modern scientific methods. He
maintained that "the actual should be reconciled to the ideal.
The present life should be made to coincide with life eternal"
For him, as referred to earlier "Truth does not pay homage to
any society ancient or modern, society has to pay homage to it
or die".^ This perhaps comes close to Kierkegaard's under¬
standing of truth and Jieidegger's concept of Being. The empha
sis of Kierkegaard is that truth has no reality except in the
1. As quoted by G. Ashe, Gandhi: A Study in Revolution (London
1968), p. 131.
2. As quoted by Romain Rolland, Prophets of the New India,
p. 250.
3. Lecture at Harvard University, March 25, 1896, cited by
V.S. Naravane, op. cit., p. 90.
A. Practical Vedanta, p. 11, Part 1 (Ihe Qomplete Works of Swami
Vxvekananda II, pp. 291-308}
5. As quoted in Swami Vivekananda Centenary Memorial Volume,
p. 34-4-.
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existence of men. His dictum is: "Where the eternal is con-
cerned there is only one txme: the present". Heidegger
affirms: "That Being itself and how Being itself concerns our
thinking does not depend upon our thinking alone. That Being
itself, and the manner in which Being itself, strikes a man's
thinking, that rouses his thinking and stirs it to rise from
p
Being itself to respond and corresponds to Being as such".
This obviously leads us to compare Vivekananda's position to
that of Bultmann. Tor Bultmann the idea of man's relation to
God "is manifested only through encounter, only as gift, and
cannot be reached by turning away from the world in a religious
flight into a beyond". Bultmann explains elsewhere the dif-
4
ference between Gogarten's and Heidegger's view of history.
What he says of history himself is as follows: "Now doubtless
the man who has death in view resolves upon a possibility of
his existence; but the resolve is a resolve of despair and the
possibility is always only the one possibility of being what
he already is Paith is from the outset an ontological
possibility of man that appears in the resolve of despair.
It is this that makes it possible for man to understand when
3
he is encountered by the kerygma". But how does Bultmann
1. As quoted by Jurgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope, p. 51-
2. As quoted by James G. Williams, "Possibility in Principle
and Possibility in Pact: A Criticism of Bultmann's Distinc¬
tion", The Journal of Bible and Religion, Vol.XXXIII
(1965), P. 325.
3. Rudolf Bultmann, "The Idea of God and Modern Man", Journal
for Theology and. the Church, Vol. Two (1965), p. 89.
4-. See Existence and Paith, pp. 103-108.
5- Existence and Paith, p. 108.
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relate this faith-event to the transcendent Being? In Bult-
mann's thought two ideas are intertwined, namely the word as
the eternal thou and the coming together of the present and
the past as one in faith's response to the proclamation of
the Christian Church.
One must admit that Bultmann puts his finger on a real problem
of relating the eternal to the temporal which is the crucial
issue of the philosophy of religion and his solution to the
problem lies in his 'kerygmatic theology'. This issue was
perhaps als ) the stimulus for Vivekananda but his way of tack¬
ling the issue is obviously different from that of Bultmann in
that he sees a "genuineness of life" as a potentiality within
man rather than response to the proclamation. All this seems
highly ingenious as a radical challenge to the traditional
idealistic understanding of the connection between noumenon
and phenomenon, be it of classical Christianity or of Vedan-
tism in Indian philosophy.
But the question still remains whether in this solution the
aspect of divine being and action is left unexplained. That
is, does this existential interpretation of one's religious
experience leave any room for the being and action of God
outside the individual's own direct experience? If God were
to be known indirectly as he was reflected in the changes of
man's self-understanding, would this not be the denial of
theology and the substitution of anthropology in its place?
Does not Bultmann often seem to reduce talk about God to talk
about God-produced conditions in us? Theology in the proper
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sense of the term requires more of a conceptual clarification
of the divine being than of his power. It is important to
recall a more balanced statement of K*asemann when he writes:
"The righteousness of God is precisely what, as the power of
the justification of the ungodly, it must be - God's victory
amid the opposition of the world". Bultmann's contention is
that a neutral statement cannot speak of God as he is for me
in my concrete existence. Schmithals characterizes Bultmann's
understanding of God as follows: "God is reality for me only
2
as a reality which encounters me". This is perhaps the stre¬
ngth of Bultmann's existentialist theology. But his position
seems to fall short of a more definite language about God. If,
on the other hand, Bultmann insists on the nature of God as
wholly "other-wordly" is he not calling for a position wherein
philosophy and theology remain essentially unrelated to each
other? It is this point of view of Bultmann which arouses
embarrassment among scholars who are less sympathetic with
his position. Those who differ from him seek to supplement
his restriction on language of God with a more definite onto¬
logy.
Another important theme of Vivekananda's system concerns the
nature and role of the individual in the community. Vivekana¬
nda 's attempt was to give the utmost importance to the theory
of practical Vedanta. We have made it clear in the previous
chapter how his teaching on the subject of human service con-
1. E. Kasemann, New Testament Questions of Today, p. 180.
2. W. Schmithals, An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf
Bultmann, p. 3^.
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stituted a challenge to the nation of India which needed a
great deal of awakening for the uplifting of society. More¬
over, the traditional understanding of the idea of self-rea¬
lization through self-abnegation gained a new meaning in the
teaching and efforts of Vivekananda. The positive signifi¬
cance of the order of the Ramakrishna Math (monastry) and
Mission could be seen in its attempt to promote a double pur¬
pose of life - salvation of one's own soul and the good of the
world. By his teaching of practical Vedanta Vivekananda made
a sustained and honest effort to remove the criticism of the
west against Hinduism as being unconcerned with the problem
of social inequality and lacking in social ethics. He has
persistently pursued the course of relating its ancient be¬
liefs to the needs of the times and delivering people from
superstitions and ignorance. He was keenly alive to the
need of helping to give bread to the needy and poor and human
dignity to the oppressed and the outcast. He has not only
done a signal service by instilling an impetus in the intelli¬
gentsia of India to embark on social service but he has also
made a most forcible appeal for human love and service. It
is in this sense that his teaching on the nature and role of
the liberated person within the context of community has be¬
come far more pertinent and made a more profound impact on
people in India than that of any other "neo-orthodox" Hindu
writer.
Bultmann's teaching on the authentic existence of the indivi¬
dual touches more on the inwardizing of one's own religious
experience. As we have already seen, his consistent emphasis
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on one's historic decisions and possibilities of his being
gives us the impression that the collective experience of
community is given a secondary place in the scale of priori¬
ties as seen from the perspective of the meaning of human
existence.
It is to be observed that evidence applicable to any one di¬
mension of experience is not final except in relation to other
dimensions. That is, man is not only responsible to God but
he is also responsible, as M. Scheler says, "for everything
of moral bearing in the character and proceedings of the lar-
-n
ger corporate selves of which he is an integral part". Given
this assumption the community life is but an indispensable
element in the total context of man's situation in the world.
To conclude this chapter it is necessary for us now to recapi¬
tulate our argument and draw its threads together. In Bult-
mann's project of demythologizing of the message of the New
Testament four of his basic presuppositions came more into
view, namely his understanding of Transcendence, human free¬
dom, 'personal history' and self-understanding. More to the
point is his 'kerygmatic theology' with which we shall present¬
ly occupy ourselves. In the first place it is to be observed
that we have to a large extent focused attention on the subject
of how these four aspects of his existentialist theology appear
to have been foreshadowed in modern Indian thought. That is,
we have reached the conclusion supported by evidence that all
1. Max Scheler, On the Eternal in Man, tr. Bernard Noble
(London, 1960), p. 376.
236
five modern Hindu thinkers whom we have selected for the pur¬
pose of comparison with Bultmann, have without exception taken
account of Western philosophy and culture, more specifically
Western Christian thought in attempting to relate their tradi¬
tional dogmas to the religious needs of the times. Hence it
is not surprising that their interpretation of the time-hallo-
wed tenets of their religion is characterized by certain new
trends of religious thought. This is seen in their affirmation
of the idea of regeneration and renunciation in place of self-
realization, 'personal history' as over against the cyclic
moment of time, transcendence in terms of humanity or human
existence as over-shadowing the age-long concept of Brahman
as it is in itself and so on. These new trends, as we have
tried to argue in this chapter, may well be compared with the
basic presuppositions of Bultmann's existentialist theology,
except that as a theologian of the Lutheran evangelical tradi¬
tion Bultmann holds fast to 'kerygmatic theology'.
In our analysis of Bultmann's theology we have time and again
alluded to the fact that Bultmann is diametrically opposed to
the objective and speculative knowledge of God. The main¬
spring of his concern is to conclusively assert the dialectic
of kerygma and history, of faith and knowledge. He is at
pains to show that proclamation is authenticated only in the
moment of revelation itself in which the believer becomes a
new creature in Christ. For him, "The preaching is itself
1. cf. Essays, p. 18.
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revelation and does not merely speak about it, " He
affirms: "Then there is indeed a knowledge that is also given
in revelation, Thus it is not an observer's knowledge,
but rather a .knowledge that is only opened up to me in
laying hold of the possibility for understanding myself that
2
is disclosed in the proclamation; It is from this
axiom that he concludes that "Paul's conversion involved the
5
abandonment of his previous understanding of himself ".
The merit of his theology is that from the standpoint of reve¬
lation theology he stresses with freshness of a new discovery
of the concept of self-understanding. One cannot but be imp¬
ressed by this new discovery.
In the light of this appreciative comment on Bultmann's theo¬
logy the question which we now have to clarify is whether the
anthropology of Bultmann and modern Indian thought can be con¬
sidered as the right clue to the understanding of one's reli¬
gious experience. In his book, Modern Indian Thought, V.S.
Naravane devoted one full chapter to the background and char¬
acteristics of the same subject. In it he made an overall
evaluation of the various forces which he thought had been
influencing Hinduism across the centuries, namely Islam,
Western science and education and Christianity. The period
between the beginning of the nineteenth century and the middle
of the twentieth century, which is considered to be the period
1. Existence and Faith, p. 78.
2. Ibid., p. 88.
5- Th. N.f. I, p. 188.
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of modern Indian thought, was designated by him as "one of
the most eventful and complicated epochs in history". He
adds: " , in spite of the interplay of forces that was
going on in a complex age, Indian thought could not have
achieved what it did if a number of extraordinary personali¬
ties had not emerged. The story of modern Indian thought is
the story of a long line of powerful thinkers blessed with
unusual creative and speculative talent".
The thought of the principal personalities of this period we
have closely examined in comparison with Bultmann's anthro¬
pology and while doing so we have repeatedly emphasized how
these men have to some extent side-stepped their traditional
Hindu thought and clearly and boldly advocated the idea that
tradition must continually be re-assessed in the light of
fresh experiences. Almost all of these writers' works were
marked by a shift in emphasis toward the man-ward aspect of
religion, hence the emphasis on divine operation in one's
self-surrender to his Creator was significantly absent from
their works. That is, in common with traditional Hinduism
they underemphasized the idea of God as acting in history.
In Bultmann's theology there is no importance given to the
conceptual thinking of the Judeo-Christian tradition which
views the world of common experience with its changing events
as the arena of God's activity, to be more precise, the
Heilsgeschichte. The idea that God acts in history is perhaps
built into the very make-up of the whole Jewish heritage of
thought.
i. V.S. Naravane, Modern Indian Thought, pp. A, 19.
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This conceptuality is seriously questioned and thrown over¬
board by Bultmann who maintains that it is expressed in full¬
blown mythological terms. Moreover, from the standpoint of
the religio-historical school he cannot admit of the assump¬
tion that God breaks through the closed connection of wordly
events. Hence he is determined to exclude from his theology
the talk of God as acting in history. Just as modern Indian
thought, in keeping with traditional Hinduism, underemphasizes
God's act in the individual's decision for God, Bultmann also
seems to underemphasize divine operation in the individual's
act of faith as he maintains that "Now it is either/orl Now
the question is whether a man really wants God and His king¬
dom or the world and its goods; and the decision must be made
radically". Elsewhere Bultmann affirms: "In every moment
slumbers the possibility of being the eschatological moment.
2
You must awaken it". Notice - "You must awaken it" not God
or the Spirit. Nonetheless, Bultmann goes a step further than
Heidegger by extending the idea of the "possibilities" of
human life to the "eschatological" (ehchatologisch) which may
perhaps explain at least his intention to speak of the work
of God as it confronts the individual with an ultimate either/
or. And he claims that this confrontation is actuated in the
preaching of the Church which opens up a real possibility of
the hearer's self-understanding. But the question is whether
Bultmann, by his belief in a divine event making itself known
1. Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament as quoted in
Religion in a Secular Age, p. 113.
2. History and Eschatology, p. 155.
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to Dasein, has not opened himself to the charge that R.
Prenter has made: "The idea that mancnly receives his own
existence by a gift is just as mythological as that of brea-
thing a pneuma into the depths of the soul". To put this
differently, Oliver observes that "Bultmann's insistence that
the kerygma alone provides the possibility of overcoming
Verfallenheit was regarded by Buri as an unwarranted attach¬
ment to myth which breaks off conversation between theology
2
and philosophy".
Apart from this charge against him it must be said that in
his overemphasis on revelation theology (i.e. his adherence
to the kerygma as the sine qua non of authentic existence)
Bultmann underemphasizes God's acting in the world, i.e.
creation. But how are we to explain divine activity in the
world? Perhaps this question was clarified long ago in
Thomism according to which God acts on his creatures in
3
accordance with the nature of each. And this talk of God
as acting in the individual's act of faith is an important
aspect of the philosophy of religion or of one's religious
experience which is notably lacking in Bultmann's theology.
Further, this comparative study brings into clear focus the
important fact that "just as Bultmann's Christian anthropo¬
logical thinking highlighted the concept of self-understand-
1. As quoted by L. Malevez, S.J., The Christian Message and
Myth:The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, tr. Olive Wyon
(London, 1958), p. 149.
2. H.H. Oliver, "Fritz Buri: A Chronology of His Theologizing",
The Journal of Bible and Religion, Vol. XXXIV (1966),p. 3^9.
3. cf. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica Part I. Third
Number (London, 1912), p. 400.
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ing of the individual" so too some recent Hindu theologians
have admirably insisted on the true knowledge of the self as
against the classical Hindu idea of the merging of the soul
in the ultimate reality in the state of Samadhi, which by its
very nature afforded no incentive to this new dimension of
life. Both fagore and Aurobindo have been adept at showing
us that the true knowledge of the self is the eventual out¬
come of his transition from the inauthentic to the authentic
existence. The following quotation will make Tagore's view¬
point of self-understanding clear: " he /Brahman.7 can
be known by joy, by love. For joy is knowledge in its com¬
pleteness, it is knowing by our whole being. Intellect sets
us apart from the things to be known, but love knows its ob¬
ject by fusion. Such knowledge is immediate and admits no
doubt. It is the same as knowing our own selves, only more
so"
For Aurobindo, "the Truth is not that God moves round the ego
and its view of dualities, but that the Divine is itself the
centre and that the experience of the individual only finds
its true truth when it is known in the terms of the universal
2
and the transcendent". These statements of modern Hindu
theologians are perhaps not dissimilar to Bultmann's state¬
ment: " ; faith is understood only when the man under-
stands himself anew in it". All this only proves how close
1. Sadhana, p. 159.
2. The Life Divine I, p. 81.
3. Faith and Understanding I, p. 316.
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the concept of self-understanding as one of the dominant
themes of the anthropology of renascent Hinduism comes to
that of Bultmann. This is certainly convincing. It is,
however, possible to argue that insistence on the self-un¬
derstanding of the individual is correct only if it is said
with equal emphasis that in authentic existence man also un¬
derstands God anew. Paul's understanding of God in Christ
bears witness to this, cf. II Cor. 5:19- If the anthropology
of both Bultmann and that of modern Hindu thought plays down
the aspect of understanding God anew in religious experience
it follows that both schools of thought heavily draw upon a




Apologetic Conclusions: The Relevance of the Pauline under¬
standing; of the God-man relationship to the anthropology of
recent Indian thought.
The purpose of this chapter is, in the main, to show the re¬
levance of Paul's anthropology to the dominant tendencies in
recent Hindu theology and thereby explicate some guide-lines
to take Indian Christian theology a step further. On the one
hand, from the standpoint of the contemporary Indian Chris¬
tian theology it is necessary for us to take account of one
important recent development. That is, there have emerged
valuable studies made by Dr. R.H.S. Boyd and Dr. M.M. Thomas
who made available particularly to the public in the West the
distinctive style of Indian Christian theology and the ferment
of change in actual Indian thought today. To be more precise,
on Dr. Thomas' account, modern Hindu theologians attempted to
interpret and evaluate Christ and Christianity within the
framework of Neo-Vedantism. On the other hand, from the
viewpoint of modern Hindu thought it is probably correct to
say, as Schiff remarks that "many modern Hindus would deny
2
that they are pantheistic". If that observation is correct
then modern Hindu thinkers must have developed a new under¬
standing of God and of the relation of God to the world.
1. R.H.S. Boyd, An Introduction to Indian Christian Theology;
M.li. Thomas, The Acknowledged Christ of the Indian
Renaissance.
2. Leonard M. Schiff, "Book Reviews", Theology, Vol.LXVIII
(1965), P. 447.
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Hence here we address ourselves to investigate (i) their
new understanding of God, (ii) their notions as to the way
of access to God, viz. their idea of the God-man relation¬
ship and (iii) their concept of history and show the relevance
of Paul's anthropology to such new trends in recent Indian
thinking.
But before we go into the discussion of the subject proper it
may well be necessary for us to deal with two preliminary, yet
important themes from an Indian context, namely the interfaith
encounter and dialogue and the idea of siiJ-^transcendence of
. - 1
the individual. The former has become a live topic today m
the Indian Church context. This inversely turns upon the
missionary apologetic which the Christian Church must continu¬
ally reinterpret. J.N. Barquhar meant by apologetic, "a cri¬
ticism that will set Christianity clearly and distinctly in
in its relation to the other faiths". What was this relation
1. The idea of sub-transcendence of the individual is one of
the deep-rooted dogmas of Hinduism, classical and modern.
The votaries of the Hindu faith hold fast to the idea that
the religious life requires self-discipline and self-puri¬
fication. The meaning of one's life is to evoke that Divi¬
nity within him. Salvation is an attainment through one's
own self-disciplined efforts and it can never be o
ti.cl the gift of grace -m<wv- The most impor¬
tant thinkers of modern Hinduism too repeatedly say that to
them the primary goal of all their religious efforts is God-
realization. The following statement of Radhakrishnan dis¬
tinctly expresses such popular notion of one's religious
experience: "We can realize the potentialities of spirit
only by a process of moral ascesis which gradually shapes
the soul into harmony with the invisible realities".2
2. S. Radhakrishnan, "The Spirit in man" in Contemporary Indian
Philosophy, p. 270.
3. As quoted by David Cairns, "Protestant Missionary Thought
in India", Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 19 (1966;
P. 343.
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to be? As Farquhar understood, it was that of fulfilment.
1PU-
But of late, it has been argued by some that^theological
meaning of mission must, of necessity, obtain a new form or
dimension in the light of the emerging nationalism and reli¬
gious renaissance which have made significant headway in India
in particular.
It is probably correct to say that it is this situation to
which the Christian Church in India has become sensitive and
begun to evolve a new understanding of mission which neither
betrays the commitment of the Christian nor exploits the con¬
fidence and reality of the power of traditional religion like
Hinduism in its renascent form. Understood from this angle,
the relevance of J.N. Farquhar's approach to prove that Christ
was "the crown of Hinduism" was perhaps rightly called into
question.
While the new move among men of other faiths points to the idea
that we have to understand each other before we try to put each
other right the move among the leaders of Christian Church of
both traditions, i.e. Roman Catholic and Protestant in India,
is that the Church should continue an interfaith dialogue.
Dr. Klaus Klostermaier of Roman Catholic Church observes that
""dialogue" in the sense of sympathetic discussion of religious
topics and as an attempt to gain insight into one another's
religious traditions tends to concentrate on certain topics
which come up almost in every discussion between Hindus and
Christians". "Whenever dialogue reacha^some depth it was not
a question of Christian versus Non-Christian but a common
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quest for more truth, more light, more insight". This new
trend is perhaps due to the spirited response to the claims
of Hindu theologians who are conscious of the individuality
of their religious tradition and convinced today that Hindu¬
ism is indeed the religion for mankind. Modern Hindu theolo¬
gians further claim that Hinduism would be the same popular
faith, but reinterpreted, cleansed of superstition, and imbued
with a social consciousness. It is pertinent to recall what
Nehru writes of Hinduism: "Hinduism, as a faith is vague,
amorphous, many sided, all things to all men In its
present form, and even in the past, it embraces many beliefs
and practices, from the highest to the lowest, Its
2
essential spirit seems to be to live and let live".
This reflects one group's concept of their religion. There
is another group of intellectuals like Vivekananda, M.K.
Gandhi and S. Radhakrishnan. Vivekananda argued that "Vedanta,
and Vedanta alone can become the universal religion of man,
and that no other religion is fitted for that role". Radha¬
krishnan writes: "An extensive application of the principle
of liberty, equality, and fraternity has made Hinduism the
most elastic of all religions, the most capable of adapting
itself to new conditions". Furthermore, more striking is
1. Klaus Klostermaier, "Hindu-Christian Dialogue", Journal of
Ecumenical Studies, Volume 5 (1968), pp. 30) 33«
2. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, Second ed. (1947,
London), p. 52.
3» The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda III, 8th ed.
(Calcutta, 1960), pT 182 cited in Swami Vivekananda Cen¬
tenary Memorial Volume, p. 311.
4. S. Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought,
p. 338.
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their insistence that all religions are basically the same.
Radhakrishnan's characteristic phrase is: The essential one¬
ness of all religions. Seen from this perspective, viz. a
mature, sophisticated and revitalized religious tradition of
recent Hindu theologians,, Hendrik Kraemer's idea that the rela¬
tion between the Christian Faith and the Religions is one of
absolute discontinuity has also come in for criticism, however
much credit was given to him for his insight into the prophe-
tic apprehension of Biblical Realism.
It is important to recall that with the spirit of the times
W.F. Hocking, author of Living Religions and a World Faith,
"favoured a policy of co-operation with other religions".
Perhaps Hocking took the discussion, namely the question of
the relation of religions a step further by "looking for a
world faith that would transcend Christianity along with other
religions, although in the meantime he regarded Christianity
1. Dr. Hendrik Kraemer held that there are three great repre¬
sentative apprehensions of life: a) the rational apprehen¬
sion of the Greeks reflected in Western civilization;
b) the prophetic apprehension of Biblical Realism; and
c) the primitive apprehension of the totality of existence.
By Biblical Realism Kraemer meant the divine revelation,
entirely given and sui generis. He affirmed: "It /the
Christian revelation/ asserts itself as the record of God's
self-disclosing and recreating revelation in Jesus Christ,
as an apprehension of existence that revolves around the
poles of divine judgment and divine salvation, giving the
divine answer to this demonic and guilty disharmony of man
and the world".2
2. Hendrik Kraemer, The Christian Message in a Non-Christian
World (London, 1938), pp. 113-14.
3. J.W. Grant, God's People in India (Toronto, 1959), p. 73«
248
1
as the nearest to truth of all religions". It is now generally-
admitted that this new attitude to other religions is perhaps
the pointer in the direction towards more enthusiastic steps
Tvul
which Christian Church in India is taking to promote the dia-
A
logue between Christian leaders and the intellectuals of Non-
Christian religions. The guiding principle in this new project
is, as S.J. Samartha puts it, that "we must now be less concern¬
ed with our "separateness" or even "distinctness" than with our
2
mutual involvement". This is given added urgency by the fact
that the Church in India in carrying its mission is faced with
a new reality of an increased Hindu self-consciousness. In their
studies both Boyd and Thomas brought to light how exactly the
stream of Indian Christian theologians tried to grapple with the
issue of presenting the scandal of Christian particularity more
meaningfully to the Hindu intellectuals. Some of the Indian
Christian theologians are Bishop A.J. Appasamy (b. 1891- )
P. Chenchiah (1886-1959), V. Chakkarai (1888-1958), P.D. Deva-
nandan (1900-1962) and the contemporary Indian Christian thin¬
kers like Surjit Singh, Mark Sundararao, Bishop Kulandran and
so on.
In his book, Christianity As Bhakti-Marga (the path of devo¬
tion) Dr. Appasamy set himself to explicate how best can con¬
verge the Bhaktimarga of the Gita which "has become the most
popular, widely memorized, authoritative statement of the basic
-7 lit*
guiding principles of Indian religious life" and Christian
doctrine of love as found in Johannine literature. His argu-
1. J.W. Grant, God's People in India (Toronto, 1959), p. 74.
2. S.J. Samartha, "More than an Encounter of Commitments" in
Living Faiths and the Ecumenical Movement, ed. S.J. Samar¬
tha (Geneva, 1971), p5 105.
5. H. Zimmer, Philosophies of India, ed. J. Campbell (London,
1951), p. 380.
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merit goes briefly as follows: "The modern Christian in India
has to /recognize that7 there are elements in the ancient
Scriptures of India which have to be fearlessly given up. But
there are also many doctrines and ideals in them which have
to be zealously assimilated and carried on to their natural
culmination in Christ".
Chenchiah gave an entirely new twist to the understanding of
the relation of Christianity to Hinduism. He was a forerunner
of Raymond Panikkar whose line of approach to this subject will
be explained presently, who advanced the idea that the message
of the Gospel can strike root in India if it is explained as
a new creation of old, viz. Hinduism. He observed: "In Jesus
God created the new man: in Hinduism God is sought for perfect¬
ing the old man Hinduism makes the perfect man, Chris¬
tianity the new Man Jesus is the first fruits of a new
2
creation, Hinduism the final fruits of the old creation". In
the same vein, Raymond Panikkar concludes that "That Christ
which is already in Hinduism, ..... that Christ has not unvei¬
led his whole face, has not yet completed his mission there...
..., he still has to be crucified there, dying with Hinduism
as he died with Judaism and with the Hellenistic religions in
order to rise again, as the same Christ ( ), but then
as a risen Hinduism, as Christianity". Chakkarai takes the
same line as that of Chenchiah in that he points out that Hin-
1. A.J. Appasamy, Christianity As Bhakti Marga:A study of the
Johannine doctrine of love (Madras, 1930), P« 165.
2. As cited byR.H.S.Boyd, op. cit., p. 163.
3. Raymond Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism (London,
1964), p. 17.
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duism has been preparing hearts for Christ and grants that
balvation may be found within Hinduism. Speaking of how it
is possible for both Hindus and Christians to be saved he
writes: "The salvation of each, as understood by each, is by
the grace of the Lord; the former by the grace of God without
the historic Christ, and the other by the grace of God in
Christ"
P.D. Devanandan was noted for his vigorous attempt to open a
dynamic conversation with the Hindu intellectuals. His charac¬
teristic statement is: "We are entering an epoch in world his¬
tory when religious differences are no longer regarded as fun-
2
damentally divisive". The work of the current writers like
Surjit Singh and Mark Sundararao are significant in that they
look for dialogue with modern Indian thinkers within the frame
3
work of Advita Vedanta.
Such "is the mode of Indian Christian theology as far as the
apologetics of the Church is concerned. This poses a question:
Does this new tide in Indian Christian theology help in such
a way that the influence of Church in India could permeate
the modern Hindu theological scene? To put this question
differently, can this newly evolved method of apologetics
through dialogue between Church leaders and the intellectuals
1. As cited by R.EL& Boyd, op. cit. , p. 184 fn. 1.
2. P.D. Devanandan, "The Christian attitude and approach to
Non-Christian Religions", International Review of Missions,
Vol.XLI (1952), p. 178.
3. Surjit Singh, Preface to Personality :Christology in relat¬
ion to Radhakrishnan1s Philosophy (Madras, 1952;; Mark
Sundera Rao, Ananyatva: Realization of Christian Non-dual-
it.y (Bangalore^ 1964).
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of India help the votaries of Hinduism to come to terms
with the scandal of Christian particularity when they them¬
selves would revitalize Hinduism from within? In point of
fact, in Radhakrishnan's writings the plea for a reformed
Hinduism is set forth with great clarity and persuasive
power. It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that the
same outlook of their Hindu faith bulks large also in the wri¬
tings of Vivekananda and Gandhi. And, what is more, Radha¬
krishnan who advocates the idea of 'fellowship of faiths' no
less interestingly aopeals to the Christian apologist to aban¬
don his exclusive claims.
All this may suggest that perhaps this new method of Christian
apologetics through dialogue is helpful only to the point
of gaining insight into one another's religious traditions and
may ultimately fail to get Hindu apologists to come to terms
with the Christian apologists because the former are speaking
with a greater assurance about their position and heritage
than the earlier reformers did. To say this is by no means
to deny the considerable value of the dialogue pursued by
the Christian theologians of our times in the East. M. Buber
rightly observes: "A time of genuine conversations is beginn¬
ing - /on the basis/7 not of an identical content of faith
which is alleged to be found in all religions, but of the
situation, of anguish and of expectation".
This brings us now to the discussion of the theme of sub-trans-
1. M. Buber, Between Man and Man, pp. 7-8.
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cendence of the individual in recent Hinduism. In the fore¬
going chapter we showed that gust as Bultmann maintained the
idea that man is not only related to himself but is also res¬
ponsible for himself so also the recent Hindu theologians ad¬
vocated the idea that man is totally and solely responsible
for himself. This is one main strand of thought of renascent
Hinduism. There is another strand as well, viz. the classi¬
cal Hindu idea of sub-transcendence of the self. That is to
say the idea of the soul's upward surge was deeply rooted in
the Indian mind. This makes it obvious that while it is sig¬
nificant that recent Hindu theologians' writings contain cer¬
tain concepts similar to those of Western Existentialism, not
surprisingly, their structural presupposition like the idea of
lifting of oneself up to the level of God is often displayed
in their writings. This tendency perhaps gives the answer to
the question why the elite oriented to Western education and
influence who became the champions of modern Indian thought
did not accept the Gospel. This question is, of course, one
of the most puzzling questions confronting the Christian apo¬
logist in India today. It is probably correct to say that
modern India's outstanding thinkers' Western training has in
no way abated their love of Hindu system of thought. Steeped
as they are in their own spiritual culture they are preoccu¬
pied always with this particular concept of religion.
That this is true of Radhakrishnan's religious thought can be
seen from the following passages. While acknowledging his
debt to the classical philosophers he says: "My thinking had
another source and proceeded from my own experience, which is
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not quite the same as what is acquired by mere study and
reading. It is born of spiritual experience rather than
deduced from logically ascertained premises. Philosophy is
produced more by our encounter with reality than by the his-
torical study of such encounters". This is not the whole
story of his thought. He also asserts the other aspects of
one's religious life. As referred to earlier, he affirms:
"The unchanging substance of religion is the evolution of
2
man's consciousness". This makes it clear that for him,
the evolution of man's consciousness is the spiritual illu¬
mination of which the individual's soul is capable and
which the soul realizes itself.
He further explains that "the mandate of religion is that man
must make the change in his own nature in order to let the di¬
vine in him manifest itself This is the teaching not
only of the Upanisads and Buddhism but also of the Greek mys-
teries and Platonism, of the Gospels and the schools of Gnos-
3
ticism".
All this is sufficient to show how ably Radhakrishnan puts
forward the idea that the dogma of sub-transcendence of man
is based on a sound understanding of the individual's spirit¬
ual realization. And, what is more, he contends that other
historical religions had jealously assimilated this idea. With
all due respect to him for the range of his informed under¬
standing of the major religions of the world I must confess
1. S. Radhakrishnan, "Fragments of a Confession" in The Philo¬
sophy of S. Radhakrishnan, p. 10.
2. Ibid., p. 77.
3. Ibid., p. 80.
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to the feeling that he has overlooked the fact that this part¬
icular notion of his is the central point of difference between
his Hindu faith and the Christian faith. For even in the Gos¬
pels, man's salvation, his true freedom is thought to be com¬
ing from a source outside himself. Man cannot achieve it by
himself. The upshot of all this discussion from the stand¬
point of Radhakrishnan1s advocacy of the idea of sub-transce-
dence of the self is that if one insists on such a notion of
the salvation of the individual then he cannot accept as con¬
vincing the Christian understanding of salvation as the gift
of God's grace to man.
Perhaps it is not too much to say that Radhakrishnan is a
conspicuous example of the group who hold to this strand of
thought. Tagore writes: "In order to realize his unity with
the universal, the individual man must live his perfect life
-1
which alone gives him the freedom to transcend it". His
understanding of the power of the human soul can be seen from
the following passage: "The whole object of man is to free his
personality of self into the personality of soul, to turn his
inward forces into the forward movement towards the infinite,
from the contraction of self in desire into the expansion of
2
soul in love". Two distinct ideas can be discerned in this
statement, namely (i) by using the phrase: "to turn the in¬
ward forces into the forward movement towards the infinite"
Tagore subscribes to the traditional idea of lifting of one¬
self up to the level of God; (ii) and yet at the same time
1. The Religion of Man, p. 195»
2. Personality, pp. 97-98.
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over against the classical Hindu understanding of the merging
of the personal self in an impersonal Being he explains the
idea of the spiritual relation of the individual to the Sup¬
reme being in personal categories. That is why on purpose
he uses the phrase; "from the contraction of self in desire
into the expansion of the soul in love". He thus brings more
clearly into view the idea of the individual's union with a
personal God.
Gandhi's religious teaching of the superior efficacy of 'soul
force' also doubtless falls in line with the other recent
Hindu theologians' presupposition, i.e. achieving of one's
true freedom through self-directed efforts. He observes:
"Man is not at peace with himself till he has become like un¬
to God. The endeavour to reach this state is the supreme,
the only ambition worth having. And this is self-realization.
This self-realization is the subject of the Gita, as it is of
all scriptures". Gandhi awakened India to its moral superi¬
ority to the West. It would not be too gross an exaggeration
to say that national independence has furthered this sense of
moral superiority in that Indians should look for guidance to
their own heritage rather than to imported principles of reli¬
gious life. To make matters plainer, there has emerged a dom¬
inant idea that the West has rothing extraordinarily spiritual
to offer. Seen from this point of view the idea of sub-trans¬
cendence of man has an added attractiveness. Without taking
into account this religious background of Gandhi not a few of
1. M.K. Gandhi, Hindu Dharma, p. 142.
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Church leaders both in India and in the West had centred
their hopes on him that he would some day publicly confess
his personal faith of Christ. But they did not understand
that Gandhi was prepared to follow Christ but only on his
own terms and that he was in fact, as Basham points out,
"the real architect of the new Hinduism". So it is beyond
doubt that Christianity as a well-defined system of religious
thought and action could not apoeal to Gandhi to the extent
that he could come to terms with the Christian apologists in
India. To make the point clear, as long as Gandhi was pre¬
occupied with the idea of lifting oneself up to the level of
God the Christian Gospel could not evoke in him the response
of faith in Christ.
Sri Aurobindo Ghosh also subscribed to this strand of thought
in neo-Orthodox Hinduism. This can be seen from the following
passage: "We have the dissolution of this egoistic construction
by the self-opening of the individual to the universe and to
God as the means of that supreme fulfilment to which egoistic
life is only a prelude even as animal life was only a prelude
2
to the human". Prom this statement it is not difficult to
show that there is embedded in Aurobindo's religious thought
the idea of sub-transcendence of the self. In his childhood
Aurobindo was entrusted to the care of a clergyman named
Drewett in whose home Aurobindo was not only initiated into
1. A.L. Basham, "Hinduism" in Concise Encyclopaedia of Living
faiths, ed. R.C. Zaehner, (London, 1959), p. 259.
2. The Life Divine-I, p. 90.
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Biblical scholarship but was also introduced to the Great
English poets. Hence it is beyond doubt that even from his
early and formative years of his stay in England Aurobind
was oriented towards Western thought and culture and Christian
influence. This discussion of Aurobindo's conception of sub-
transcendence of man shows that with all this orientation to
the Western Christian thought behind him, his thinking was
rather conditioned by such a popular notion of one's religious
experience.
In Vivekananda's writings also there is this note of sub-trans¬
cendence of the self. For him man's moral struggle could be
a path towards spiritual liberation. As a student of philoso¬
phy and poetry Vivekananda studied all the systems of Western
philosophy and was well acquainted with the contemporary phil¬
osophy of Herbert Spencer and J.S. Mill. From his characteri¬
zation of Jesus as 'Jeevanmukta' one gets the impression that
he had acquired considerable knowledge of the Christian faith.
All this goes to show that Vivekananda never disputed the posi¬
tive value of Western culture and thought. On the other hand,
he made full use of 'Western philosophy in expounding the Ve-
danta. In so doing he was concerned to bring to light the
importance of the ancient dynamism of the far-off Vedic seers,
perhaps with a view to comparing them with Christ. His own
words are: " Let us therefore find God not only in Jesus
of Nazareth but in all the great Ones that have preceded him,
in all that came after him, and all that are yet to come
1. As cited by M.M. Thomas, op. cit. , p. 121.
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The three essential propositions of the Vedanta are as
follows: (i) Man's real nature is divine; (ii) the aim of
life is to realize this divine nature; and (iii) all reli¬
gions are basically the same and lead to the same object. It
is the practical application of this philosophy which Viveka-
nanda untiringly stressed. Sarma thinks that Man's goal is
'i
to reach "the unutterable perfection of God".
All this suggests that however much the most important thinkers
of renascent Hinduism have been oriented towards Western
thought and Christian influence they could not persuade them¬
selves that the Gospel could take the place of their spiritual
heritage. If one were to ask why this is so it might be said
in reply that for the Indian mind the idea of sub-transcendence
of the self has considerable attraction. This strand of
thought is one of the distinctive emphases of renascent Hin¬
duism of which the Christian apologists in India have to take
account. It is notable that modern Hindus are discovering a
new sense of history - the datum of human freedom as against
the age-long principle of karma, and the importance and rele¬
vance of social reform. But there does seem one observation
which may not be inapposite here. So long as the intellegent-
sia of modern India are preoccupied with the revivalism of the
traditional idea of lifting oneself up to the level of God by
one's own efforts it is surely doubtly difficult for the Chris¬
tian apologists to strike home the meaning of the Gospel, viz.
1. As quoted in H. Reinggren and A.V. Strom, Religions of
Mankind - Today and Yesterday, ed. J.C.G. Greig, tr. N.L.
Jensen, (Edinburgh: London, 1967), p. 3^3.
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"man in his striving to live out of his own resources loses
his self, life arises out of surrendering one's self to God,
thereby gaining one's self". That this is the fundamental
distinction between the scandal of Christian particularity
and the Hindu faith scarcely needs further explanation.
Now this brings us to the discussion of the subject proper of
this chapter. In the first place we need to know and reckon
with the distinctive emphases of the anthropology of modern
Indian thought and in the second place we examine them from
the Pauline perspective on the God-man relationship as a
supplement to the current Indian Christian theology. In add¬
ition to the fact that "the pressures of modern nation would
have caused something of a crisis in Hinduism", as Leonard
M. Schiff observes, the question of man's ultimate destiny
has been clarified from the standpoint of a new understanding
of God, a new idea of the God-man relationship and a concept
of history developed within the framework of recent Indian
thought.
A. Modern Hindu Theologians' New Understanding of God:
tfe showed in the second chapter that there has emerged in
recent Indian thinking a new understanding of God - the Abso¬
lute as "humanized". Tagore protests energetically that those
thinkers, both Indian and European, are wrong who "maintain
that the Brahman of India is a mere abstraction, a negation
1. Rudolf Bultmann, Th. N.T. I, p. 270.
2. Leonard M. Schiff, "Book Reviews", Theology, Vol.LXVIII
(1965), P. 4-4-8.
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of all that is in the world", though he admits that "such a
doctrine has been and still is prevalent with a section of
our countrymen". He declares: "The Infinite in India was
p
not a thin nonentity, void of all content". He can even
speak of "the sovereignty of the universal will". He affirms:
"It is the self of man which the great King of the universe
has not shadowed with his throne - he has left it free. In
his physical and mental organism, where man is related with
nature, he has to acknowledge the rule of his King, but in
his self he is free to disown him. There our God must win
his entrance. There he comes as a guest not as a king, and
Ll
therefore he has to wait till he is invited". For him,
"without the world God would be phantasm; without God, the
5
world would be chaos". All these statements obviously re¬
flect Tagore's pointed expression to a theistic concept of
religion. Further, it may also be safely asserted that Ta¬
gore took the discussion of the nature of the ultimate rea¬
lity to a decisive conclusion by casting doubt on the Advaita
understanding of the Absolute and his relation to the world.
It has also become axiomatic with Gandhi that God is revealed
in his significance for humanity. When he was in England for
the Round Table Conference the Columbia Gramophone Company
1. Sadhana, p. 16.
2. Ibid., p. 20.
3. Ibid., p. 63
4. Ibid., p. 41.
5. As cited in V.S. Naravane, op. cit., p. 136, fn. 121.
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asked him to make a recording, and he read an article on God
which he had written for Young India: "In the midst of death,
life persists. In the midst of untruth, truth persists. In
the midst of darkness, light persists. Hence I gather that
God is Life, Truth, Light. He is Love. He is the Supreme
Good God to be God must rule the heart and transform
it". All this makes it clear that Gandhi's understanding of
the relation of God to the world comes very close to Bultmann's
existentialist theological concern to relate the noumenon to
phenomena, the Absolute to existence, for Bultmann the affir¬
mation of the existence of God cannot be understood as a uni¬
versal, theoretical, and objective truth, "apart from our own
existence". For "it is not feasible to think of God as the
world-principle on the basis of which the world and our own
p
existence along with the world becomes comprehensible". It
is this understanding of God and of his relation to the world
at which both modern Hindu theologians' thought and
Bultmann's thought most readily meet.
It is remarkable that the Christian concept of God as Creator
of the universe appears prominently in the writings of both
Tagore and Radhakrishnan. As has been stated above, Tagore
maintained that God is personal where he creates. He writes:
"God finds himself by creating". He elsewhere writes; "God's
love from which our self has taken form has made it separate
1. As quoted by G. Ashe, Gandhi : A Study in Revolution, p. 310.
2. Faith and Understanding I, pp. 59-60.
3. Tagore, Stray Birds (London, 1917), p. 12.
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1
from God". He poihts out that the phenomenon of the Infinite
finding itself in the finite is apparently a paradox. But
2
"it is a paradox that lies at the root of existence". Radha-
krishnan's understanding of the relation of God to the world
has two facets: (i) As the ablest exponent of Sankara's monism
he upholds the concept of the Absolute as the universal Spirit;
and (ii) as a theist he firmly believes that the ultimate
reality is the Creator of the universe. This can be seen in
the following passages. He writes: "He /the Absolute/ is the
universal Spirit who creates and is aware of the contents of
the universe". Elsewhere he explains that "the great prob¬
lem of the philosophy of religion has been the reconciliation
of the character of the Absolute as in a sense eternally
complete with the character of God as a self-determining prin¬
ciple manifested in a temporal development which includes
nature and man". He declares: "Only a complete apprehension
of reality as a whole can justify the hypothesis that God is
5
and he is the creator of all". He adds: "The work of the
world is not the result of chance or thoughtlessness, but is
simply the outcome of God's nature. Out of the fullness of
his joy, God scatters abroad life and power".^ Aurobindo
thought of the relation of God to the world as follows: "The
affirmation of a divine life upon earth can have no
1. Sadhana, p. 87.
2. Personality, p. 55.
5. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy II, p. 498.
4. An Idealist View of Life, p. 34-3.
5. Indian Philosophy II, p. 54-2.
6. Ibid., p. 551.
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base unless we recognize not only the eternal Spirit as the
inhabitant of the bodily mansion, the weaver of this mutable
robe, but accept Matter of which it is made, as a fit noble
material out of which He weaves constantly His garbs,
For him, the ultimate reality as in its essence is utterly
transcendent and indescribable. But from human point of view,
the Reality has a three-fold character: "The highest experi¬
ence of this Reality in the universe shows it to be not only
a conscious Existence, but a supreme Intelligence and Force
2
and as a self-existent Bliss".
All this however does not warrant us to say that all recent
Hindu intellectuals subscribe to these writers' understanding
of God as Creator of the universe. For some, the universe
exists from eternity. Vivekananda points out that the word
'creation' in its Judaeo-Christian sense is absent in Sans¬
krit "since there is no school of thought in India believing
in a creation in the sense the word has in the West: that
7.
something springs from nothing". For Nikhilandanda, what
is called creation is merely the transformation of energy to
names and forms (namarupa) and this feature of the world pro¬
cess hypnotizes us into believing in the existence of the
4
manifold.
But from the foregoing quotations of Tagore, Radhakrishnan
and Aurobindo two inferences can be drawn: (1) Their under-
1. The Life Divine I, p. 8.
2. Ibid., p. 49.
3. As quoted in Religions of Mankind - Today and Yesterday,
p. 342.
4. cf. Ibid., p. 342.
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standing of God is perhaps not dissimilar to one of the pro¬
positions of the existentialist theology of Bultmann, viz.
God is not known to speculative thought; (2) their understan¬
ding of God can be regarded as a real advance in that it pin¬
points the growing tendency to uphold the idea of the Creator-
creature relationship while playing down the pantheistic view
of God and breaking away from the full-fledged Idealistic
scheme of Sankara. However, their new concept of God stops
short of an important aspect of the ultimate reality, viz. the
definition of God should allow his ontological status. It is
true that the Bible itself does not speak of what God is like
in himself but for Paul the being of God, what God is in him¬
self was manifest in what he has done for mankind in Christ.
It is true that faith be it Hindu or Christian concerns exis¬
tence, but it (faith) is also knowledge and contemplation of
God. For Paul it is God who has raised Jesus from the dead,
Rom. 4:24, 8:11, 10:9; I Cor. 6:14; Gal. 1:1. Paul's message
is the Gospel of Christ, I Cor. 9=12, II Cor. 2:12, 4:4, 9:13-
And precisely because it is the Gospel of Christ it is also
the Gospel of God, Rom. 1:1, 15:16; I Thes. 2:8, 9«
Paul's understanding of the relation of God to the world does
not spring merely from his concept of man in his historical
existence but from his new understanding of God in Christ.
That is, Paul's theological language springs from "his stan¬
ding in the grace". He declares: "It is no longer I who live,
but Christ lives in me I do not nullify the grace of
God; ", Gal. 2:20-21 a. This language in turn, springs
from his new understanding of the relation of the Gospel to
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the Law and his concept of the new era inaugurated by the
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, further, from his
understanding of the Adam-Christ relationship, Rom. 5=12ff.
it can be implied that Paul has not written a theoretical
anthropology which can be studied in isolation from the rest
of his thought. That is, in Paul there is, indeed, a defi¬
nite knowledge of God which lies behind much of what he says
about man in his historical existence. And on the other hand,
the interelation of his understanding of man with Christology
and ecclesiology seems to be the over-all scheme of Paul's
thought.
Perhaps a case can be made for the idea that we can legiti¬
mately make objective statements about the being of God. In
this connection it is pertinent to recall the remark of Will¬
iam Hordern when he comments on the statement of the writer
of the first Epistle of John, i.e. God is love: "We can ask
whether this statement is objectively true or only an expres¬
sion of John's feeling. Of course John's statement is not
"objective" in the sense of a scientist's statement that
"iron is metal", but there is an appropriate use of "objective"
in this context". If one really wants to know what Paul's
teaching of God is one has to turn to a consistent exegesis
of Paul's phrases relating to God's righteousness. Properly
speaking, the phrase"^v<. TCxtTYiriJ S Q TT\VTw > Rom. 1:17 and
the similar formulationcTs K»<c o_,(T0 y/<r) S& o^cLTTt(TT^S ,
Rom. 3=22 make plain what Paul means by God's righteousness.
1. William Hordern, Speaking of God (London, 1964), p. 157-
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The implication is that God's righteousness is essentially
tied up with faith. Further, God's righteousness becomes in
some sense man's when he turns to God in his response of faith.
To put it differently, God's righteousness is a gift given to
man on the condition of the surrender of his self to him. This
is one aspect of it. But there is another aspect as well.
Righteousness stands not merely for God's power but also for
the character of the giver. Paul's statement that God in
Christ is reconciling the world unto himself, II Cor. 5:19
explains the fact that Paul infers what God is like from a
change in the situation of the world. He thus establishes
the necessity of theology.
Interestingly enough, Radhakrishnan explains the philosophy
of religion in existential categories. He writes: "The reli¬
gions of the world can be distinguished into those which em¬
phasize the object and those which insist on experience. For
the first class religion is an attitude of faith and conduct
directed to a power without. For the second it is an experi¬
ence to which the individual attaches supreme value". For
Hindus and Buddhists "it /religion.7 is more a transforming
experience than a notion of God. Real religion can exist
without a definite conception of the deity but not without a
distinction between the spiritual and the profane, the sacred
1. The double-sidedness is well set out by Sanday and Headlam,
also by Althaus. cf. W. Sanday and A.C. Headlam, The
Epistle to the Romans, 5th ed. (Edinburgh, 1902), p. 24-f.
2. P. Althaus comments: All that God has he gives and what he
gives is himself (Alles was Gott hat, das gibt er, und was
er gibt, das ist er selbst).* cf. P. Althaus, Per Brief
an die Romer, 8th ed. (Gottingen, 195^), p. 12f.
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and the secular In theistic systems the essential
thing is not the existence of the deity, but its power to
transform man Belief and conduct, rites and ceremonies,
authorities and dogma, are assigned a place subordinate to
the art of conscious self-discovery and contact with the
-1
divine".
The statement: "Real religion can exist without a definite
conception of the deity but not without distinction between
the sacred and the secular" obviously points to the
idea that the existentialist theological landmark of our age
can be found in the writings of recent Indian thinkers, not
to say that the whole passage strikes the keynote of Radha-
krishnan's religious thought. The phrase "its (deity's) power
to transform man" pinpoints the idea that the Creator-creature
relationship concerns the transformation that takes place in
the creature. We may fully accept this important concept as
this is not dissimilar to the Pauline teaching on salvation.
But the question is whether this concept of religious experi¬
ence says anything about God. Man's awareness of his finitude
must, of necessity, lead him to think of transcendence in
terms of infinitude as being the ultimate limit of human ex¬
perience. At this point the question inevitably arises whether
the warrant of acceptability of the limitation of language
about God is not the eventual outcome of an abstraction of the
distinction between Time and Eternity. Prom the viewpoint of
1, Eastern Religions and 'Western Thought, p. 21.
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human existence - the self-consciousness of man's necessary-
ability and obligation to be a self we can justifiably reflect
upon the nature of the ultimate being in the sense of rational
Ghriatian theology. Moreover, we can safely suggest that human
conscience and reason can be the effective means of an objec¬
tive affirmation about the being of God. This is brought more
clearly into view by William Temple when he observes that "to
deny that revelation can, and in the long run must, on pain
of becoming manifest as superstition, vindicate its claim by
satisfying reason and conscience, is fanatical. But that re¬
velation is altogether other than rational inference from pre¬
vious experience is vitally important; that only by revelation
and by his surrender to its spiritual power can man be "saved",
is a profound and irrefragable truth; ".
If it is a valid observation that Pauline understanding of
God necessitates a genuinely theological concept of reality
it follows that the biblical understanding of God must be
made more intelligible to "enlightened Hindus who had
2
themselves outgrown the myths of popular Hinduism". India's
religious thought in its modern form is full of cross-currents
and therefore their understanding of God is often elusive or
eclectic. The concept of God as an 'avatar' (an incarnation
of God, occurring when the state of the world seems to call
for it) immediately comes to the mind of any Hindu the moment
you begin to talk about the being of God or more often than
1. William Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 396.
2. J.W. Grant, God's People in India, p. 16.
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not, God is thought to be 'absolute' reality or the chief
of the gods and so on. The attempts made by several Indian
Christian thinkers to explain the incarnation of our Lord as
"the Supreme avatar" or Jesus, "the eternal avatar" have not
2
been acceptable to many and of late, were called in question.
In any case, Just as there is an urgent need in Christian
theology for the rearticulation of the Pauline emphasis on
language about God so also in renascent Hindu thought there
is the need for developing a new understanding of God which
includes not only the canons of existential interpretation
1. See R.BLS» Boyd, op. cit., p. 175.
2. George Johnston observes: "His unique role cannot be
surrendered to any aratar or any prophet. In his life,
death and resurrection our whole message consists".-
■
% George Johnston, "Christian Mission and Christ's preve-
nience", Theology To-day, Vol. XX (1963-64), p. 4-1. Also,
from the standpoint of Hindu idea of Jesus as one of the
Avataras as a Christian reaction to Swami Akhilananda's
exposition of the word avatara and his explanation of the
death and resurrection of Jesus to fit him into Hindu un¬
derstanding of the avatra, S.J. Samartha observes:_"It
would be foolish if we wanted to force upon them /_ the
death and resurrection of Jesus_7 meanings borrowed from
elsewhere. He who describes Good Friday as a symbol for
the fact that Christ had let 'his empirical self' be cru¬
cified and that the resurrection is a proof for the power
of the spirit over the body through the realization of
the truth does not find himself in harmony with the tone
of the New Testament and with the faith of the Church
through the centuries", my tr. (Es ware toricht, wenn wir
anderswo entliehene Bedeutungen ihnen aufzwingen wollten.
Wer den Karfreitag als Sinnbild dafur beschreibt, daB
Christus "Sein empirisches selbst" habter kreuzigen lassen,
und daB die Auferstehung ein Beweis "fur die Kraft des
Geistes uber den Korper durch die Verwirklichung der Wahr-
heit", der befindest sich nich im Einklang mit dem Grund-
ton des Neuen Testaments und dem Glauben der Kirche durch
die Jahrhunderte hindurch" .'!-
S.J. Samartha, Hindus vor dem Universalen Christus
(Stuttgart, 1970), pp. 81-82.
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of the God-man relationship but also a genuinely theological
concept of reality "as it is possible to discuss the ontolo-
gical status of God without getting into that illegitimate
-1
kind of objectifying which Bultmann justly fears".
B. Modern Hindu theologians' understanding of the God-man
relationship:
Modern Hindu theologians' concept of the actual relation be¬
tween God and man underlines two basic notions, namely the
man-ward aspect of religion and man's salvation being attained
by human effort and self-discipline. The essence of the Gita
which in modern times has acquired an independent position in
the consciousness and piety of the people is apparently found
in the verse, XI:55J He who does work for Me, he who looks
upon Me as his goal, he who worships Me, free from attachment,
who is free from enmity to all creatures, he goes to Me, 0
— 2
Pandava (Arjuna)". Of the three-fold path of salvation, i.e.
Jnana-Marga (the path of insight), Karma-Marga (the path of
action); and the Bhakti-Marga (the path of devotion, personal
commitment to God) the third way is considered to be open to
all. This essential teaching of the Gita about man's salva¬
tion is summarized by Vivekananda as follows: "When a man
reaches the stage where he loves everyone and is ready to give
his life for an animal without desiring any reward, then his
heart is purified". By the phrase "ready to give his life
1. J. Macquarrie, "Bultmann's understanding of God", The Expos.
Times, Volume The Seventy-Nineth (1967-68), p. 560.
2. S. Radhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgita, p. 289.
5. As quoted in Religions of Mankind - Today and Yesterday,
p. 5^-4-.
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for an animal without desiring any reward" Vivekananda empha¬
tically defends much of what is implied in the concept of
nishkamakarma (action without thought for a reward) and this,
on his account, is the outcome of a purified heart which is
inversely achieved through one's own self-directed efforts.
This view of salvation embodies two trains of thought; on
the one hand, ultimately the individual has to be responsible
for himself to attain salvation; and on the other hand, the
moment of enlightenment comes to him in isolation - hence
true freedom may be said to be individualistic in the tradi¬
tional sense of the term.
With respect to the former, there is a clear train of argu¬
ment, i.e. the self is not given ready-made; it has to be
acquired by discipline and devoted spirit. In this sense the
responsibilities and actualities of man become a matter of
great importance. If we say that man is primarily responsible
for the actuality of his authentic life we then probably over¬
play the man-ward aspect of religion. In so doing the imm¬
ense problem of man's essential relation to God is solved
from the point of view of anthropology. One cannot resist
the conclusion that on the idea of divine operation in one's
religious experience modern Hindu theologians lay very little
emphasis. What this amounts to is little more than existen¬
tialism for which "there is no meaning in life and no moral
standards except what man can himself create". Of course
this is the basic existentialist position and there is an
1. "Talking Points from Books", The Expos. Times, Volume
The Eighty-Eirst (1969-70), p. 259.
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essential and a marked difference between this position andftU,
existentialist theology of the Bultmannian school of thought
which continually insists that authentic life is given to
Dasein as a gift from God. It is precisely in this sense
that modern Hindu notion of the man-ward aspect of religion
is different from Bultmann's understanding of faith.
With this in mind, let us now penetrate a little deeper into
Pauline anthropology to see whether his Christian thought
stresses any other facets of philosophy of religion neglected
by Hindu theology in its modern form. What is Paul's most
important and characteristic contribution to Christian anth¬
ropology? In order to clarify this question we have to turn
to his understanding of the role of the Spirit, viz. the exe¬
gesis of Pauline texts wherein the work of the Spirit is re¬
ferred to. At the outset let us state our premise: Paul views
the Spirit as active in the individual's act of faith and
sanctification of the believer united with Christ through
faith.
But before we actually deal with this in detail it may well
be necessary for us to make a brief survey of the scheme of
thinking of Indian Christian theologians with a view to in¬
vestigate the question whether they had run into a mist of
ambiguities with respect to the role of the Spirit. It is
notable that of all Indian Christian thinkers Chenchiah and
Chakkarai most significantly set themselves to re-apprehend
and re-address the meaning of the role of the Spirit in a
manner relevant to the forms of thought of the Hindu intell¬
ectuals. The summary teaching of Chenchiah on the work of
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the Spirit is as follows: "The Holy Spirit is the new cosmic
energy; the Kingdom of God the new order; the children of God
the new type that Christ has inaugurated. The Gospel is that
God in Jesus has made a new creation ". Chenchiah
apparently explained the doctrine and personality of the Spirit
in "terms of the mighty power of God, the power-house. He writes:
"After Christ we do not abide in the woods of God-realization:
we search for the waterfalls of God, that would release the
2
new energy for the transformation of the world".
On the basis of these statements two observations can be made:
(i) Chenchiah rightly views the Holy Spirit as of God's power
and suggests that a conscious submission to and use of that
power must be made by the individual in order to make his life
more dynamic, (ii) From this it does not follow that the Holy
Spirit is the "new cosmic energy". We may fully agree with
him in so far as he holds fast to the idea of cosmic redemp¬
tion, world theology as spelled out by Paul in Rom. 8:18 ff.
But if we work out the full implications of Chenchiah's idea
of the Spirit as the new cosmic spirit his apologetic suffers
one peculiarity, namely he overstates the comparison
between the Holy Spirit and the divine sakti as mahaskati,
'great power' as found in Hindu scriptures.
Chakkarai, on the other hand, not only looks upon the work of
the Holy Spirit as a continuing part of the incarnation of
Christ but also sees no objection to the identification of
1. As quoted inRH.S. Boyd, op. cit., p. 156-
2. As quoted inRJH.S. Boyd, op. cit. , p. 158.
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the Spirit with the risen, living Christ at work in the world
today. He, in fact, goes a step further than this. He affirms:
"It is from the Holy Spirit our antaryamin, the Indweller,
that we start our enquiry concerning the nature of the person
<1
of Jesus". Particularly with regard to the relation between
Jesus and the Spirit Chakkarai affirms: "The Holy Spirit is
Jesus Christ Himself, taking His abode within us The
starting point in consciousness of the Christian disciple is
2
that the Holy Spirit is Jesus Himself".
Prom these statements it can be seen that Chakkarai'sunderstan¬
ding of the Spirit as compared with the risen Jesus at work in
the world today certainly accords with the New Testament tea¬
ching on the Spirit, particularly with Pauline teaching on the
same, viz. the Christ became sT\\^ /AdL ^uJoTCd-ofMJV, I Cor.
15-45. It is certainly arguable, on Chakkarai's account,
that the Holy Spirit can be understood in terms of the Indweller
Rom. 8:11. However, his interpretation of the Spirit as the
antaryamin (inner controller) in the sense the word has in
Hindu scriptures is surely open to question. It is one thing
to say that the Spirit is the risen Jesus at work in the world
today and it is another thing to say that the Spirit is the
antaryamin, for once one begins to speak of the role of the
Spirit in terms of antaryamin one is falling into the fallacy
CKs
of^pantheistic view of God, i.e. the spirit in the divine be-
1. As quoted in R.H.S.Boyd, op. cit., p. 173-
2. As quoted in Ibid., p. 173-
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ing of the universe and the spirit in human being are one
and the same, only the universal Spirit is world power or
more powerful than the human spirit. With respect to the
Hindu understanding of the soul (atman) "every individual
soul is a reflection of the world soul, " Here the
logical fallacy is surely obvious as the more judicious under¬
standing of Paul's concept of the Spirit makes it clear: "A
distinction between the human and divine spirits is worked
2
out for the first time It was a Pauline creation".
So much for Indian Christian theologians' understanding of
the Spirit.
Let us now look at a closer range Pauline texts to see whether
Paul's anthropology has given a foothold to those who wish to
deny completely the role of the Spirit as being the necessary
element in the individual's act of faith. It is true that
Paul never develops a theoretical pneumatology as such but
that does not warrant us to set aside his understanding of
the divine operation in terms of the Spirit, the historical
power in the community. Certainly Paul's idea of the God-
man relationship gains a new depth of meaning if we emphasize,
as Punk observes "Paul's basic theological tenet: God comes
to man in his Word". It may, however, be safely asserted,
as Stalder points out, that for Paul "the revelation of God
in Jesus Christ can at the same time be hidden in spite of all
1. Religions of Mankind - Today and Yesterday, p. 343.
2. R. Jewett, Paul's Anthropological Terms, p. 451.
3. R.W. Punk, "Phenomenology of Language and the New Testa¬
ment", The Journal of Bible and Religion, Vol. XXXIV.
(1966), p. 212.
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preaching. It must be made known in the Spirit; the unspi-
ritual man does not understand thereby, even though his ears
hear it (I Cor. 2)." , "The testimony of God is the con¬
tent of Paul's message. Hence it follows that the problem
of Paul's understanding of the Spirit is always to be laid
hold of in consideration to his witness of God". Paul de¬
clares that he appeared in Corinth "in demonstration of the
Spirit and power", that their "faith might not rest in the
wisdom of men but in the power of God", I Cor. 2:4f. This
makes it clear that true Word, power and the Spirit are in¬
terrelated concepts of Paul's preaching. The exegesis of
the passage I Thes. 1:5-6 particularly makes it plain that
it was in power and in the Holy Spirit that Paul's message
reached the Thessalonians and there the text shows that ...
... they received the word in much affliction, with joy in-
e
spired by the Holy Spirit, f^k-ToL )("ff~VCr-uyuJTTo S flV'-
which certainly recalls £v ~7TV& o^AalTC ft \/ ( c-j
Further, Paul's statement that 'we speak of those gifts of
God in words found for us not by our human wisdom but by
the Spirit, I Cor. 2:15 (NEB Tr.) serves to illustrate the
manner of Paul's teaching on the role of the Spirit.
Paul's underlying presupposition is that man should live in
humble believing obedience on God but he is also obviously
1. Kurt Stalder, Das Werk .Pes Geistes in Per Heiligung Bei
Paulus (Bern, 1961), pp. 12, and 17, my tr. (Die Offen-
barug Gottes in Jesus Christus kann bei aller Predigt
gleichwohl verborgen bleiben. Sie muB im Heiligen Geist
erkannt werden; der psychische Mensch vernimmt nichts
davon, obwohl seine Ohren die Botschaft auch horen (I Cor.
2). "Das Zeugnis von Gott ist der Inhalt der Paulinis-
chen Botschaft. - Daraus folgt, daB bei der Prage nach
dem Geistverstandnis des Paulus immer auf sein Zeugnis
von Gott Bedacht zu nehmen ist).
277
aware of the fact that man refuses to accept that utter de¬
pendence upon God which his creatureliness connotes. How
man can live in complete obedience to God is the central
issue of our understanding of our religious experience. In
Paul's language the divine way of obedience is described as
being free from the Law and open to God's grace. What Paul
expressly emphasizes is that the divine way of obedience
means the end of legalism (one's efforts to achieve true self¬
hood), and the life in Christ, united with him by faith, and
quickened by the Spirit. It is in this sense that Paul's
phrase 'the power of the Spirit' becomes intelligible. Surely
this expression 'the power of the Spirit' gains in significance
if it is recognized that Paul knows very well that man cannot
make up his mind to change his way to this divine way of obe¬
dience. Paul's correlation of divine power and the power of
the Holy Spirit is nowhere clearer than in Rom. 15:18 wherein
Paul declared that he was able to win the obedience from the
Gentiles by word and deed, and by the power of the Holy
Spirit.
Furthermore, it will be noted that the Jew could not get away
from the idea of the objective reality of the Spirit as being
the divine operation at work in history any more than he could
get away from the idea of flesh, i.e. the evil impulse ~l
pi_Ti as the source of sin in the human race. |4<GvA-
idea of the flesh, sin that dwells within me - nothing good
dwells, that is, in my flesh, Rom. 7:17, 18, (it will be re¬
membered that the question whether the passage in Rom. 7:14- If-
speaks of the pre-Christian or Christian experience of Paul
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is still a debatable issue). If for the Jew, sin was associa¬
ted with flesh, it would be all the more true of a Jew, Paul
in particular, who moved in Hellenistic circles. It would be
inescapably true to say that Paul must have readily adopted
thought-forms of the day in order to explain the Christ-event
and the role of the .Spirit; the latter being a part of the
whole. Moreover, in the Rabbinic view, as Schweizer explains,
"the personal categories used to describe the activity of the
Spirit are not designed to present Him as a special heavenly
being but rather to bring out the fact that He is an object¬
ive divine reality which encounters and claims man The
decisive thing is that man stands here before a reality which
comes from God, which in some sense represents the presence
of God, and yet which is not identical with God The
Spirit is God's Spirit and is sent by God".
In short, the characteristic feature of Paul's anthropology
is that confrontation between God and man is possible; the
whole man is at stake when confronted by God and at the same
time man's faculties are such that he cannot make the required
unconditional surrender to God; and yet in order to make this
surrender possible man's faculties require awakening or quick¬
ening by divine power which is nothing less than the Spirit of
God, the historical power in the community. Schweizer observes
that for Paul, "Christ, must Himself be called(?
and, though this is formally a statement about His substance,
materially it is a statement about His power, i.e., His sig-
1. Th. D.H.T. VI, 387-88.
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nificance for the community".
In his attempt to re-address the meaning of Paul's anthropology
in a manner relevant to the anthropology of recent Indian
thought the Christian apologist must, of necessity, make a
substantial case for Paul's expression given to divine opera¬
tion. Only thus can he show that divine operation and human
response of faith (the aspect of human freedom) are held in
balance and thereby he need not draw the same conclusion as
the wholehearted champions and exponents of existentialist
theology do, namely having said that the whole man is at
stake when confronted by God there is no more to be said in
the matter of the individual's act of faith.
This now brings us to the discussion of the second aspect of
the individual's salvation in modern Hindu thought. Even with
p
the rise of renaissance of ancient Hindu culture and religion
an uncompromisingly individualistic salvation was still noti¬
ceable in the writings of some modern Hindu intellectuals like
Pandit Mahabhagavat who held that "it is an impertinence to
seek anything but one's own salvation. There is great spiri¬
tual danger in thinking that the world is in need of our
help"
However, this traditional individualistic salvation is no
1- Th. D. N.T. VI, p. 417.
2. The recognition of the Christian concept of the value of
personality, the efforts to uplift the depressed classes,
t© raise the status of women, to abolish child-marriage and
the devadasi system (religious prostitution) can be men¬
tioned as some aspects of the renaissance of Hinduism.
3» As cited in A.C. Underwood, Contemporary Thought of India
(London, 1930), p. 149.
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longer thought to be the general feeling of the religio-philo-
sophical thinkers of renascent Hinduism like Radhakrishnan,
Gandhi, Aurobindo, Sri Ramakrishna and Vivekananda. That is,
one of the insights of these men is that they under the spell
of the Christian idea of society learned to imbue the structure
of modern Hinduism with ethical ideas of human solidarity and
called for modification of classical Hindu ethics. It is not
an exaggeration to say that Radhakrishnan, "the Ambassador-
General of Indian culture" as W. Perston calls him, offers
more structural assistance to this new trend of thinking which
stresses the role of the individual in society over against
the traditional individualistic concept of salvation.
This can be seen from the way Radhakrishnan interprets the
ancient Tat Tvam asi (That art Thou) in agreement with Paul
Deussen's comment on the ancient Hindu scriptures "you must
love your neighbour as yourself, because you are your neigh¬
bour. It is an illusion making you believe that your neigh-
2
bour is anything but yourself". Radhakrishnan elsewhere
writes: "The liberated individual works for the welfare of
the world Love to God expresses itself in love to crea¬
tion He /the sage/ is conscious of the wider destiny
of the universe". The Christian Church in India cannot afford
to ignore the incentive which Radhakrishnan's writings give
to the vast majority of people in India to lay stress upon
1. W. Perston, "Christian Theology and Vedanta", International
Review of Missions, Vol. XLIV (1955), p. 155.
2. As quoted in Religions of Mankind - Today and Y.esterday,
p. 34-4. """ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
3. Eastern Religions and Western Thought, pp. 100-1.
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religious and ethical values of society. For Tagore, "To
live the life of goodness is to live the life of all". A
genuine concern for the welfare of the whole is a dominant
feature of modern Hindu theology and this is because the
intelligentsia of modern India have come to realize that those
who seek to save their lives in isolation will lose them.
Another feature of renascent Hinduism is that of its emphasis
upon the love element - 'the way of love' as being plainly a
preparation for one's true selfhood. In this connection it
is pertinent to recall the comment of R.C. Zaehner: "In the
modern Hindu revivalist sects, particularly in the Ramakrishna
Mission they /the philosophically minded.7 tend to speak in-
2
differently of 'self-realization and 'God-realization'".
Under the leadership of Vivekananda, Ramakrishnan Mission
called for radical modification in society. That is, his
urging people to humanitarian and compassionate action is
significant and praiseworthy. His own words are: "He who
serves all beings serves God indeed".^ The Sarvodaya Move¬
ment whose principal concern is 'the welfare of all' is vi¬
gorously carrying on its programme of land distribution to
the landless in the country.
All this goes to show that the "enlightened" of renascent
Hinduism have played a highly significant role in stressing
this spontaneous social concern within Hinduism - they saw
1. Sadhana, pp. 56-57-
2. R.C. Zaehner "Learning from Other Faiths: 1 Hinduism"
The Expos. Times, March 1972 Volume LXXX-III No.6, p.168.
5. As quoted by W. Stewart, India's Religions Frontier, p. 89-
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the final concerns in social rather than in purely personal
dimensions. Thus their new ethics marks a real advance on
the classical idea of one's own true freedom as achieved in
isolation. In this sense there can be discerned a striking
affinity between Hindu theology in its modern form and the
anthropology of Paul who never thinks of man in purely indivi¬
dualistic terms. Indeed, he sees the redeemed man as part of
the corporate community.
But reflection prompts further questions, namely can this new
dimension of life in recent Hindu theology come close to the
Pauline perspective on corporate community? This question
may be replaced by a more practical one. Can the Hindu faith
in its renascent form have a doctrine of Church in the sense
of fellowship expressed in the corporate act of common worship
which is considered to be the indispensable focus of the
community's life? Can it put "a visible human community in
the centre of its creed"? It is true that Radhakrishnan ad¬
vanced the idea that the meaning of history is to make all
men prophets to establish a kingdom of free spirits. But it
might be asked whether this kingdom of free spirits can be
'i
squared with "corporate Samadhi" if there is any such thing
even in present day Hinduism?
The late Dr. P.D. Devadanandan, motivated by an apologetic
concern pointed out that in Hinduism "there can, be no
such community as the Church claims itself to be, where there
is an inflow and outflow of personal influence which is trans-
1.1 owe these expressions to Bishop J.E.L. Newbigin, A
Faith for this One World? (London, 1961), pp. 40-417
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1
forming, Corporate fellowship of the community of
believers united with Christ who have the Holy Spirit as the
earnest expectation of that which is to come is thought to be
embodied in Paul's phrase "in Christ" which is not the same
as the experience of the pure selfhood which is none other
than the individual1s integral experience on which both Radha-
krishnan and Aurobindo constantly insist.
C. Modern Hindu theologians' concept of history:
It is now time to discuss the last theme of this chapter,
namely the concept of history in recent Indian thinking. We
have seen in the second chapter how in fact the outstanding
thinkers of modern India have developed their view of history.
The main purpose of taking up the same theme at this place is
to examine more closely how deeply modern Hindu thought con¬
cerns itself with a historical method and assess it from the
standpoint of the Pauline view of the God-man relationship so
that the current Indian theology can take account of the full
swing of all the tides of thought of modern India.
It is probably correct to say that within the framework of the
anthropology of Hinduism in its modern form the material world
is no longer considered to be an illusion and the movement of
events interpreted in terms of cyclic view of time is no lon¬
ger held to be congenial to modern Indian thinkers. Radha-
krishnan's view of history comes to very clear expression in
the following statements: "Man with his creative acts can
1. P.D. Devadanandan, The Gospel and Renascent Hinduism
(London, 1959), p. 37.
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mould the closed circle of nature and disclose its possibili-
ties". He writes: "The scriptures of an earlier age cannot
answer the problem of our time. The great representatives of
Indian culture were men of mobility and ceaseless adventure.
We are not loyal to their spirit if we mark time in a world
of perpetual movement by sitting still and chanting ancient
hymns " . ^
One can discern in this statement Radhakrishnan developing a
concept of history. Foremost among the reasons for this new
tendency to develop a historical method are that (i) Karma,
a concept of unparalleled importance in the development of
Hindu religion has been given a new interpretation. That is,
over against the fatalistic concept of karma the concept of
the freedom of the will is emphasized which Radhakrishnan
explains by means of a very suggestive metaphor: Life is a
game of bridge. (ii) The traditional concept of Maya has
also been reinterpreted in such a way that a negative attitude
to the world is no longer held to be the right view of one's
historical existence because it excludes a sense of involve¬
ment with society. Again, on Radhakrishnan's account, "Maya
does not imply that the world is an illusion or is non-exist-
3
ent absolutely ". And above all, as we have already
seen, for him, man has to fling a flaming torch into the dark¬
ness of the future.
1. S. Radhakrishnan, "Fragments of a Confession" in The Philo¬
sophy of S. Radhakrishnan, p. 59.
2. As quoted in V.S. Naravane, op. cit., p. 261.
5. S. Radhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgita, p. 38.
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It would be unwise to suggest that by this view of history
modern Hindu theologians mean a teleological conception of
life as against cosmic cycles. Nor would be it correct to
say that renascent Hinduism has developed its historical
methodology to the same extent as Western existentialism did.
It would be an exaggeration to say that they have uniform^JLy
developed a concept of history. All we can say is that inas¬
much as they tacitly recognize the weight of the criticism of
the West that Hindu cyclic view of time is still overriding
all other considerations of their world-view the philosophi¬
cally minded are changing the lineaments of their culture and
forms of thought. It is in this sense that we have to under¬
stand the viewpoint of history of the elite of modern India.
As we have seen, Radhakrishnan's view of history is orientated
to the individual's use of his freedom. He writes "By a
change in mental and spiritual disposition, we can pre¬
pare for overselves a new destiny. It depends on us whether
we take the rake's line downhill to destruction or the pil-
1
grim's progress upward".
Besides, as Gogley points out, "these men have been exposed
to Christian influence or have been "secularized" in the Wes-
2
tern sense of the term". Therefore their thought is charac¬
terized by the modification of old certitudes and the throwing
away of old ways of thinking and this may suggest that they
have begun to take seriously the thought of the modern world.
1. S. Radhakrishnan, "My Search for Truth", in Religion in
Transition, pp. 52-53•
2. J. Cogley, . "Religion in aSecular Age, p. 12.
286
It is now necessary to take up the discussion of the question
whether the idea of a providential ordering of the universe
makes sense to modern Hindu theologians. Do they think in terms
of eschatology? Will they accept the idea that divine purpose
is being worked out in history? We have seen that most of
them, though not all, subscribe to the idea that the universe
is the creation of the supreme being. From this does it follow
that they also believe that this world is the object of God's
concern and that there is some ultimate consummation of the
Divine purposes? One might argue that some of the basic assu¬
mptions implied in these questions are frankly meaningless to
modern theologians of the Hindu faith. If these basic assump¬
tions are not part of the logic of their understanding of his¬
tory in what way is their concept of history a matter of con¬
cern for the Christian apologists? This dilemma or query can
be defined yet more sharply. What good reason do the Chris¬
tian apologists in India have to be concerned about their idea
of history? It is precisely because of their stressing of the
primacy of personal history against cosmic history that the
present study seeks to show the relevance of Paul's anthropo¬
logy to the anthropology of modern Indian thought.
Paul views the Christ-event as an event of decisive signifi¬
cance for mankind. Paul's understanding of the Adam-Christ
relationship makes it obvious that the reconciliation wrought
through the Christ-event embraces all creation and the whole
of mankind. Basic to Paul's position is that through the
obedience of One the many who will be established as righteous
will not merely be given the standing of righteous but
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really be righteous. On his showing the Christ-event has
opened the possibility of the change of relationship between
God and man and in his language, as Barrett comments, both
"sinners" and "righteous" are "words of relationship", not
character". A careful study of Paul's (scheme of) concepts
shows that "to belong to Christ" is to be a member of the ul¬
timate eschatological order which is to be consummated. Under¬
stood from this point of view of history Paul certainly thought
in terms of the ultimate consummation of the Divine purposes.
This implies that Paul had anticipated the end of history when
God will be all in all, I Cor. 15:28, or to use our twentieth
2
century language, "the wholeness of reality will come to light".
Let us now examine some of the statements of the champions of
modern Hindu thought on history. In the second chapter we
touched on the existentialist interpretation of history as an
Eastern corollary of the Western existentialist interpretation
of history. Here we explain more fully the same topic with
a view to show how best we can bring out the relevance of
Paul's anthropology to that of renascent Hinduism. J. Moltmann
observes: "Heidegger's existentialist interpretation of his¬
tory as a science seeks to construct the idea of his-
tory from the 'historicality' of Dasein". As compared with
this view of history we find not dissimilar statements in
Radhakrishnan's writings. As we have already discussed his
1. C.K. Barrett, A Commentary on The Epistle to the Romans
(London, 1962), p. 117-
2. Jurgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope, p. 277-
v V
5. Jurgen Moltmann, op. cit., p. 256.
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view of history we cannot traverse the same ground in detail
again. His concept of history comes out most clearly in the
following statements: For him, "His /man's/ being is open to
himself". He observes: "We cannot say that everything is
finished before it starts and the last day of reckoning will
2
read what the first day of creation wrote".
In a similar manner Tagore also explains his view of history
by his analogy of the picture and the canvas. He insists:
"The soul's birth in the spiritual world is not the severance
of relationship with what we call nature, but freedom of re-
lationship, ". As for Tagore's view of human freedom,
in Nature, the reigning principle is Determinism, in man it
is Freedom. It is this freedom that helps him to "cross
nature's bonds". Further, for Tagore, "Man proves his in¬
born mania for repeated reforms of constitution, for pelting
amendments at every resolution proposed by providence".^
Tagore is convinced that "there is no external means of tak¬
ing freedom by the throat. It is the inward process of los¬
ing ourselves that leads us to it
Gandhi maintained that the autonomy of the human individual
must be given supreme worth. He considered society to be a
1. Religion in PL Changing 'World, p. 67-
2. S. Radhakrishnan, "Fragments of a Confession" in The Philo¬
sophy of S. Radhakrishnan, p. 42.
3. Personality, p. 94-.
4. Tagore, Man, Andhra University Lectures (Waltair, 1937), p.4.
5. The Religion of Man, p. 52.
6. As cited by Naravane, op. cit., p. 153.
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community of souls rather than of biologically impelled organ¬
isms. One of the special merits of Gandhi's philosophy of life
is that he laid a consistent emphasis on human freedom. This
is indeed admirable when seen from the perspective of classi¬
cal Hindu understanding of time and of the human being in the
scheme of things.
Vivekananda did not subscribe to the popular idea of the world
as being "pure illusion". He had little sympathy for those
whose concept of Maya was in line with the traditional under¬
standing of the doctrine of Maya. In the popular usage the
word Maya often denotes a sense of ignorance, attachment to
transitory thing:;, hence the phrase: Caught up in the web of
Maya. This view of Maya obviously calls for negative attitude
to the world and to use Naravane's expression, "all action has
to be abandoned so long as the world is what it is".
For that very reason Vivekananda viewed this attitude as un¬
warranted. For him, the world has both aspects, - illusion
and reality, Nature and Freedom, passion and reason. He dis¬
approved the idea of seeking liberation through escape. His
characteristic statement is: "Plunge into the world and learn
the world and learn the secret of work. Do not fly from the
wheels of the world machine. Stand inside it and see how it
2
functions. You can find a way to come out of it". In point
of fact, this view of the world is undoubtedly a remarkable
epitomization of the newly developed view of human freedom in
1. V.S. Naravane, op. cit., p. 94-.
2. As cited in Ibid., p. 102.
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renascent Hinduism. This reflects the currents of contemporary
Indian thinking coming to terms with the modern world. lor
Vivekananda, man represents the principle of freedom in the
highest form. The struggle for freedom is the common basis
of all religions and Vivekananda called it, "the first impulse
1
towards becoming religious". Vivekananda firmly believed
that the human being cannot relinquish his freedom. This has
p
been referred to earlier. For him, "Freedom is the only con¬
dition of growth; take that off, the result will be degenera¬
tion".^
From all these statements two inferences can be drawn:
(i) India's notable recent philosophers rightly emphasized
the datum of human freedom and thereby tried to do justice to
the complexity of life - the determinism of nature and freedom
of the individual; and (ii) they virtually eliminated the idea
of the cosmic perspective of God's futurity in their emphasis
on human freedom. And above all, these statements explain one
particularly crucial point, namely the idea of 'personal his¬
tory'. All this may seem admirable seen from recent abstrac¬
tions of historical study.
But it is nonetheless arguable that 'world-history' may be
said to be the arena of the vindication of God's right because
he is the Created. of this universe (that this world is God's
1. As quoted in Swami Vivekananda Centenary Memorial Volume,
p. 296.
2. See above, p. 153»
3. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda V, 7"th ed.
(Calcutta, 1959), p. 19. ~
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creation is one of the basic presuppositions of a theistic
concept of religion). This is how Paul understood the 'world-
history'. This is admirably expressed by J. Moltmann when
he observes: "They /the mission and cal/7 reveal and open up
to him /man/ new possibilities, with the result that he can
become what he is not yet and never yet was It /a
missionary exposition of the biblical witness to man's his¬
tory and mission.7 will not interpret the phenomena of past
history on the ground of the possibilities of human existence,
but on the contrary, it will interpret the new possibilities
of human existence on the basis of the 'phenomenon' of God's
promise and mission and of the 'phenomenon' of the resurrec-
1
tion and future of Christ".
In this view of history two important presuppositions come to
light: 1) Reality in its totality of continuity and contin¬
gency is understood as history; and 2) the supreme being, con¬
ceived as personal Will is active in and through phenomenon.
If, on the other hand, modern Hindu theologians stress the
idea of 'personal history' to the neglect of God's futurity
their viewpoint of history does not lead us to see the under¬
lying purpose in movements, individualities and complexes of
history. How do we reconcile these two differing views of
history? To put it more plainly, where do we draw the line?
Perhaps the most satisfactory solution to this problem is to
be found in the recognition of the fact that one is necessari¬
ly inclusive of the other so as to explain the whole range of
1. Jurgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope, pp. 286, 287-88.
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human affairs. This is perhaps one of the most far-reaching
insights of Pauline anthropology. How very Pauline this argu¬
ment is may be elucidated by reference to his texts. The
passage in I Cor. 15:24-28 speaks of the advent of the coming
Lordship of Christ, the end of history. For Paul, this is
perhaps the logical outcome of the premise, the proclamation
of the exalted Christ. The proclamation of the Gospel and
the mission to the Gentiles are, on his own showing, traced
back to the revelation of the exalted Christ, cf. Gal. 1:2ff-;
I Cor. 9:1, 15:8.
This is not all. There is another important aspect to it.
Paul undoubtedly links the Word, Kerygma with power to bestow
life and to bring death, cf. I Cor. 1:18; Rom. 1 :Tl6; II Cor.
2:14-16. The implication of these verses is that if man turns
to God in response of faith upon hearing of the Gospel he
receives his genuine life as a gift from God. This makes it
obvious that Paul equally emphasizes the idea of man as a
self-choosing agent in his historical existence, cf. II Cor.
5:20. It is in this sense that Paul's understanding of exis¬
tence, 'personal history' becomes more marked. There is thus
reason for thinking that for Paul both views (one's historic
existence and the cosmic perspective), are to be equally em¬
phasized because both views are sufficiently incisive to solve
the final issues of man. This means that even though it can¬
not be claimed that Paul himself had an explicit philosophy
of history yet Christian theology must bring out his statements'
latent reference to man's existence. This is the burden of
Bultmann's theology. However, Bultmann showed that "the
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Pauline view of history is the expression of his view of
man: " And as we have seen, for him, the core of his¬
tory is man. This shows that Bultmann emphasized the aspect
of 'personal history' to the neglect of the cosmic perspec¬
tive in Paul. Our conclusion is that the two-fold strand of
thought, i.e. 'personal history' and the cosmic perspective
implied in Pauline anthropology must be rearticulated with
equal emphasis.
In this chapter we focused our attention on three aspects of
the anthropology of renascent Hinduism, (i) A new understand¬
ing of God. The most important thinkers of modern India no
longer tend to take refuge in the appeal to Pantheism but
rather stress the idea of God as revealed in the concrete
stuff of human living. This is the point at which their
existentialist thought and Bultmann's Christian existential¬
ism most readily meet. We showed that however much they stress
the importance of the transforming power of God it is beyond
dispute that they have not given an adequate consideration to
the being of God. This is also true of Bultmann's position.
Bultmann has little sympathy for those who make objective
statements about God, i.e. talk of God as he is in himself.
It is however possible to argue that language about God is
not lacking in Pauline anthropology. (ii) In modern Hindu
theologians' understanding of the God-man relationship there
are two things to be noted. \. They overplay the man-ward
aspect of religious experience. We reached the conclusion
1. History and Eschatology, p. 41.
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that such a totally anthropological approach to the theme
of religious experience necessarily carries with it silence
on the question of the divine operation. We also noted that
this position is not dissimilar to Bultmann's theology although
Bultmann leaves open the question of divine operation. There
is however another essential and a marked difference between
recent Hindu theologians' understanding of the individual's
salvation and that of Bultmann, namely for the former it is
a matter of a spiritual realization achieved through self-
directed and devoted efforts, but for the latter it is a gift
from God.
As opposed to their silence on the idea of the divine opera¬
tion we maintain that in Christian theology be it Western or
Indian which supposedly explicates the actual relation between
God and man it is important to point out that one must take
account of the divine operation in religious experience with¬
out which it is not possible for man to live in complete obe¬
dience to the supreme being. Paul conceives of this divine
operation as nothing less than the Spirit of God, the histori¬
cal power in the community. ^.. The elite of modern India
rightly stress the importance of society in relation to the
individual. The Christian apologist in India fully agrees
with them on this although he would point to the fact that
their idea of society stops short of the corporate fellowship
of the church, the "corporate Samadhi", to use their termino¬
logy- (Hi) In their philosophy of history the outstanding
thinkers of renascent Hinduism emphasize the dimension of
the human freedom. It is remarkable that they rightly
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stress the datum of human freedom over against the cyclic
view of time. It will nonetheless be pointed out that they
stress the importance of 'personal history' to the neglect
of the cosmic perspective. It is precisely here that their
view of history and that of Bultmann converge. As our reac¬
tion against this position we explained that a more judicious
examination of Pauline thought brings more clearly into view
the fact that 'personal history' and the cosmic perspective
are not mutually exclusive strands of his anthropology.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the course of this investigation remarkable similarities
between Bultmann's thought and that of recent Indian thinkers
with respect to man's understanding of himself in the world
came into focus.
1. It is highly significant that both schools of thought em¬
phasize the indispensability of decision for historical exi¬
stence. Still more significant is entirely new interpreta¬
tion which modern Hindu theologians give to the doctrine of
karma. The fatalistic concept of karma is no longer held by
them. How do we account for this new interpretation of karma
which is opposed to the roots of the traditional concept
which lie deep in the Indian mind? It has frequently been
contended and is perhaps generally acknowledged that on acco¬
unt of their recognition of the positive value of the Western
Christian thought and culture, particularly the Christian con¬
cept of human personality the outstanding thinkers of modern
India did not rest content with the deterministic concept of
karma and were determined to insist on stressing human free¬
dom at all costs.
2. Both systems of thought reject the building of rational
systems as the way to truth. Both disclose a sense of risk
and commitment which is basic to man's coming to an under¬
standing of himself in relation to transcendental being. It
will be profitable to pause here and point out a striking
difference between the existentialist theology of Bultmann
and modern Hindu scheme of thinking. That is, for Bultmann,
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it is essentially faith which intimates transcendent Being
as the source of authentic selfhood. In his language this
links up more closely with his Kerygmatic theology - the ac¬
tual occurrence of the Word of God in the preaching of the
Church. For him, authentic life is given to Dasein as a gift
from God. This is not possible within modern Hindu thought
for which man's true freedom is achieved through self-disci¬
pline and self purification.
3. As stated above, one particularly crucial point which these
two systems of thought brought to light is that man is totally
and wholly responsible for himself and therefore is responsi¬
ble for his true selfhood. It may however be argued that nei¬
ther system offers a straight answer to the moral and theolo¬
gical objection that this is impossible for man, if unaided,
that is, in view of the universal impotence of the human will
to make an act of obedient self-commitment to God. Scant res¬
pect is paid to the possibility of divine operation in the
individual's act of self-surrender to the supreme being. To
make matters plainer, however much one concedes to the concept
of the inalienable right or power of free choice of the human
being the question of how he can decide for the Creator still
remains unresolved as long as the idea of divine operation is
played down.
Surely, the Pauline perspective on the God-man relationship
comes close to the heart of the matter, i.e. the usefulness
of his concept of the relation of the Creator-creature can¬
not be brought out without reference to his pointed expres¬
sion to divine operation which is nothing less than God's
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Spirit. In Paul's understanding the exalted Lord became
known in the sphere of Spirit, the power of the historical
community. (It is remarkable that the writings of Tagore,
Gandhi, Aurobindo Ghosh and Radhakrishnan strike a note para¬
llel to the Pauline understanding of the Creator-creature re¬
lationship) .
4. It is notable that both schools of thought lay a consis¬
tent emphasis on the concept of self-understanding, only dif¬
ferent terminology is used by modern Hindu theologians who
use phrases like "constant regeneration" and "renunciation"
of the self as against the classical concept of self-realiza¬
tion. Further, one of the findings of this investigation is
that the learned modern Hindus continually insist on the idea
of the self finding its true fulfilment in the collective ex¬
perience of the community and therefore it is probably correct
to say that their position largely scores over Bultmann's con¬
cept of one's authentic existence which is individualistic in
its essentials. We often find in the writings of the Indian
thinkers we studied a more remarkable expression, namely "the
liberated individual is conscious of the wider destiny of the
universe". We find the emphasis that love for God cannot be
complete except in so far as it expresses itself in love for
man. In this sense, they come close to Pauline perspective
on the positive outgoing love for all, cf. I Cor. 10:33-
We have also discovered in the course of our investigation
that Aurobindo's insistence on epistemology as against onto¬
logy strikes a point of resemblance with Western existential¬
ism of Heidegger. As there is no sign of the former having
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been in any way inspired by the latter for what they share,
it must be said that they reached the same conclusion quite
independently.
5. Another remarkable parallel between Bultmann's thought and
recent Indian thinking concerns their historiological presu¬
ppositions, viz. they emphasize the idea of 'personal history'
as against the linear view of history. In the final chapter
of this thesis we have however made it particularly plain that
modern Hindu theologians have not made in their historiology
so tbocoughrgoing an advance as Bultmann did. This indicates
that their view of history as implying 'personal history' is
in the making. As a reaction against this view of 'personal
history' found in both the systems we have registered our
opinion that it is part of Paul's understanding of the 'world
history' to emphasize equally two view of history - 'personal
history and the cosmic perspective.
6. In the final analysis, one is obviously struck by the re¬
markable parallel between Bultmann's existentialist theology
and modern Hindu theology, namely their understanding of
transcendence took a fresh distinction in that they explained
the ultimate reality as a principle of concretion. Nonethe¬
less, one cannot escape the feeling that these systems of
thought lay an unwarranted emphasis on the limitation of lan¬
guage about God, viz. a rational explanation of the ontologi-
cal status of the ultimate being. Por them an affirmation
about the being of God in his reality for us is possible only
in the light of human existence. Statements about God can be
made 'only in existential involvement' in Bultmann's language.
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This means that the idea of God in his own, inner, proper
reality is an abstraction which Bultmann strongly opposes.
As opposed to mythological language about God Bultmann con¬
ceives the being and action of God on the analogy of human
action. He continually insists that the object of faith can¬
not be restricted to concepts or rationality. This attempt
has been called into question for he could not establish a
satisfactory relationship between theology and philosophy.
His and modern Hindu thinkers' strict adherence to an anthro¬
pological approach to the philosophy of religion necessarily
implies silence on the question of God. For that very reason,
Bultmann's theology needs for its completion this balance
(the relationship between the conceptual clarification of
theological speech, viz. ontology and phenomology) for theo¬
logy properly speaking, requires that faith and reason, man's
spiritual and intellectual capacities must be kept in mind.
Theology, be it systematic or existentialist must keep these
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